

THE
KĀLASAMUDDĒŚA
OF

BHARTRHARI'S VĀKYAPADĪYA
(together with Helārāja's commentary translated from the
Sanskrit for the first time)

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DELHI LADANASTHAN, BATHINDA

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ABBREVIATIONS

Benares ed.	The Vākyapadīya, Vol II. (See Introduction, p. —5, C. Editions: 1)
M. Bh.	The Mahābhāṣya
Mbh.	The Mahābhārata ¹
Poona ed. 1963	The Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa III, Vol. I (See Introduction p. —5, C. Editions: 3)
Triv. ed. (1935)	The Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa III, Part I. (See ibid. 2)
Triv. ed. 1942	The Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa III, Part II. (See ibid. 2)
VP	The Vākyapadīya consisting of the three Kāṇḍas (See Introduction, p. 1)
VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtra

1. For all references to the Mahābhārata, see the critical edition of the Mahābhārata published by BORI Poona, in different volumes from 1933 to 1959.

PREFACE

My present translation of the *Kālasamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* has been based on the Trivandrum edition. In the text of this edition there are some gaps as well as wrong readings. To fill in these gaps and to restore the correct readings, I have taken the help of the Benares edition. Besides, there are certain printing and editing mistakes which have been corrected by us (see pp. 143-145).

I have closely followed the commentary of Helārāja, while I have translated the *kārikās* of Bhartṛhari. For translating *kārikās* 89 and 90 as well as the commentary on them, I have made use of the *Mādhaviyadhātuvṛtti*, wherein these two *kārikās* have been quoted and commented upon. For the commentary of Helārāja on these two *kārikās* was not so clear to me.

I convey my thanks, which are due, to Prof. Dr. Paul Thieme, Director of the Institute of Indology and Comparative Study of Religions, University of Tübingen, for the valuable suggestions he made with regard to my thesis during my stay at Tübingen in March 1968.

Lastly, I must express my feeling of indebtedness to Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Rau, my Doctor-father, who made available to me all necessary material for my thesis and guided me in the real sense of the word with great patience and friendliness.

INTRODUCTION

The *Vākyapadīya* is a treatise on philosophical aspects of Grammar. It is divided into three “*Kāṇḍas*” (parts) and therefore known as “*Trikāṇḍī*”. The first of the three *Kāṇḍas* is called *Brahmakāṇḍa* or *Āgamakāṇḍa* or *Āgamasamuccaya*, the second *Vākyakāṇḍa*; the third *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* or *Prakīrṇakakāṇḍa* or *Padakāṇḍa*. The *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*, as available now, contains fourteen *Samuddeśas* (chapters)¹, of which the *Kālasamuddeśa* is the ninth. My present translation of the *Kālasamuddeśa* consists both of *Bhartṛhari*’s verses (*kārikās*) and Helārāja’s commentary on them.

Though the three *Kāṇḍas* together are called “*Vākyapadīya*” now, it is clear from I-tsing’s report as well as from internal evidence that, in early times, the first two *kāṇḍas* (i.e. the *Brahmakāṇḍa* and the *Vākyakāṇḍa*) together alone were referred to as “*Vākyapadīya*”.

According to I-tsing, the *Vākyapadīya* contained 700 *kārikās*, and the first two *Kāṇḍas* together now contain nearly 670 or roughly speaking, 700 *kārikās*². Again, Vardhamāna, the author of “*Gaṇaratnamahodadhī*”, who lived in the middle of the 12th century, stated in his introductory note that Bhartṛhari was the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and the *Prakīrṇaka* (-*kāṇḍa*) and the commentator of three *pādas* of the *Mahābhāṣya*³. Helārāja names his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa* “*Prakīrṇakaparakāśa*” and calls but the first two *Kāṇḍas* “*Vākyapadīya*”⁴.

1. The names of the fourteen *Samuddeśas* are as follows :

1. *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, 2. *Dravyasamuddeśa*, 3. *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, 4. *Bhūyo dravyasamuddeśa*, 5. *Guṇasamuddeśa*, 6. *Diksamuddeśa*, 7. *Sādhanaśamuddeśa*, 8. *Kriyāśamuddeśa*, 9. *Kālasamuddeśa*, 10. *Puruṣasamuddeśa*, 11. *Samkhyāśamuddeśa*, 12. *Uṣagrahasamuddeśa*, 13. *Liṅgasamuddeśa*, 14. *Vṛttisamuddeśa*.

2. F. Kielhorn ‘*On the Grammarian Bhartṛhari*’ (F. Kielhorn, Kleine Schriften, herausgegeben von Wilhelm Rau, Teil I. Wiesbaden 1969, p. 185, line 27ff. left column; and p. 186, line 7. right column).

3. “*Bhartṛharir vākyapadīyaprakīrṇakayoḥ kartā mahābhāṣyatripāḍyā vyākhyātā ca* |”

(*Gaṇaratnamahodadhī*, ed. by Julius Eggeling, reprinted in Delhi 1963, p. 2, line 9ff.).

4. Helārāja mentions “*Vakyapadīya*”, meaning the first two *Kāṇḍas*

The author of the Vākyapadīya; name and date :—The author of the *Vākyapadīya* (including the *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*) is called Bhartrhari or Hari in a short form, as well as Harivṛṣabha.⁵ His date is fairly certain : he must have lived c. 450-500 A.D.⁶

Bhartrhari's other works :—Bhartrhari himself composed a commentary on the first two *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya*, which is called “*Vṛtti*”. This “*Vṛtti*” on the first *Kāṇḍa* is complete, but that on the second *Kāṇḍa* is full of gaps and errors.⁷ Another work of Bhartrhari is a commentary on the first three *pādas* of the *Mahābhāṣya*, called *Tripādī* or *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* or *Mahābhāṣyatīkā*. But unfortunately only a portion of this, extending upto the 55th sūtra (i.e. “*anekāl śit sarvasya*”) of the first *pāda*, is available now.⁸

Commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya*.

A. *Brahmakāṇḍa*

1. Bhartrhari : *Vṛtti*
2. [Hari]-vṛṣabhadeva : *Paddhati*
3. [Helārāja : *Śabdaprabhā*⁹]
4. [Puṇyarāja : *Prakāśa*]
5. Dravyeśa Jhā : *Pratyekārthaprakāśikā*
6. Nārāyaṇadattaśarman Tripāṭhin : *Prakāśa*
7. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla : *Bhāvapradīpa*
8. Raghunātha Śarmar : *Ambakartrī*.

only, in the following places of his commentary “*Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*” :

Poona ed. 1963 : p. 1, line 11, 54.8; 119.5; 146.5; 300.1.

Trivandrum ed. 1935: 54.15; 72.17; 73.1; 76.21; 93.20.

5. The colophon at the end of the first *Kāṇḍa*, ed. by Charudeva Shastrī, Lahore 1934, and by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966, reads : “*iti śrīharivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇaviracite vākyapadīye āgamasamuccayo nāma brahmakāṇḍam samāptam ||*”

6. The article by Hajime Nakamura entitled ‘*Tibetan citations of Bhartrhari's verses and the problem of his date.*’, From : *Studies in Indology and Buddhology*. Presented in honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday. Hozokan, Kyoto, 1955, 122-136.

7. For details concerning the “*Vṛtti*”, see :

‘*The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Vṛtti, Chapter I.*’ English Translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1965, Introduction, pp. xi—xxxvii.

‘*Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*’ *Kāṇḍa I.* ed. by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1966, Introduction, p. viii, line 13ff.

8. ‘*Mahābhāṣya Tīkā by Bhartrhari*’ Vol. I, ed. by V. Swaminathan, Banaras Hindu University 1965 (upto 1.1.10).

The same work has been edited by K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye and published by the BORI under Post Graduate and Research Department Series No. 8, Poona 1970.

Editions :

1. *Bhagavadbhartr̥hariviracitaṃ vākyapadīyam. tatra hary-yupajñavṛttisanātham vṛṣabhadevaṭīkāsaṃkṣepasam̐yutam̐ prathamam̐ kāṇḍam. pariṣkartā cārudevaḥ śāstrī pāṇinīyaḥ. Lavapura [=Lahore], vikramasamvat-sarāḥ 1991 (=1934 A.D.), 8^o, pp. 8, 138, 10. Bhartr̥hari. Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa. Avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha. Texte reproduit de l'édition de Lahore. Traduction, introduction et notes par Madeleine Biardeau. Paris 1964, 8^o, pp. 4, 194. = Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Série in-8^o, fascicule 24.
Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. Critically edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. Poona 1966, 8^o, pp. 28, 268. = Deccan College Monograph Series 32.*
2. See under A.1., above.
4. *Vākyapadīya. A treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar by Bhartr̥hari, with a Commentary by Puṇyarāja. Edited by Paṇḍit Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Mānavallī. Benares, 8^o, pp. 2, 292. = Benares Sanskrit Series, Work no. 6 : nos. 11 (1884), 19 (1886), 24 (1887). (Containing the first and the second kāṇḍa. The commentary on the former is wrongly attributed to Puṇyarāja : it is but an abridged version of Bhartr̥hari's own vṛtti¹⁰).*
5. *Śrībhartr̥hariviracitavākyapadīyabrahmakāṇḍaḥ | so [']yam...śrīdravyeśajhāpraṇītapratyekārthaparakāśīkāsamākhyayā vyākhyayopetaḥ 'śrīvṛndāvane paṇ^o rāmanivāsaśarmadvārā śrī 'brajendra' mudraṇālaye sammudrya prakāśyam̐ nītaḥ' sam^o 1983 (=1926/7 A.D.), 8^o, pp. 6, 64.*
6. *The Vakyapadiya—Brahmakandam of Bhartri—Hari. With The Prakash Commentary of Pt. Narain Datt Tripathi.... Edited by Pt. Avadh Bihari Mishra. Benares 1937, small-8^o, pp. 9, 3, 2, 132.*

9. Lost, but mentioned by Helārājā, Poona ed. 1963, p. 45,3; 54,9; 117, 1.4; 110,5. Trivandrum ed. 1935, p. 73,1.

10. See Gārudeva Śāstrī, A.1. above, Sanskrit Upodghāta, pp. 18 ff.

7. *The Vākyapadīya. A treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartrī Hari (sic). (Brahma Kāṇḍa).* Edited with the *Bhāvaṇḍīya* commentary and notes by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śūkla [sic]. Benares 1937, 8^o, pp. 122. = Kashi Sanskrit Series 124.

The Vākyapadīya . A treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartrhari. (Brahma Kāṇḍa). With the *Bhāvaṇḍīya* Sanskrit commentary and notes by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śūkla. Edited with Hindī commentary etc., by Rāmagovinda Śūkla. Varanasi 1961, 8^o, pp. 24, 135. = Kashi Sanskrit Series 124.

8. *Vākyapadīya with the commentary Ambakartrī by Raghunātha Sharma. Part I (Brahma-Kāṇḍa).* Varanasi 1963, 8^o, pp. 10, 12, 4, 272. = Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā 91.

B. *Vākyakāṇḍa*

1. Bhartrhari : *Vṛtti*
2. Puṇyarāja¹¹ : *ṭīkā*
3. [Helārāja : *Śabdaprabhā (?)*¹²]

Editions :

1. *Vākyapadīyam. bhartrharyupajñāvṛttisanātham puṇya - rājaṭīkāsaṃyutam dvitīyaṃ kāṇḍam (dvitīyabhāge prathamakhaṇḍaḥ). śrīmatyā rāmalālakapūranāyāsasamityā prakāśitam. pariṣkarttā cārudevaḥ śāstrī pāṇinīyaḥ. [Lahore], vikramābdaḥ 1996 [=1940 A. D.] (8^o, pp. 96 — (Contains 2, 1-184).*
2. See under A.4. and B.1., above.

C. *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa*

1. Helārāja : *Prakīrṇa[ka]prakāśa*
2. (Puṇyarāja : *ṭīkā*¹³)

¹¹. In manuscripts as well as in printed books we occasionally find the spelling Puñjarāja instead of Puṇyarāja..

¹². In one of his introductory stanzas to the *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*, Helārāja states that he wrote a commentary on each of the first two *kāṇḍas* :

*kāṇḍadvaye yathāvṛtti siddhāntārthasatattvataḥ |
prabandho vihito 'smābhir āgamārthānusāribhiḥ ||2||*

(Poona ed. 1963, p. 1, 7-8). Both of them are lost. See also footnote 9, above.

¹³. The copyists of Helārāja's commentary write at 3, 7, 34: *ito grāntha-*

Editions :

1. (Continuation of A. 4. above) —

Vākyapadīya. A treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar by Bhartṛhari, with a Commentary by Helārāja. Edited by Paṇḍit Rāmachandra Śāstrī Koṭibhāskara and Gosvāmī Dāmodara Śāstrī. Benares, 8°, vol. II, pp. 744. = Benares Sanskrit Series, Work no. 6 : nos. 95 (1905), 102 (1905), 130 (1907), 160 (1928), 161 (1930), 162 (1933), 163 (1937), 164 (1937).

2. *The Vākyapadīya (3rd Kāṇḍa) with The commentary Prakīrṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja son of Bhūtirāja. Part I.* Edited by K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, Trivandrum 1935, 8°, pp. 6, 6, 6, 152, 10. = Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. No. CXVI. Śrī Citrodayamañjarī. No. V. (Contains 3, 7, 156—13, 31). — Part II. Edited by L. A. Ravi Varmā. Trivandrum 1942, 8°, pp. 10, 272, 14. = University of Travancore Sanskrit Series No. CXLVIII. (Contains 3, 14, 1-624).3. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa III, Part I.* Edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. Poona 1963, 8°, pp. 20, 408. = Deccan College Monograph Series 21 (Contains 3, 1, 1—7, 167).

Besides, Helārāja frequently refers to the opinion of others without giving their names (using the words *kecit*, *anye*, *pūrve* etc.), which shows the existence of many exegetic works on the third *Kāṇḍa* at his time.¹⁴

Helārāja, a commentator of the Vākyapadīya :—It has been stated already that Helārāja composed commentaries on all three *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya*, but his *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* on the third *Kāṇḍa* alone is extant now and at the same time the only gloss on this portion of Bhartṛhari's work we possess. In it, Helārāja mentions three other compositions of his own, none of which has come down to us either, viz. *Advayasiddhi*¹⁵, *Kriyā-*

pāṭasamdhānāya phullarājakṛtir likhyate (Poona ed. 1963, p. 261, 8) and again at 3, 7, 65 : *ihāpi patitagrantho helārājakṛtiḥ phukkarājakṛtyā sandhīyate* (Poona ed. 1963, p. 280, 27). Probably Puṇyarāja is meant in both cases.

14. Poona ed. 1963: p. 60, line 13; 103.9, 14; 221.13; 256.20; 260.12; 279.20; 310.7; 368.10.

15. Poona ed. 1963 : p. 117, line 4; 119.6.
Triv. ed. 1935 : p. 117, 27.

*viveka*¹⁶ and *Vārtikonmeṣa*.¹⁷

Helārāja cites widely from other sources. All identified sources of citations have been listed in Appendix II of the Poona edition 1963, and at the end of the Triv. edition 1935-1942. So far as the *Kālasamuddeśa* is concerned, I have noted all traceable quotations in my translation. Helārāja also gives variant readings of Bhartṛhari's *kārikās*.¹⁸

He mentions the word '*grantha*' meaning the *Vākyapadīya* and the word '*granthakāra*' or '*granthakṛt*' meaning Bhartṛhari.¹⁹

Helārāja's date :—Helārāja cannot be a direct disciple of Bhartṛhari, as suggested by K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī²⁰, for he quotes a verse from the *Tantravārttika* of Kumārilabhaṭṭa who lived in the 7th century.²¹ Moreover, the mention of variant readings (footnote 18) and the references to previous commentators (footnote 14), suggest that there must have been at least a few centuries between Bhartṛhari and Helārāja.

The first direct references to Helārāja have been found in the *Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti* and in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.²² Mādhavācārya, the author of these two works, lived in the first quarter of the 14th century.

Helārāja, at the close of his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*, gives the following information about himself :

'Helārāja, the son of Bhūtirāja, born in the family of Lakṣaṇa who was a generous minister at the court of a wealthy and a famous Kāśmīrian king popular with the name of Mukṭāpīḍa, composed this (commentary called) *Prakāśa*'.

(*muktāpīḍa iti prasiddhim agamat kāśmīradeśe nṛpaḥ
śrīmān khyātayaśā babhūva nṛpates tasya prabhāvānugaḥ* |

16. Poona ed. 1963 : p. 60, line 10. Triv. ed. 1935: 20.22; 39.18,22.

17. Triv. ed. 1935 : p. 149. line 23; 150.19; 152.19. Triv. ed. 1942: 93.23.

18. Poona ed. 1963: p. 35. line 10; 60.15; 66.2; 156. 12., Triv. ed. 1942 : p. 43.4; 148.1.

19. Poona ed. 1963 : p. 43, line 10; 70.18; 144.8; 273.6. Triv. ed. 1942 : 172.12; 271.25.

20. Triv. ed. 1935: English Introduction, p. 4. line 4ff.

21. Poona ed. 1963 : p. 60. line 5-6 :

'*Bhūtabhāvvyupayogaṃ hi dravyaṃ saṃskāryaṃ iṣyate |
saktavo nopayokṣyante nopayuktāś ca te kva cit ||*'

(*Tantravārttika* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.4, p. 411, Ānandāśrama ed.)

22. *Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti*, Benares 1934 : p. 2. line 15.

Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Poona 1924: p. 299. line 1-2.

*mantri lakṣaṇa ity udāracaritas tasyānvavāye bhavo
helārāja imam prakāśam akaroc chrībhūtirājātmajaḥ ||)*

We know from Kalhaṇa's *Rājataranginī* that in Kāśmīr, there lived a king called Lalitāditya Mukṭāpīḍa at about 650-736 A.D., who was very famous and became a universal monarch.²³ The same source gives the name of his chief minister as Caṅkuṇa²⁴. But at another place, in the *Rājataranginī*, it is mentioned that Mukṭāpīḍa had many ministers²⁵. Lakṣaṇa may, therefore, have been one of them. As there was in the history of Kāśmīr no other king with the name of Mukṭāpīḍa, it may be accepted that Helārāja refers to Lalitāditya Mukṭāpīḍa.

Again, Kalhaṇa, who lived in the first half of the 12th century²⁶, refers to a Pāśupata Brahman Helārāja who formerly composed a "List of Kings" (*pārthivāvali*) in twelve thousand verses (*śloka*s)²⁷. In the foot-note, M. A. Stein, the translator of the *Rājataranginī*, gives the following remarks by Prof. Bühler "A Helārāja, who was a Kāśmīrian and lived probably in the 9th or 10th century, has written a commentary on the *Vākya-padīya*, of which fragments are still extant"²⁸.

Mr. M. Ramakrishna Kavi also expresses the same opinion. He writes : 'The third *kāṇḍa* also comprises *kārikā* and a commentary, the latter is very elaborate and thoroughly discursive and is attributed to Helārāja, son of Bhūtirāja, probably of A.D. 980, and a native of Kāśmīr'²⁹. Like Prof. Bühler, Charudeva Shastrī too identifies both the Helārājas.³⁰ Further, Charudeva Shastrī opines that Bhaṭṭendurāja, the

23. 'Kalhaṇa's *Rājataranginī*', translated by M.A. Stein, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1961: Vol. I, IV. 126, p. 130.

24. *ibid.* IV. 215, p. 144.

25. *ibid.* IV. 207, p. 143.

26. *ibid.* Introduction. p. 15, line 5ff.

27. *ibid.* I. 17-18, p. 4.

28. *ibid.* footnote, p. 4, line 9 (left column).

29. 'The Discovery of The Author's *Vṛtti* on The *Vākya-padīya*' by M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Published in the Journal of The Andhra Historical Research Society, Rajahmundry 1930 : Vol. IV. Parts 3 & 4. p. 236, line 2ff.

30. 'Bhartrhari : A Critical Study With Special References To The *Vākya-padīya* And Its Commentaries' by Charudeva Shastrī, published in Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, November 19, 20, 21 and 22, 1928. Vol. I, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1930 : p. 653, 1ff.

teacher of Abhinavagupta (950—1020 A.D.), and Helārāja are real brothers. He writes in his article :

‘We know from Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* (Bühler’s K. Report CXVIII), that his guru (teacher) was Bhaṭṭendurāja whose father was Bhūtirāja. Now if this Bhūtirāja be identical with the father of Helārāja, which seems probable, Helārāja and Bhaṭṭendurāja are real brothers. Helārāja may therefore belong to the early half of the 10th century.’³¹

But Prof. K. C. Pandey differs with Charudeva Shastrī, so far as the relation between Helārāja and Bhaṭṭendurāja is concerned, and says that there were two Bhūtirājas, one the father of Helārāja and the other the father of Bhaṭṭendurājā,, but that both of them lived at the same time. He further mentions that Abhinavagupta had many teachers, that he learned from Bhūtirāja (the father of Helārāja) the ‘*Brahmavidyā*’ and from Bhūtirājanāyaka (i. e. Helārāja) the ‘*Dualistic-cum-monistic-Śaivism*’. He writes in his voluminous Work “*Abhinavagupta, An Historical And Philosophical Study*” as follows : “It appears that Abhinavagupta sat at the feet of not only Bhūtirāja but at those of his son also, to whom he distinctly refers as one of his teachers. He is recognised to be as important in the line of Śrīnātha as is the sun among the heavenly bodies. In his commentary on Bharṭṛhari’s *Vākyapadīyam*, Helārāja regularly refers to himself in the colophon to each section as the son of Bhūtirāja : “*Bhūtirājanāyaka-Helārājakṛte...*”. If we accept Bhūtirājanāyaka, the teacher of Abhinavagupta, to be identical with the commentator on the *Vākyapadīyam*, for the reason that Abhinava shows so deep knowledge of the *Vākyapadīyam*, we can definitely say that he lived in the 10th century A.D. in Kashmir”³².

Further he writes at another place of his work as follows: “It may be pointed out here that Bhaṭṭendurāja, though he does not refer to himself as “*Bhūtirājanāyaka*”, was the son of Bhūtirājā, as is clear from the genealogy of Indurāja, given

31. *ibid* p. 652, 10ff.

32. “*Abhinavagupta, An Historical And Philosophical Study*” by K. C. Pandey, published as Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. I. Varanasi 1963: p. 166, line 22ff. 16.1 ff.

in the concluding lines of Abhinava's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, as follows :"

- "1. Kātyāyana (a distant ancestor ?)
2. Sauśuka
3. Bhūtirāja
4. Bhaṭṭendurāja"

"But Helārāja regularly refers to himself, in the colophon to each section of his commentary on Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīyam*, as "Bhūtirājatanaya". The two, therefore, have to be distinguished from each other: one was a philosopher and the other was a literary critic. One is referred to in the T. A. (= *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta), Ah. (= *Āhnika*) XXXVII, Ś. 60 as a descendant of Śrinatha, the earliest propounder of the monistic-cum-dualistic Śaivāgamas; and the other as that of Kātyāyana as pointed out above."³³

Hence, according to Prof. K.C. Pandey, too, Helārāja is a contemporary of Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭendurāja. In support of this view, I have found some indirect references to Helārāja, in the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, a commentary written by Kaiyaṭa on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. They are given below :

Mahābhāṣyapradīpa :

"*anye tv āhuḥ | mīyate anayeti mātrā samkhyocyate | samāhāradvandve napuṃsakatvāc ca hrasvatom kṛtam | tenābhihitāyām api samkhyāyām prathamā bhavati*||"

(Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* with Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa's *Uddyota*, ed. by Paṇḍit S. D. Kudāla and Raghunāthaśāstri, Bombay 1935 : Vol. II. p. 515, line 24ff. (right column), on P. 2.3.46.

"*anye tv āhuḥ :— anirdhārita-viśeṣadharmanibandhanā kutsā*

Prakīrṇaparakāśa :

"*mīyate) nayeti mātrā samkhyā | tasyāḥ samāhāradvandvena nirdeśaḥ | tatra samkhyāyām abhihitāyām ekādibhyo yathā syād iti mātragrahaṇasya prayojanam vacanagrahaṇenaiva śuddham iti* |"
(Poona ed. 1963 : p. 366, line 24; and p. 367, 1-2.

"*tathā cānirdhāritadharma-viśeṣanibandhanakutsā kutsita-*

33. *ibid.* p 214. 11ff.

*kutsitaśabdapravṛttinimittam,
brahmahatyādiviśeṣanibandhanā
kutsā tu pratyayanibandhanam /*”
(Patañjali’s *Vyākaraṇa Mahā-
bhāṣya* with Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa*
and Nāgeśa’s *Uddyota*, ed. by
Pt. Bhārgavaśāstrī Joshi,
Bombay 1942 : Vol. IV, p. 397,
line 25ff. (right column), on
P. 5.3.74.

“*anye tu :—sarvasaṃkhyāviśe-
ṣāṇām avibhāgo bhedaikatva-
saṃkhyety āhuḥ /*”
(ibid. Bombay 1945 : Vol.
V, p. 213, line 6ff. (right
column), on P. 6.3.1.

These passages suggest that Kaiyaṭa has indirectly re-ferred to Helārāja.

On the contrary, Mr. L. A. Ravi Varma, the editor of Triv. ed. 1942, citing some parallel and most identical passages from Kaiyaṭa’s *Pradīpa* and Helārāja’s *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* in his introduction, expressed the opinion that Helārāja was either a contemporary, or subsequent to Kaiyaṭa. The citation, upon which his view is based, is given below :

Mahābhāṣyapradīpa

“*kiṃ ca jñāpakāt saptamyanumāne
adhikarāṇasaptamyantād vater
anutpattiḥ syāt / evaṃ tarhi
tantreṇa sūtradvayam uccāritam
iti bhāṣyakārābhiprāyaḥ /
tatraikena sūtreṇa svalakṣaṇa-
vihitaśaṣṭhīsaptamyantād vater
vidhīyate / dvitīyena tu iva-
śabdayoge tasyety asyārthe
tatreti saptamī vidhīyate /*”
‘iti ‘tatra tasyeva’ iti sūtre
kaiyaṭaḥ ||’

*śabdapravṛttinimittam,
brahmahatyādiviśeṣanibandhanā
tu kapratyayahetur iti viśeṣaḥ /*”
(Triv. ed. 1942: p. 3, line
21-22).

“*sarvasaṃkhyāviśeṣāṇām
avibhāgenāvasthānād
abhedaikatvasaṃkhyāpi tathā-
bhūtaiva boddhavyā /*”
(ibid. p. 53, line 26-27).

Prakīrṇaparakāśa

“*nanu ca yadi śeṣaviśaye
saptamīyam ata eva jñāpakād
ity ucyate tadādhikarāṇa-
saptamyantād vater na syāt /
.. ..
satyam etat / tatrety etat
punar āvartate, tantreṇa
vā nirdeśa ity adhikarāṇa-
saptamyantād vater ekena
kriyate, apareṇa śeṣaviśaye
saptamī jñāpyata iti bhāṣya-
kārābhiprāyam upādhyāyā
varṇayanti ||*”

(Triv. ed. 1942 : Introduction, p. 5, line 17ff. (left column)).

'*lṛtīyakāṇḍe* 550 *śloka-vyākhyāyām helārājaḥ* (page 240)'

(See 'Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* with Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa's *Uddyota*', ed. by Pt. Bhārgavaśāstrī Joshi, Bombay 1942 : Vol. IV, p. 291, line 39ff. (left column) and 1ff. (right column), on P. 5.1.116.

(Triv. ed. 1942 : Introduction, p. 5, line 15ff. (right column))

(For this reference, see *ibid.* p. 240, line 8ff.)

If we compare these two statements, it appears as if Helārāja, mentioning the word '*upādhyāyāḥ*' (underlined), had directly referred to Kaiyaṭa, since the latter regularly calls himself *upādhyāya* in the colophon to each *āhnika* of his *Pradīpa* (*ity upādhyāyajaiyaṭaputrakaiyaṭakṛtamahābhāṣyapradīpe...*). But it is not so. Because, Helārāja has used here the plural number (*upādhyāyāḥ*). Generally, when an author refers to another author in his work, with his name or a title, he uses only the singular number. Moreover, the word *upādhyāya* means a teacher or a great scholar, being a synonym to *guru* (a teacher or a great scholar). Helārāja, at two places of his commentary, cites the following two verses, referring to *guravaḥ* (teachers, or great scholars):

“*tathā ca* :—

tām prātipadikārtham ca dhātvartham ca pracakṣate |
iti sattaiva bhāvaśabdavācyaḥ guravaḥ kriyete manyante ||”

(Triv. ed. 1935 : p. 31, line 12ff.).

“*tathā coktam gurubhiḥ* :—

dver vinaḥ parimāṇākhyād daśadarthāt tad ity ataḥ |
śatij asyeti saṃghāte dāśate tu nipātanāt ||”

(Triv. ed. 1935 : p. 112, line 12ff.).

Of these two citations, the former is from the *Vākyapadīya* 3.1.34. Helārāja, therefore, by mentioning the word *guravaḥ* (underlined), refers to Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*. The latter citation is not traceable to the *Vākyapadīya*. It is, therefore, inferred that here, Helārāja, by mentioning the

word *gurubhiḥ* (underlined), refers either to his own *guru* (teacher), or a famous grammarian whom he highly respects. In the same way, Helārāja, by mentioning the word *upādhyāyāḥ*, may have referred to his own teacher, or Bhartṛhari himself. Because, if we try to understand the underlying meaning of the verse (*kārikā*), commentating on which, Helārāja refers to *upādhyāyāḥ*, it will be clear that it is a reference to Bhartṛhari's view only.

Thus, on the basis of indirect references made by Kaiyaṭa to Helārāja, as shown by me, it can be concluded that Helārāja lived before Kaiyaṭa (1050-1100 A.D.)³⁴; probably as supposed by Prof. Bühler, Prof. Charudeva Shastrī and Prof. K. C. Pandey, in the second half of the 10th century.

The subject-matter of the *Kālasamuddeśa* may suitably divided into two parts : one (*Kārikās* 1-79) dealing mainly with philosophical and the other (*kārikās* 80-114) with grammatical aspects of time.

In the first, Bhartṛhari propounds, together with his own, other traditional doctrines current in his day. Thus, the popular view (Atharvaveda, Mahābhārata, Purāṇas, Āgamas) is put forth in *kārikās* 3-5, 12-15, 41, 43, 45, 62, 68, 72; the teaching of astronomy in 76; the doctrine of Sāṃkhya-Yoga in 49-57, 59-61; of Buddhist philosophers in 57 (*Sautrāntika*), 49-56 and 59-61 (*Vaibhāṣika*), 85-88 (*Mādhyamika*); of Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya in 1-3, 6-8, 11, 13, 18-23, 31-37, 45, 47-48, 68-69, 75. The tradition of the Pāṇinīyas appears in 29, 37-38, 63-67, 70-71, 77 and 79. It is, of course, supported by the author, who, supplementing it, states his own views in 3-5, 9-17, 24-32, 37-46, 49, 58, 62-75, 77-79. They frequently coincide with the tenets of others and may have been influenced especially by Śaiva or Vaiṣṇava sectarian teaching, because both of them regard time as either identical with, or as a power of, Śiva or Viṣṇu.

34. Puruṣottamadeva refers to Kaiyaṭa in his work "*Bhāṣāvṛtti*, commenting on Pāṇini's rule 8.3.5, as follows :

"*atra ca saṃskaroṭeḥ kaiyaṭaśrutapālayor matubhedāt ṣoḍaśa rūpāṇi granthavistarabhayān na darśitāni* |"

Puruṣottamadeva composed his work at about 1150 A.D. (For Kaiyaṭa's date see "*The Bhāṣa-Vṛtti by Puruṣottamadeva*", ed. by S. C. Chakravarti, Rajashahi 1918 : Introduction, p. 4, line 3ff. For Puruṣottamadeva's date, see *ibid.* p. 9, line 8ff.).

In the second part, Bhartṛhari continues the discussion of Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* on a number of Pāṇini's *sūtras* and Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* thereon; see p. 17 below.

For the convenience of the reader we here subjoin an analytical summary of our text, indicating for each *kārikā* the traditional teaching to which it may be assigned. After that (see p. 17 ff. below) we propose to furnish with the help of quotations a brief digest of what they, singly, teach concerning time.

Numbers refer to *kārikās*

A	Astronomer
Bh	<i>Bhartṛhari</i>
BSau	Buddhist <i>Sautrāntika</i>
BVai	Buddhist <i>Vaibhāṣika</i>
G	Grammarian
P	Popular view (<i>Atharvaveda</i> , <i>Mahābhārata</i> , <i>Purāṇas</i> , <i>Āgamas</i>)
S	<i>Sāṃkhya-Yoga</i>
V	<i>Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya</i>

1	V	Definition : Time a single, all-pervading, eternal substance;
2	V	a measure for activities;
3	P V Bh	the cause of creation, existence and destruction of beings;
4	P Bh	the operator of the world through suspension and permission;
5	P Bh	in the absence of which there would be disorder.
6-8	V	Time, a pure substance, obtains modifications through commingling with activities;
9	Bh	instigates efficient powers.
10	Bh	Production, existence and destruction depend on time.
11	V Bh	Promotion, suspension, disappearance and cessation caused by commingled activities.
12	P Bh	Time's operation universal; activity identified with time.
13	P V Bh	Growth and decay (<i>ācayāpacayau</i>) of material

objects observed through time (M. Bh. 2.2.5).

14 P Bh

Etymology of *kāla*.

15 P Bh

By suspension and permission time controls the universe; simile of the bird-catcher.

16 Bh

Eternal activity manifested through the instigation of time.

17 Bh

Effect prompted by genus and checked by a miraculous course of action.

18 V

Cause and effect identified through inherency (*samavāya*).

19 V

Manifestation of genera.

20 V

Production of qualities.

21 V

Duration of effects explained.

22 V

Duration of an effect dependent on its cause.

23 V

Existent effect promoted to function through cooperative elements.

24 Bh

Decomposition, a power of time, obstructs growth.

25 Bh

Upon the disappearance of cooperative elements destruction ensues.

26 Bh

Destruction,—just as creation—, effected by a miraculous course of action.

27 Bh

Time postulated as the linking factor connecting two different activities.

28 Bh

Time measuring the course of activity.

29 G Bh

Etymology of *hāyana* (Pāṇini 3.1.148).

30 Bh

Time, through suspension and permission acquiring sequence;

31 V Bh

differentiated through the diversity of agents;

32 V Bh

as well as through the diversity of activities.

33 V

Time divided into 'beginning', 'functioning', and 'completion' through superimposition of alien elements.

34 V

This division of time equal in small as well as in big wholes.

35 V

Alien elements causing growth, thereby effect the notions 'quick' and 'slow'.

- 36 V Sequence, actually, impossible.
- 37 V G Bh Activities, superimposed on time, divide it into past, future and present which three are again subdivided into eleven forms :
- 38 G Bh Five kinds of past, four kinds of future, two kinds of present.
- 39 Bh Beings transfer their form (which is perceived by the intellect) upon time and then vanish. This proves the existence of time.
- 40 Bh Future objects also reflected in time; simile of the mirror.
- 41 P Bh Time, just as a stream, drags things from their positions.
- 42 Bh Time effects sequence in beings; simile of the vital air.
- 43 P Bh The course of heavenly bodies as well as creation and destruction of the gross elements depend on time.
- 44 Bh Time transforms subtle elements into asterisms.
- 45 P V Bh Time divided into seasons by the phenomena of nature.
- 46 Bh Time produces an appearance of sequence in the universe.
- 47 V The notions 'quick' and 'slow' superimposed on time just like the notions 'far' and 'near' are superimposed on space.
- 48 V Activities superimpose 'past', 'present', and 'future' on time.
- 49 S BVai Bh 'Past', 'present', and 'future' are the three powers of time. They cause *darśanādarśane*.
- 50 S BVai Past and future conceal beings, present reveals them.
- 51 S BVai Future does not obstruct present but past does.
- 52-53 S BVai Past and future compared with darkness, present with light.
- 54 S BVai A being participates, simulataneously, in past, present and future.
- 55 S BVai appearing and disappearing, alternately.

- 56 S BVai Two powers of time effect manifestation and obscuration of beings.
- 57 S BSau Time defined as an intellectual accumulation of distinct instances (*kalāḥ*).
- 58 Bh Whatever its real nature, time is postulated for practical purposes.
- 59 S BVai Every being made up of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*) participates in the three powers of activity (past, present, future).
- 60 S BVai These three powers effect sequence. Yet, there is no difference between existence and non-existence.
- 61 S BVai Things become visible, invisible, alternately. The said three powers are not confounded.
- 62 Bh Time may be a power, an *ālman* (= *dravya* = substance ?), or a deity—according to different philosophers. Really, the problem is unsolvable.
- 63-64 G Bh Objection: If there is no real time-division, how can the water in the water-clock decrease and increase when a short, or long, or protracted vowel is uttered, respectively ?
- 65 G Bh Vowel gradation belongs to the manifesting sounds only;
- 66 G Bh the eternal sound (*sphoṭa*) remains without change.
- 67 G Bh After the eternal sound (*sphoṭa*) is manifested, the secondary sounds (*dhvanayaḥ*) cause the modifications of recitation (*vṛttibheda*).
- 68 P V Bh Time-division in everyday life,
- 69 V Bh which is, however, not real.
- 70-71 G Bh The flow of water in the water-clock is caused by time through suspension and permission. Continued from 63-65.
- 72 P Bh Time, through its powers, plays with beings.
- 73 Bh Time remains essentially the same with regard to the growth of different trees.
- 74 Bh Time does not vanish with the vanishing of states of beings. Simile of the road and the gait of travellers.

- 75 V Bh Heavenly bodies superimpose by their risings and settings divisions upon time.
- 76 A Definition : The motion of planets and constellations is called time.
- 77 G Bh Some activities of fixed duration serve to measure other activities.
- 78 Bh Internal activity is measured by the intellect.
- 79 G Bh Correctness of the statement '*bhūtā sattā* : "Existence existed."
- 80-90 G Discussion of *Mahābhāṣya* on 3.2.123 85-88 : The Buddhist *Mādhyamika* view of time refuted.
- 91-92 G Discussion of *Mahābhāṣya*, on 3.3.139-140;
- 93-101 G on 3.4.1;
- 102 G on 3.3.131;
- 103-105 G on 3.3.132;
- 106-113 G on 3.3.133;
- 114 G on 4.1.3.

Time according to Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya.

S. Radhakrishnan summarises the view of this philosophical school as follows :—

The form of time is essential to the concrete changes of nature, such as production, destruction and persistence of things. It is the force which brings about changes in non-eternal substances. It is not the cosmic power which causes the movements, but is the condition of all movement.⁷ All perceptible things are perceived as moving, changing, coming into existence and as passing out of it. Discrete things have no power of self-origination or self-movement. If they had, there would not be that mutual relation of things, which persists in spite of all change. The movement is ordered, which means that there must be a reality which has a general relation to all changes. Time is regarded as the independent real pervading the whole universe and making the ordered movement of things possible. It is the basis of the relations of priority

7. ii. 2. 9; v. 2. 26. This view is not to be confused with the *kālavāda*, which deifies time.

and posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, and of the notion of soon and late.¹ There is only one time which is omnipresent in dimension,² individual in character, and has the qualities of conjunction and disjunction. Conventional notions, as moment, minute, hour, year, etc., are derived by abstraction from concrete time. According to the Vaiśeṣika time is an eternal substance,³ and the basis of all experience.⁴ We do not know what time is in itself, but our experience is cast in the form of time. It is the formal cause of the relations of priority and posteriority, while their material cause is the nature of objects, as jar, cloth and the like. Time which is one appears as many on account of its association with the changes that are related to it.⁵

The distinction between time and space is noticed in the Vaiśeṣika treatises. Space deals with coexistence, time with successions; or more accurately, space deals with visible objects, while time deals with things produced and destroyed.⁶ Śaṅkara Miśra holds that the relations of time are constant or irreversible (*niyata*), while those of space are not irreversible (*aniyata*).⁷ Things move by virtue of time and hold together by virtue of space. While space and time cover the most comprehensive kinds of relations, transition from place to place, or state to state, spatial locomotion and temporal alternation, they are only formal and imply real things which move and change.³⁵

The Nyāya accepts the metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika, and regards the world of nature as a composite of eternal,

1. V. S., ii. 2. 6. (p. 192).

2. vii. 1. 25.

3. II. 2. 7.

4. *atītādivyavahārahetuḥ* (*Tarkasaṃgraha*, 15; *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 45).

5. *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 136.

6. *Siddhāntacandrodaya* says : “*Janyamātram kriyāmātram vā kālopādhiḥ, mūrtamātram digupādhiḥ.*”

7. *Upaskāra*, ii. 2. 10. Cp. with this Kant's Second and Third Analogies of Experience.

unalterable, causeless atoms, existing independently of our thoughts. The physical conceptions of the Nyāya are almost the same as those of the Vaiśeṣika.

It will, however, be of interest to know the way in which the Nyāya answers the objections of the rival schools. The problem of time offers peculiar difficulties. Some Naiyāyikas hold that time is a form of experience and is perceived by the sense-organs as a qualification of objects of perception. For example, Rāmakṛṣṇādhvarin, the author of *Śikhāmaṇi*, says that since we cognise objects as existing at present, time also may be said to be perceived. In the perception of the jar as existing at present (*idānim ghaṭo vartate*), present time also enters into the perception of the object. Every object is perceived as existing in time, though time is never perceived by itself.¹ Temporal relations are dependent on the terms related. There is no sooner or later, before or after, apart from events and actions. Time is perceived as a qualification of objects, and is therefore a substantive reality.²

The Mādhyamika theory, that there is no present time (*vartamānakāla*) apart from the past and the future, is examined by Vātsyāyana.³ The past is defined as that which precedes the present, and the future as that which succeeds it. But the present has no meaning apart from the past and the future. Vātsyāyana replies that all this is due to a confusion between time and space. The objector argues that when the object falls, we have the time taken up by its traversing a certain distance and the time that will be taken up by it in traversing the remaining distance, and there is no intervening distance which the object can be said to traverse at the present time. Space traversed gives the idea of past time, space to be traversed that of the future, and there is no third space which could give rise to the present time.⁴ But, says Vātsyāyana, "time, or *kāla*, is not manifested by space (*adhvā*)

1. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 136.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

3. N.B., ii, 1. 39-ii. 1. 43. See I.P., p. 649.

4. N.B., ii. 1. 39.

but by action (*kriyā*).” “We have the conception of time (as past) when the action of falling has ceased. When the same action is going to happen, we have the conception of time as future; and lastly, when the action of the thing is perceived as going on at the time, we have the conception of present time. In the circumstances, if a person were never to perceive the action as ‘going on,’ at the time, what could he conceive of as having ceased or as going to happen ?.. At both the points of time (past and future) the object is devoid of action; whereas, when we have the idea that the thing is falling down, the object is actually connected with the action; so that what the present time apprehends is the actual existing connection of the object and the action, and thus it is only on the basis of this (existing connection and the time indicated by it) that we could have the conception of the other two points of time; which latter, for this reason, would not be conceivable, if the present time did not exist.”¹

Again, perceptions arise in connection with things which are present in time. There cannot be perception, if there is not present time. The present therefore is not a mere mathematical point but a tract of time with a certain duration, “a slab of time with temporal thickness.”² ³⁶

S. Dasgupta, comparing the view of the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya with that of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Astronomers, states briefly :

In addition to these they (i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) admitted the existence of time (*kāla*) as extending from the past through the present to the endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sāṃkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of *kāla* is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no

1. N.B., ii. 1. 40. (p. 143).

2. Whitehead : *The Principle of Relativity*, p. 7.

existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of *kāla* as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi (*buddhinirmāṇa*) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But *kāla* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Sāṃkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution (*adhvan*). The astronomers regarded it as being due to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of *kāla* which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it.^{1 37}

To supplement the above quotation from S. Dasgupta's work, we add here S. Radhakrishnan's summary of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga views concerning time :

Every phenomenon of cosmic evolution is characterised by activity, change or motion (*parispanda*).² All things undergo infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. In the smallest instant of time (*kṣaṇa*) the whole universe undergoes a change. In the empirical world, space and time appear as limited, and are said to arise from *ākāśa*, when it is conditioned by coexistent things in space and moving bodies in time.

Vijñānabhikṣu says : "Eternal space and time are of the form of *prakṛti*, or the root-cause of *ākāśa*, and are only the specific modifications of *prakṛti*. Hence the universality of space and time is established. But these,

1. See *Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 64-66, and *Nyāymañjarī*, pp. 136-139. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.

2. *Vyaktam sakriyam parispandavat : Tattvakaumudī*, 10. see also *Y. B.* iii. 13.

37. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' by Surendranath Dasgupta, Vol. I, published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, reprinted 1951, Cambridge : p. 310, 30 ff.

space and time, which are limited, are produced from *ākāśa* through the conjunction of this or that limiting object (*upādhi*).’’³ Limited space and time are *ākāśa* itself particularised by this or that limiting object, though they are said to be its effects. Space and time are by themselves abstractions. They are not substances, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought, but relations binding the events of the development of *prakṛti*. Events stand in relations of time and space. We have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, and so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. From the limited objects of perception which stand to one another in the relation of antecedence and sequence, we construct an infinite time order to represent the course of evolution. Vyāsa says : “Just as the atom is the minimal limit of matter, so the moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the minimal limit of time, or the time taken by an atom in motion in order to leave one point and reach the next point is a moment. But the continuous flow of these is a sequence (*krama*). Moments and the sequences of these cannot be combined into a real (*vastu*). Thus, time, being of this nature, does not correspond to anything real, but is a product of mind, and follows as a result of perceptions or of words’’¹; but the moment is objective and rests on the sequence.² The sequence (*krama*) has for its essence an uninterrupted succession of moments which is called time (*kāla*) by experts. Two moments cannot occur simultaneously, since it is impossible that there be a sequence of two things that occur simultaneously. When a later moment succeeds an earlier, there is a sequence. Thus in the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or later moments. Therefore, there is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the changes (*pariṇāma*). Accordingly, the whole world passes through change in

3. S.P.B., ii. 12; ii. 10.

1. *Sa khalv ayaṁ kālo vastuśūnyo ’pi buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabda-jñānānupātī* (Y.B.) (p. 278)

2. *Kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī*. (Y.B.)

any single moment;³ so all those external aspects of the world are relative to this present moment.⁴ ³⁸

In this connection it is worth noting that the Sautrāntika School of Buddhism holds to similar view :

The main idea of the Sautrāntika doctrine is the negation of the reality of the future and past elements: the only one to be real is the dynamical moment of efficacious activity (*artha-kriyā-kārita*) and this is essentially—present. The distinction of the three times is only a construction of the mind, a pure imagination.³⁹

Again, the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* 3.13 runs as follows :

And the mutation of time-variation is the restriction having the three time-variations, (that is,) connected with the three time-forms (*adhvan*). This (restriction), one may say, puts aside the first time-form whose variation is yet to come, and passes into the present time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. But in this (condition) it becomes manifest as being what it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely severed from past or future time-variations.—Likewise emergence has the three time-variations; it is connected with the three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external-aspect. This is its third time-form. And it is not completely severed from the future and the present time-variations. In the same manner, emergence, completing itself again (as a phenomenalized form), having put aside the future time-variation, and not having passed out of its state as external-aspect, passes into the present time-variation. In

3. *Tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmanam anubhavati.*
(Y.B.)

4. So the Yogis can perceive directly both the moments and their sequence (Y.B., iii. 52).

38. 'Indian Philosophy' p. 277, 10ff. (See footnote 35).

39. Schayer, Stanislaw : 'Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy' Polska Akademia Umiejetności, Prace Komisji Orientalistycznej Nr 31, Krakow 1938 : Preface, p. 2, 24ff.

which (time), since this (emergence) manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional activity. This is the second time-form of this (emergence). And it is not completely released from past and future time-variations.⁴⁰

Thus we have to understand the three-fold mutation (of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity) in the case of elements and organs, because there is the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects. But in the strict sense there is but a single mutation. For the external-aspect is nothing more than substance itself. Since it is merely an evolved form of the substance amplified in the form of an external-aspect. In such cases there is within the substance an alteration of the condition of the present external-aspect with regard to past and future and present time-forms. There is no alteration of the matter. Just as by dividing a plate of gold there is an alteration of its condition, in so far as it is altered; (but) there is no alteration of the gold.⁴¹

Again (the world of things) continues to exist even after it has passed out (of phenomenalized individual existence). For (we are obliged) to deny its annihilation. On being refunded (into its primary cause by the dissolution of the coarse elements,) it (the world takes on) a subtile form. And by reason of this subtile form it becomes unapperceived. An external-aspect⁵ in the mutation of time-variation exists really in (all three) time-forms. (It is said to be) past (that is) having the past time-variation, though not completely severed from future and present time-variations. (So too it is said to be) future (that is) having the future time-variation, though not completely severed from present and past time-variations. (So also it is said to be)

5. In the Yoga system the *dharma* is real; in the *Vedānta* it is unreal (*vivarta*). The *dharma* is constantly changing into another thing; but involves the concept of permanence.

40. 'The Yoga-System of Patañjali', translated by James Haughton Woods, published as Harvard Oriental Series, Volume Seventeen; First Edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Harvard University Press 1914 : p. 212, 24ff.

41. *ibid.* p. 213, 21ff.

present (that is) having a present time-variation, though not completely severed from past and future time-variations. Take the case of a man enamoured of one particular woman—he has not thereby lost his sexual feeling for the rest of woman-folk.⁴²

In this connection it is interesting to note that the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism also believes that each *dharma* passes through all three time-variations :

The doctrine of the *traikālyā* is an interesting and original attempt at replacing the hypostasis of a substantial Time by another hypostasis, viz. that of real future and past elements of being. Each *dharma* exists through the three phases of the future, present and past. The future has no beginning but it has an end, the present has both a beginning and an end; the past has a beginning but no end. In this sense it is said that a *dharma* exists always (= *sarvam asti* = *sadāsti* = *sarvadāsti*) and that it is only its—mode of existence—(*bhāva*, *avasthā*) which is changing.⁴³

Moreover, if the past and the future did not exist really, then present would also be inexistent, because the present is established (only) by the (right) discernment of the past and the future. If the three times were inexistent then *saṃskṛta* would be inexistent. If the *saṃskṛta* were inexistent, then the *asaṃskṛta* would also be inexistent, because the *asaṃskṛta* is established (only) by a (right) discernment of the *saṃskṛtadharmas*. If the *saṃskṛta* as well as the *asaṃskṛta* were inexistent, then all *dharma*s would be inexistent. If all *dharma*s were inexistent, then salvation and the reaching of *nirvāṇa* would be inexistent. Great heresies would thus arise. In order to avoid these mistakes it must be known that the past and future exist really.⁴⁴

Time according to Astronomers :—Bhartṛhari gives this view in *kārikā* 76. Helārāja comments : “In this way, the division of time such as ‘yuga’, ‘manvantara’, ‘kalpa’, ‘mahākalpa’, etc., can

42. *ibid.* p. 214, 16ff.

43. Schayer, Stanislaw: ‘Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy’, Preface, p. 2, 7ff. (See footnote 39).

44. *ibid.* p. 68, footnote 2.

be traced by observing the difference of the motions of the other planets and constellations established in the science of astronomy." I have already cited above from Dasgupta's work who writes : 'The astronomers regarded it (i.e. time) as being due to the motion of the planets.'⁴⁵

In the field of Grammar Pāṇini, the author of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, follows this view. He says that time is well-known and it does not require any definition (1.2.57). Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārttikas* takes the same stand.

In *kārikā* 62 Bhartṛhari states that there are various doctrines about time : some call it power (*śakti*), some soul (*ātman*), and others deity (*devatā*). The question arises whom he may have meant.

1. time = *śakti*

According to Helārāja this is Bhartṛhari's own view : he considers *kāla* as an independent power of *brahman* (neutr.), see p. 29 below. Besides, certain Śaiva sects hold time to be a power of *Rudra/Śiva*, and as the relevant Sanskrit texts are not available in Marburg, we must be content with referring the reader to Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* :

In the second section of the *Śiva-mahāpurāṇa* called the *Rudra-saṃhitā*, we are told that at the time of the great dissolution, when all things were destroyed, there was only darkness, no sun, no planets, no stars, no moon, and no day and night; there is only pure vacuity devoid of all energy. There was no sensibility of any kind, it was a state when there was neither being nor non-being; it was beyond all mind and speech, beyond all name and form. But yet in that neutral state there existed only the pure being, the pure consciousness, infinite and pure bliss, which was immeasurable and a state in itself; it had no form and devoid of all qualities.¹ This was purely

1. *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ ca parānandaṃ param-mahah.
aprameyam anādhāram avikāram anākṛti,
nirguṇaṃ yogigamyañ ca sarva-vyāpyeka-kāraṇaṃ* (sic).
Śiva-mahāpurāṇa, ii. 1.6, 11c, d-12.

45. See page 21, line 10, above.

of the nature of pure consciousness, without beginning and end and without any development. Gradually there arose a second desire or will by which the formless was changed into some form by its own playful activities. This may be regarded as the all-creating pure energy, of which there is no parallel. The form created by this energy is called *sadāśiva*. People also call Him *Īśvara*, or God. The lone energy, spontaneously moving, created from itself its own eternal body, which is called *pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, or *māyā*, and which generates the category of *buddhi*. This *māyā* or *prakṛti* is the creator of all beings and is regarded as coming into contact with the supreme *puruṣa*, the *Śiva*, called *Śambhu*, who is different from God. This *śakti* or energy is also regarded as *kāla* or time.⁴⁶

The *Vāyaviyaśaṃhitā* makes it still clearer :

In VII. 1.6.67 (of the *Śivamahāpurāṇa*) the Lord is described as one who produces time and is the Lord of all the *guṇas* and the liberator of all bondage. A question is raised as regards the nature of *kāla* or time. In reply to such a question *Vāyu* says that *kāla* appears before us in the form of successive moments and durations. The real essence of *kāla* is the energy of *Śiva*. *Kāla* therefore cannot be outstripped by any being whatsoever. It is, as it were, the ordering power of God.¹

The *kāla* thus is an energy of God emanates from Him and pervades all things. For this reason everything is under the domination of time. But *Śiva* is not fettered by time; He is the master of all time. The unrestricted power of God is manifested through time, and for this reason no one can transcend the limits of time. No amount of wisdom can take us beyond time, and whatever deeds are done in time cannot be outstripped. It is time which decides the fates and destinies of persons in accordance

1. *niyogarūpam īśasya balaṃ viśva (niyāmakam.)*

Śiva-mahāpurāṇa VII. 1.7.7.

46. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' by S. Dasgupta, Vol. V., published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1955 : p. 98, 33 ff.

with their deeds, yet no one can say what is the nature of the essence of time.⁴⁷

2. time = *ātman*

Helārāja takes this to imply the identification of time with *puruṣa* or *jīva*, i.e. with the individual soul, the correctness of which assumption remains, to us at least, doubtful. Instead we wish to point out at least one passage where time is directly referred to as *paramātmā*, *bhūtātmā*, *triguṇātmā*, *kālātmā* and considered higher in rank than *Brahman*, *Nārāyaṇa* or *Rudra*. Mbh. 12, App. 26, 53-60 :

eṣām uddhartakaḥ kālo nānābhedaḥ āsthitaḥ |
paramātmā ca bhūtātmā guṇabhedaḥ saṁsthitaḥ |
eka eva tridhā bhinnāḥ karoti vividhāḥ kriyāḥ |
brahmā sṛjati bhūtāni pāti nārāyaṇo 'vyayaḥ |
rudro hanti jaganmūrtiḥ kāla eṣa kriyābudhaḥ |
kālo 'pi tanmayo 'cintyas triguṇātmā sanātanaḥ |
avyakto 'sāv acintyo 'sau vartate bhinnalakṣaṇaḥ |
kālātmā tv idaṁ bhinnam abhinnam śrūyate hi tat |

'Time assuming apparently different forms becomes preserver of these (subtle and gross elements). He is the *paramātmā*, and also *bhūtātmā* (individual soul) having obtained different *guṇas* (i.e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*).

The single one, divided into three, performs different functions. As *Brahmā* he creates the creatures. As indestructible *Nārāyaṇa* he preserves (them); as *Rudra*, whose form is the world, he destroys (them). This time (is really) the master of activities.

Time is identical with them (i.e. *Brahman*, *Viṣṇu* and *Rudra*); (he is) beyond thoughts, possessing three *guṇas*, eternal, unmanifested, unthinkable; this (time) possesses different characteristics.

By the soul of time this (entire world is) divided; though it is referred to as (really) undivided.⁴⁸

47. *ibid.* p. 112, 30 ff.

48. Compare with this Mbh. 12, App. 26, 23-24 post.

3. time = *devatā*

Here it may suffice to state that *kāla*, from *Atharvaveda* 19, 53 and 54 onwards, occasionally appears as an independent deity but is much more often identified with either (1) *Śiva* or (2) *Viṣṇu*. References for (1) :

Mbh. 8, App. 2, 90 pr. Mbh. 13, 16, 17; 17, 56; 17, 71-73; 17, 91; 17, 109; 17, 122; 17, 138; 145, 38. Dasgupta, S.; *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. V, Cambridge 1955, p. 137 (a passage from the *Pāśupata-sūtras*), etc.

References for (2) :

Mbh. 6, 32, 30d; 33c; = *Bhagavadgītā* X, 30, 33. Mbh—13, 135, 23; 58; 143, 30. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 1, 2, 14-18; 26; 1, 3, 4-7, etc.

Time according to Bhartrhari

As I have mentioned above, Helārāja commenting on *kārikā* 62 has stated that according to Bhartrhari time is an independent power of brahman (neuter. See p. 26 above). Explaining *kārikā* 14 he affirms the same thing, and in support of his view refers there to *kārikā* 3 of the *Brahmakāṇḍa* which reads together with the *Vṛtti* as follows :

adhyāhitakalām yasya kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ |
janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ ||3||
kālākhyena hi svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmavatyāḥ
śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktivṛttim anupatanti | tataś ca prati-
bhāvaṁ vaiśvarūpyasya pratibandhābhyānujñābhyām śaktya-
vacchedena kramavān ivābhāsopagamo lakṣyate | sarveṣāṃ hi
vikārāṇāṃ kāraṇāntareṣu apy apekṣāvatām pratibaddhajanmanām
abhyānujñayā sahakārikāraṇam kālaḥ | tasya kramavadbhir
mātrārūpaiḥ kartṛśaktir vibhajyamānā vikāramātrāgataṃ
bhedarūpaṃ tatrādhyāropayati tulāsūtra iva saṃyogidravyān-
taragurutvaprati-bandhakāle daṇḍalekhāvacchedam | tatraivam
abhūn nābhūd ity apūrvāparasya bhāvasya paurvāporyavavasthā-
vikalpe sati janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaṭ pariṇāmānām sattāvikārāṇaṃ
yonaya upaplavante | jātīsamuddese tu śattāvibhāge nyakṣā
bhāvavikārā vakṣyante ||3||

3. Depending on whose Time-power to which (though one) differentiation is attributed, the six transformations, birth etc. become the cause of all variety in Being.'

'All powers depending on their causes and having a starting point are governed by the creative power (*svātantrya*) called Time; they follow the modes of this Time-power. Because of the regulation of the immense diversity of each object by means of prevention and permission, its appearances seem to have a sequence. Time, by allowing them to come to be, is the secondary cause of all transformations which depend on their own other causes also and whose production has been delayed. Its causal power being thus differentiated by the manifestations which have a sequence, the differentiation which exists in the manifestations is attributed to it. It is like attributing to the balance the divisions marked by lines on it at the time of the balancing of the weight of the material which is in contact with it. Thus when sequence is attributed to something which is neither prior nor posterior in the form 'it was' or 'it was not', the six transformations birth etc., become the source of the modifications, the changes in Being. Transformation of action will be dealt with in detail in the section devoted to 'Being' under the subject of universal.'⁴⁹

Since the *Vṛtti* just quoted is from Bhartṛhari's pen, too, most of the ideas expressed in the *Kālasamuddeśa* are clear to us now. Bhartṛhari repeatedly states that time controls the entire universe through its two powers 'suspension' and 'permission'. This is his novel conception. He exemplifies it, as we have seen, in *kārikās* 4-5. 15. 30. 42-44 and 70, and shows that the sequence we notice in the states of all things is also caused by the said two powers.

Besides, time possesses three other energies—past, future, and present—through which things appear and disappear (see *kārikā* 49). But these three can, as a matter of fact, be reduced to two 'opening' (*unmīlana*) and 'closing' (*nimīlana*)—'present'

49. 'The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the *Vṛtti*' Chapter I, English Translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, Poona 1965 : p. 5, 13 ff.

representing *unmīlana*, and 'past' as well as 'future' *nimīlana*. Again, *unmīlana* and *nimīlana* are nothing but *abhyānujñā* and *pratibandha*, respectively.

At the beginning of the world-process, time acts as instigation (*prayoga*) for creative energies (*kārika* 9), and thus the creation, manifestation and restricted existence of things depend on the impulsion of time (*kārikā* 10) : eternal activity is manifested when the efficient powers have matured. Again another energy of time called 'decomposition' (*jarā*) causes the destruction of things (*kārikās* 24-25).

In his explanation of creation as well as destruction, Bhartṛhari differs with both the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas. He contradicts their theory of causation saying : Just as everything is created, by a miraculous course of action, without sequence, bond or abode, in the same way, it perishes too (*kārikā* 26, and *Sambandhasamuddeśa* 43-81).

Although time is SINGLE, it becomes many on account of its various powers mentioned above. Through them it sports with beings causing their creation, existence and destruction (*kārikā* 72). Bhartṛhari expresses the same idea in the case of the diverse forms of *brahman*, too :

ekam eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnaśaktivyāpāśrayāt |

aprthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktveneiva vartate ||2||

(= VP 1.2)

Who has been taught as the One appearing as many due to the multiplicity of his powers, who, though not different from his powers, seems to be so.⁵⁰

It is like a tree and its branches and sub-branches. Suppose *brahman* is a tree, then its powers represent the branches. If time-power represents a branch, its energies represent sub-branches. Ultimately all these branches and sub-branches are nothing but the tree itself. In the same way, the powers of *brahman*, and the powers of its powers are ultimately nothing but *brahman* itself.

Here too, Bhartṛhari differs with the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas accept time as an eternal, all-pervading substance uncaused by anything. According to them time is not a power.

50. *Vākyapadīya* Chapter I, English Translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer (see footnote 49): p. 4, 6 ff.

They are not monists. In their philosophy, though the words *vidyā* and *avidyā* appear (*avidyā vidyālingam*, VS 7.1.27), they have not been used in the technical vedāntic sense—i.e. *vidyā* meaning the true knowledge of *brahman*, the non-dualistic state where the world is recognised as an illusion and only *brahman* remains real: and *avidyā* meaning the empirical state of the world, where the world and its diversities appear to be true. Commenting on VS 7.1.27, Candrānanda writes :

*parimāṇarahitasya dravyasyāsaṁbhavaḥ paramāṇūnām paramāṇu-
parimāṇasya saṁbhavaḥ liṅgam | 'avidyā' asaṁbhavaḥ, saṁ-
bhavo 'vidyā' |*⁵¹

Non-existence of a substance devoid of quantity is the reason (to prove) the existence of atoms and the quantity of atoms. *Avidyā* (means) non-existence, (and) *vidyā* (means) existence.

According to them ether, time, space, soul, though substances, are devoid of action, since they are incorporeal.⁵² Divisions of time are due to the superimpositions of different activities on it. Time is the common or formal cause of non-eternal substances.

According to Bhartṛhari, time is a creative power. As long as *avidyā* continues, time and its powers—*pratibandha*, *abhyanuḥjñā*, *krama*, *jarā*, *bhūta*, *bhaviṣyat*, *vartamāna*, etc.—all are real in the empirical world. They are not superimpositions. When true knowledge i.e. *vidyā* is attained, the entire universe is recognised as mere illusion and thus time, which is the first creation of illusion, disappears together with the entire universe (*kārikās* 62 and 72).

The essence of Bhartṛhari's view lies in the conception of time as a *śakti* of *brahman* and its two powers *pratibandha* and *abhyanuḥjñā*. Because, as I have shown above, all other energies of time can be traced back to these two.

51. 'Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda', critically edited by Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1961 : p. 55, line 15-16.

52. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5. 2. 23.

References to 'time' in the first two *Kāṇḍas* and in other *Samuddēśas* of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.

I have given above *kārikā* 1.3, and the *Vṛtti* on it together with their translation. In 1.75-77 Bhartṛhari shows the function of time in connection with the manifested sound. In 1.91-92 he regards sequence as a power of time. In 101-104 he explains how the duration of the manifesting sounds is attributed to the phoneme (*varṇa*), word (*pada*), and sentence (*vākya*).

In 2.23 he states that a short vowel and a long vowel, though in reality, devoid of time-difference, (just as the notions 'slow' and 'quick') possess apparent time-differences. In 2.24-26 he argues that the division of time is not possible on the basis of the motions of atoms (*paramātrā*). Because these motions vanish, and therefore cannot form a sequence : i.e. cannot enter into a mutual connection. The opinion that the intellect being one makes through its own power the notion of sequence possible, is refuted by raising the following question : 'Is the impression of a sequence in the intellect different from the intellect or is it not different ? If it is different from it, it cannot be used in the argument; if it is not different from it, sequence is impossible as the intellect is one.' In 2.27 he concludes that the sentence, in reality, is devoid of sequence, but at the time of apprehending its meaning it possesses sequence whereby the meaning, though devoid of division, appears as if divided. In 2.51 proposing the view that the sentence is defined as sequence (of words), he states that this sequence is the nature of time and therefore cannot convey the conception of 'sentence' different from it.

In 3.1.37 he teaches that sequence is the nature of Being (*sattā*) i.e. the highest generality wherein the conception of time abides and it (i.e. time) appears as if divided into prior, posterior, etc. In 3.2.8. he explains how the ultimate reality (*tattva*) i.e. *brahman*, though devoid of division, obtains time-divisions. In 3.3.50 he asserts that this Being (*sattā*), i.e. the highest generality, does not possess time-variations, and that individuals only pass through time-variations. In 3.3.69 he argues that reference to all three times (i.e. past, future and present) is not consistent with the doctrine (i.e. *Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya*) according to which a thing is non-existent (before its produc-

tion and after its destruction) as well as with the doctrine (i.e. *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*) that a thing is existent (even before its production and after its destruction). In 3.3.83 he declares that the supporters of eternity (of *brahman*) suppose that this (miraculous course of action) is the power of Being (*bhāva*) i.e. *brahman*. This very Being (*bhāva*) is called sequence and sequence is not different from this Being.⁵³ In 3.3.84 he affirms that in reality there is no difference between sequence and simultaneity just as Non-being is not different from Being. But how can simultaneity and non-simultaneity be the same? Having raised this doubt, he states in the next *kārikā* that just as people—though there is no real division in time—refer to its divisions for practical purposes, in the same way, though there is no real difference between simultaneity and non-simultaneity, a difference between them is assumed in the empirical world.

In this connection it is worth mentioning that Diñnāga, a famous Buddhist logician adopts *kārikās* 3.3.55-85 with a few variations in his work called *Traikālyaparīkṣā*.⁵⁴ This adoption by Diñnāga of the aforesaid *kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya* helps us in two ways. Firstly, to settle Bhartṛhari's date, and secondly, to understand that the *Sambandhasamuddēśa* is, indirectly, a chapter on time, where the question of the existence of the three times—present, past and future—has widely been discussed according to different theories (i.e. *Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya*, *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, etc.).

According to 3.6.1 space, instrument, activity and time, being powers, are not immediately evident just like substances, and therefore they require a definition. In 3.6.4 he shows the difference between space and time (see 3.9.47). In 3.6.18 he asserts that just as consciousness, time and space too, belong to the nature of living beings. In 3.7.34 he enumerates different views about the nature of instrument (*sādhana*) : Some

53. According to Bhartṛhari '*bhāva*' here means *brahman*, the essence of sound (see VP 1.1). Therefore one should not mistake it for the '*bhāva*' of the *Sāṃkhyas*, according to whom every product is '*bhāva*'. Of course Bhartṛhari, too, uses the term in the meaning of 'a being' in other places. For instance, in *kārikās* 39, 49, 50, 52, 56, 59 and 72 of the *Kālasamuddēśa*.

54. See WZKSOA Bd. 3, 1959, pp. 145-152, and p. 137, 26 ff.

call it time-power; others activity; again others time-substance. (Here Bhartṛhari uses the words *kālaśakti* and *kāla* in order to differentiate his view from that of Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya). In 3.7.42 he repeats once again that the ultimate reality, though devoid of sequence, appears as if possessing sequence on account of time. In 3.7.67-68 he mentions time in connection with the accusative of duration such as '*māsam āste*' (He remains the whole month), '*māsam odanam pacati*' (He cooks food the whole month), etc. In 3.7.153 he states that activities are divided with reference to time and all material forms with reference to space. In 3.7.154 he shows how in the usage '*trirātram upavasati*' (He observes fasting for three nights), the verb *upavasati* refers to time as its object. In 3.8.5 he states that inasmuch as the entire collection of moments relating to the activity of cooking is anticipated in the very first moment of putting the pot on the fire, it is possible to say '*pacati*'—he is cooking—and likewise '*apākṣīt*'—he has cooked—as soon as some of the moments of the activity are past and taken into consideration (as such). And taking into consideration the future moments of the same activity, one can say '*pakṣyati*'—he will cook—. Thus all the three different times abide in the activity. When you define activity as (something) to be accomplished, and as possessing sequence, how can *existence*, which is eternal, be called an activity, such as '*asti*'—it exists—? Having raised this doubt, he states in 3.8.12, that the form (of existence) which follows time is apprehended as existing ; but (the same existence), after having been measured (by time), is called existence (*bhāva*) (by nouns), which means that as time is the dividing factor of activities (VP 3.9.2), any activity, whether it is eternally present or non-eternally present, past, or future, is verbally treated as (something) to be accomplished and as possessing sequence; and thus the usage of all tenses is possible (3.8.1). Therefore the definition of activity as well as the usages of different tenses are verbal only and not real. Otherwise, the conception of activity as defined in *kārikās* 3.8.1-4 would be impossible and inapplicable.⁵⁵

55. For further information about the conception of time see :

'The Concept of Time According to Bhartṛhari' by Dr. Satya Vrat, published in the ABORI 39, 1958, pp. 68-78.

The background of Bhartṛhari's view.

The essence of Bhartṛhari's tenet lies, as I have mentioned above, in his conception of time as a *śakti* of *brahman* and its two energies *pratibandha* and *abhyānujñā*. Did he, in this respect, have any predecessors ?

In the field of Grammar, Pāṇini and Kātyāyana are silent on the philosophical aspects of time.⁵⁶ But Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, touches the subject at two places. On 2.2.5 (ed. F. Kielhorn, p. 409, 21 ff.) :

*yena mūrtinām upacayās cāpacayās ca lakṣyante taṁ
kālam āhuḥ | tasyaiva hi kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhar iti ca
bhavati rātrir iti ca | kayā kriyayā | ādityagatyā | tayaivāsakṛdā-
vṛttayā māsa iti bhavati samvatsara iti ca |*

They say that *kāla* is that when the growth or the decay of bodies is seen. The same, in association with some action, gets the name of the day and the night.—With which action ?—With the movement of the sun. The same being associated with it when repeated gets the name of month and year.⁵⁷

Kārikā 13 of the *Kālasamuddheśa* is a direct reference to this passage. Kaiyaṭa, commenting on it, quotes *kārikās* 6-8 of our text which represent the view of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Again, on 4.2.3 (ed. F. Kielhorn, II p. 272, 1) Patañjali says :

nitye hi kālanakṣatre |

Time and constellation are eternal.

Thus the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* defines time as an eternal entity causing growth and decay of material objects. Superimposing on it the movement of the sun it is designated as 'day',

'*The Concept of time according to Bhartṛhari*' by Dr. J. M. Shukla, published in the Proceedings of the 17th All-India Oriental Conference, October-November 1953, pp. 379-384.

'*Essays On Indology*' by Dr. Satyavrat Sastri, published by Shri Sudarshan Kumar, Managing Director, Shri Bharat Bharati Pr. Ltd. Delhi-6, 1963, First Edition : pp. 149-204.

56. See p. 26.6, 18 ff. above.

57. P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, Lectures on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, Volume V (*Āhnikas* 15 to 22) Tiruchirapalli 1957, p. 316, 20 ff.

‘night’, ‘month’, ‘year’ etc. But Patañjali does not say whether he considers time as a power or as a substance. His statements are akin to the views of the Vaiśeṣikas.

I have above (p. 26 ff.) drawn attention to two passages in the *Rudrasaṃhitā* and the *Vāyaviyasaṃhitā* where *kāla* is conceived as an energy of Śiva. This seems to be the nearest approximation to Bhartṛhari’s doctrine, but there remains the important difference that the passages of the *Samhitās* speak of time as the power of a personal god while our author makes it a *śakti* of the impersonal *brahman* (neutr.).

It is, therefore, not yet possible to trace the source from which Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of time has been derived. Nevertheless, we would like to take the opportunity of quoting a number of passages from the *Mahābhārata* where—we think—faint echoes of certain lines of the *Kālasamuddeśa* can be detected. They may, at this moment, appear insignificant, but if their number could be increased, cumulative evidence might perhaps lead future students of the *Vākyapadīya* on to the right track :

tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate |
pratibandhābhyanuññābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate ||4||

Mbh. 13, 150, 2 :

kāla evātra kālena nigrahānugrahaḥ dadat |
buddhim āviśya bhūtānāṃ dharmārtheṣu pravartate ||
jalayantrabhramāveśasadrśibhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ |
sa kalāḥ kālayan sarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ ||14||

Mbh. 12, 220, 35d :

kālaḥ kalayati prajāḥ.

Mbh. 1, 60, 20d :

kālo lokaparakālanāḥ.

Cp. *Suśrutasamhitā* 1, 6, 2 :

sa sūkṣmāṃ api kalāṃ na līyata iti kālāḥ, saṃkalayati kālayati
vā bhūtānīti kālāḥ ||

Ḍallanācārya comments :

saḥ kālāḥ sūkṣmāṃ api stokāṃ api kalāṃ bhāgaṃ na līyate
gatimattvāt śliṣṭo na bhavati | anye tu na līyata ity atra kalīyate
saṃkhyāyate iti paṭhanti, vyākhyānanti ca—kalīyate saṃkhyā-
yate iti kālāḥ | niruktīpakṣāntaram āha—saṃkalayatītyādi |
saṃkalayati saṃharaṇād ekarāśīkaroti bhūtānīti vā kālāḥ,
saṃkalayati sukhaduḥkṣābhyāṃ bhūtāni yojayatīti vā kālāḥ,

*kālayati saṁkṣipyatīti vā kālaḥ, athavā kālayati mṛtyusamīpaṁ
nayatīti vā kālaḥ | anye tu kālayatīty atra kalayatīti paṭhanti,
kalayati saṁkhyātīti kālaḥ iti ca vyākhyānanti ||*⁵⁸

This time even for a minute i.e. very small moment i.e. portion does not stick i.e. does not remain stuck, because (it is) ever moving. Instead of *na līyate*, some read *kalīyate* (meaning) *saṁkhyāyate* and comment that *kalīyate* means *saṁkhyāyate* (counts up) therefore (it is called) *kāla* (time). (The author) gives another definition— heaps together etc. (it derives its epithet) *kāla*, because, it heaps together i.e. lays in heaps creatures by destroying them; or (it is called) *kāla* due to the fact that time blends all beings with misery or happiness; or (it obtains its name) *kāla* since it drives forth i.e. throws together (things); or (it gets the name) *kāla*, inasmuch as it drives on i.e. leads (the creatures) to the vicinity of death. But some read *kalāyati* instead of *kālayati* and comment that since (it) sums up i.e. counts up (the age of creatures), therefore (it is called) *kāla*.

*tṛṇaparnalatādīni yathā sroto 'nukarṣati |
pravartayati kālo 'pi mātṛā mātṛāvatām tathā ||41||*

Mbh. 11, 7, 5 pr., App. I. 25pr.

kālaḥ karṣati bhūtāni

Mbh. 12, 220, 98cd :

*kālo harati saṁprāpto nadivega ivodupam ||
kalābhiḥ pṛthagarthābhiḥ pravibhaktam svabhāvataḥ |
ke cid buddhyanusamhāralakṣaṇam taṁ pracakṣate ||57||*

Mbh. 12, 308, 121 :

*kalānām pṛthagarthānām pratibhedaḥ kṣaṇe kṣaṇe |
vartate sarvabhūteṣu saukṣmyāt tu na vibhāvvyate ||*

*ākriḍa iva kālasya dṛśyate yaḥ svaśaktibhiḥ |
bahurūpasya bhāveṣu bahudhā tena bhidyate ||72||*

Viṣṇupurāṇa 1, 2, 18 :

58. 'Suśrutasaṁhitā, with the commentary called *Nibandhasaṁgraha* by Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrīdallanācārya', ed. by Kavirāja Śrīnṛpendranātha Senagupta, Vol. I., First Edition, Calcutta 1937-38 : p. 42, 5-6 and 24 ff.

vyaktaṃ viṣṇus tathāvyaktaṃ puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca |
 krīdato bālakasyeva ceṣṭāṃ tasya niśāmaya ||
 vyatikrame 'pi mātrāṇāṃ tasya nāsti vyatikramaḥ | 74ab
 Mbh. 12, 220, 96cd :

kālo na parihāryaś ca na cāsyāsti vyatikramaḥ ||
 udayāstamayāvṛttyā jyotiṣāṃ lokasiddhayā |
 kālasyāvyatipāte 'pi tāddharmyam iva lakṣyate ||75||
 Mbh. 12, 326, 71 :

yathā sūryasya gaganād udayāstamayāv iha |
 naṣṭau punar balāt kāla ānayatṣu amitādyutiḥ ||

VĀKYAPADĪYAM

3. Kāṇḍa

Kālasamuddeśa

After activity, time is described; for, it is the divider of activity. There he (first) states the definition of it (i.e. of time) according to another school of philosophy :

*vyāpāravyatirekeṇa kālam eke pracakṣate |
nityam ekaṃ vibhūdravyaṃ parimāṇaṃ kriyāvatām ||1||*

Some declare that time is different from activity, an eternal, SINGLE, all-pervading elementary substance, the measure of (beings) possessing activity.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, time is said to have as its characteristic signs (by which its existence can be proved) the relation “prior, posterior” etc. (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.6), it is all-pervading, SINGLE, formless and for this very reason, because it is not produced, eternal, different from activity, the dividing factor of things by means of activity such as creation etc. (creation, existence, transformation, growth, decay and destruction :—*jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate, vārdhate, apakṣiyate, vinaśyati*). It (i.e. time) may be learned in detail from that (very source i.e. the Vaiśeṣika System).¹ (1)

He states that time is different from other dividing factors due to the difference of the objects to be divided :

*diṣṭiprasthasuvarṇādi mūrtibhedāya kalpate |
kriyābhedāya kālas tu saṃkhyā sarvasya bhedikā ||2||*

diṣṭi (a measure of length), *prastha* (a measure of capacity), *suvarṇa* (a measure of weight) etc. are dividing factors of material form. But, time is the dividing factor of activity (and) number (is) the dividing factor of everything.

1. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.6-11; 5.2.23, 5.2.28.

Material form is the quantity of substances that are limited (lit. not reaching everywhere). This (quantity) is determined by a measure of length such as “*diṣṭi*” etc. And thus a “*diṣṭi*”, “*vitastī*” etc. applies to a thing possessing material form. And by it, delimiting a portion of one dimension, the limitation of a thing (is effected). And this (is called) ‘linear measure’ (*pramāṇa*). But with the help of a *prastha* etc., because it limits from all-around, a heap of paddy etc., is limited by both elevation and circumference; “*prastha*”, “*drona*”, “*ādhaka*” (i.e. different measuring pots) (are called) ‘cubic measure’ (*parimāṇa*). “*Pari*” is used in the sense of “reaching all-around”. *Suvarṇa* etc. i.e. *suvarṇa*, *niṣka*, *pala* (different measures of weight) etc., however, as a ‘measure of weight’ (*unmāṇa*), limits a thing by a particular heaviness. Different from these, time is the cause of the division of activity which is formless. For, by time, the movement of the sun etc. is measured : a month, a year etc. Number, however, fixes a limitation to everything, to that possessing form as well as to that not possessing form; and also to linear measure etc., two pots, many souls, two activities, one “*vitastī*”, two hands, four “*prastha*”, five “*pala*”. Numbers are also measured by number : two twenties, five fifties. (2)

He states how activities are measured by time :

utpattau ca sthitau caivavināśe cāpitadvatām |
nimittam kālam evāhur vibhaktēnātmanā sthitam ||3||

In the creation (arising), existence and destruction (of beings) which possess these (activities), time, remaining in a divided state, is said to be the (instrumental) cause. All (other) activities are included in-these three main activities i.e. creation, existence and destruction. Therefore, time is said to be, through them, the instrumental cause of all substances possessing these said activities. For, depending on it (i.e. time), creation etc. takes place individually in the case of all substances. It is possible, therefore, to state that “some are born in spring, others in autumn, and again others in the rainy season.” In the same way, (statements) about existence and destruction (are possible). Thus, time, being differentiated by the difference of super-impositions, is capable of making a difference in commingled (things). (3)

Because time is the instrumental cause of the creation etc. of substances, therefore :

*tam asya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṃ pracakṣate /
pratibandhābhyanujñābhyāṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate ||4||*

It (i.e. time) is called the operator (lit. string-holder) of this mechanical contrivance 'world'. It (i.e. time) divides the universe by suspension and permission.

The universe is similar to a mechanical puppet whose movements are controlled by time representing a puppet-operator (string-holder). As the puppet-operator (string-holder) causes the actions such as the opening and closing of the eyes etc. of a mechanical puppet by moving the strings, in the same way, time, by its own power, divides the 'concealment' and 'emergence' of things which are synonyms for 'creation' and 'destruction' respectively, and thus makes the world obtain the division of priority and posteriority. (It is by time that) activities, which are characterised by division, are effected. (4)

For it is thus :

*yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibandhaṃ ca notsrjet /
avasthā vyatikīryeraṃ paurvāparyavinākṛtāḥ ||5||*

If (time) did not suspend and did not remove the suspension, the states (of a being) would be confused, deprived of priority and posteriority.

In the absence of suspension effected by time, the appearance of states (of beings) would occur simultaneously; in the absence of the law of due sequence, confusion of seed, sprout, stalk, stem etc. would take place. For this reason, because it is observed that things, though arising from their (special material) causes, do sojourn in time, and this time is unavoidably to be depended upon (by them); time must be recognised as being the instrumental cause. (5)

Now, after the SINGLENESSE of time has been ascertained, he states (its) diversity which rests on the difference of the superimpositions :

*tasyātmā bahudhā bhinno bhedair dharmāntarāśrayaiḥ /
na hi bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā vastu kiñcana vidyate ||6||*

Its (i.e. time's) self is manifoldly divided by differences resting on alien activities. For, there exists no elementary substance that could be either divided or undivided.

“Alien activities” commingled forms of activities, are to be stated later on (in verses 8 and 11 of the same chapter). Because of the differences belonging to these activities, time, though SINGLE, is treated as manifold. And thus (it) gives rise to manifold activities. And everywhere, the difference of substances is due only to the difference of the superimposition of something else. Because, by themselves (the substances) cannot be characterised by (the term) “difference” or “indifference” (i.e. dividedness or undividedness). Thus it has been said : “(That they are) divided is an alien superimposition; so also (that they are) undivided. This talk of diversity takes place only with regard to the commingled beings themselves” (=VP 3.1.20). (6)

He exemplifies (the statement made in the previous verse) “For, there exists no elementary substance that could be either divided or undivided” :

*naiko na cāpy aneko 'sti na śuklo nāpi cāsitaḥ |
dravyātmā sa tu saṃsargād evaṃrūpaḥ prakāśate -||7||*

The real essence of a substance is neither one nor many, neither black nor white. But it appears as such because of (its) commingling (with something else).

The true nature of a substance cannot be referred to without any superimposition. Therefore, a reference to it as “one” etc. is due to the inherency of a number like ‘oneness’ etc. A substance is called black and white due to the inherency of a colour like black and white. Likewise, due to the inherency of the “genus cow” (*gotva*) etc., the references to “cow” etc. are to be understood. In the same way, with regard to time, reference is also made to “time of creation”, “time of existence”, “time of destruction” etc., due to the contact with activities (such as) “creation” etc. (7)

And hence :

*saṃsargiṇām tu ye bheda viśeṣās tasya te matāḥ |
sa bhinnas tair vyāvasthānām kālo bhedāya kalpate ||8||*

But the differences of commingled (activities) are considered to be its (i.e. time's) peculiarities. Divided by them, this term "time" effects different fixed limits.

(The term) "commingled" (*samsargin*, means) peculiar activities related to time, namely the motion of the planets, the sun etc. This (i.e. time), possessing the distinguished nature (lit := distinction in its own nature), superimposed on it by the difference of these (peculiar activities), effects the fixed limit of day, night, fortnight, month, season, half year, *yuga* (the world-age), *manvantara* etc.¹

For it is thus : The time limited by the boundaries of sun-rise and sun-set is to be designated as "day". But (the time) possessing the superimposed limitation by the interruption of sun-rise (is to be designated) as "night". (The time) revolving by day and night causes the designation "fortnight" etc. respectively. Possessing, however, a superimposed division by the activity of the shutting and opening of the eye-lashes, (time) regulates the reference to *kṣaṇa*, *lava*, *kāṣṭhā* (small units of time) etc. (8)

In the way mentioned above, time, having superimposed (all) peculiarities (upon itself) through the superimposed divisions, becomes the instrumental cause of beings by separating activities such as creation etc., without confusion arising (i.e. without sequence being broken). For it is thus :

viśiṣṭakālasaṃbandhād vṛttilābhaḥ prakalpate |
śaktinām sa prayogasya hetutvenāvatiṣṭhate ||9||

1. The *yugas* of gods : 1. *Kṛtayuga*, lasting for 4,800 divine years.
2. *Tretāyuga*, 3,600; 3. *Dvāparayuga*, 2,400; 4. *Kaliyuga*, 1,200. A year of men being a day of gods, by multiplying these divine years by 360, we obtain the *yugas* of mortals :

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. <i>Kṛtayuga</i> : | = 4,800 × 360 = 1,728,000 | years of mortals. |
| 2. <i>Tretāyuga</i> | = 3,600 × 360 = 1,296,000 | „ |
| 3. <i>Dvāparayuga</i> | = 2,400 × 360 = 864,000 | „ |
| 4. <i>Kaliyuga</i> | = 1,200 × 360 = 432,000 | „ |

4,320,000 = one *Mahāyuga*.

Seventy-one *Mahāyugas* form a *Manvantara* :

$$4,320,000 \times 71 = 306,720,000$$

(This is according to the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. For details, see the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, translated by H. H. Wilson, M.A. F.R.S., London 1840 : p. 24, (footnote 4,) line 1 ff., left column).

By contact with a peculiar time, there results the functioning ability of the powers. It (i.e. time) is established as the cause of (their) instigation.

Because the activity of efficient powers is perceived at the time of spring etc. (i.e. at a particular time only), time is inferred as being the instigator and the instrumental cause of them (i.e. efficient powers). The (efficient) powers, instigated by time, accomplish the activities such as the creation etc. of beings. (9)

And thus :

janmābhivyaktinīyamāḥ prayogopanibandhanāḥ /
nityādhīnasthititvāc ca sthitir niyamapūrvikā ||10||

The restrictions concerning creation and manifestation are dependent upon (this) instigation. And, because the existence (of created beings) is dependent upon the eternal (time), existence follows the restrictions (of time),

The efficient powers, instigated i.e. permitted by time, create an effect and also manifest (it). In the 'satkārya' (Sāṃkhya) system of philosophy, a created and manifested (being) is restricted to exist for a particular period of time. That is why he states : 'existence follows restrictions (of time)'. It (i.e. existence) is dependent upon eternal time. Even the destruction (of beings) is dependent upon time, because of the capacity of the destructive instigations of (the efficient) powers effected by time. By this (kārikā) is elaborated what has been said previously :

'In the creation (arising), existence and destruction (of beings).....' (= VP 3.9.3). (10)

He states yet another effect of time :

sthitasyānugrahas tais tair dharmaiḥ saṃsargibhis tataḥ /
pratibandhas tirobhāvaḥ prahāṇam iti cātmanah ||11||

From this (i.e. time, results), through various commingled activities, the promotion of an existing being, (as well as) suspension, disappearance and destruction.

From this i.e. time, there result one by one (i.e. in due order)

for a being already existing, through other commingled activities which cause growth (1) promotion characterised by growth; (and through other commingled activities) which are destructive (2) suspension of the self of the being, i.e. the inability to perform its task; (3) disappearance i.e. vanishing; (4) destruction i.e. the state of dwindling away etc. All these changes depend upon time, because (their) duration is restricted. (11)

Having done thus (i.e. in the light of the above statements), he states that all orderly peculiar activities of beings are called time itself, because, due to (their) dependence upon time, they do not appear separately :

*pratyavastham tu kālasya vyāpāro 'tra vyavasthitaḥ |
kāla eva hi viśvātmā vyāpāra iti kathyate ||12||*

Here (i.e. in this world) at every stage, certainly the operation of time is established. For indeed, activity is called time, the soul of the universe, itself.

By the difference of "favourableness" etc., the operation of time is invariably connected with every stage of restricted existence, creation and suspension. Therefore, (time is) *ātman* i.e. operator (lit. = remaining in the place of a string) of the universe, due to its (i.e. the universe's) dependence upon this (i.e. time).¹ Because (time is the instrumental) cause of activities, this (i.e. time) is treated as being identical with activity. (12)

To establish its (i.e. time's) being the soul of the universe, he states :

*mūrtinām tena bhinnānām ācayāpacayāḥ prthak | -
lakṣyante pariṇāmena sarvāsām bhedayoginā ||13||*

By it (i.e. time), possessing differences, through transformation (caused by it), growths and decays of all different material forms are seen separately.

Because the transformation of beings possessing animate and inanimate forms is caused by it (i.e. time), in youth and old

1. For *sūtrātman* compare *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3, 7, 1-2.

age, growth and decay are seen distinctly in their succession. "Possessing differences" means possessing diversity, which is superimposed by peculiar commingled activities. By using the term "material forms" (*mūrti*), he states that with regard to eternal (beings), there is no time-effected promotion. Through permission and suspension, the states of creation and destruction depend upon time. (13)

He states that time, because of (its) appropriate name, is the cause of the diversity of the universe :

*jalayantrabhramāveśasadrśībhiḥ pravṛttibhiḥ /
sa kalāḥkālayaṁ sarvāḥ kālākhyāṁ labhate vibhuḥ ||14||*

With motions similar to the turnings and agitations of a water-wheel, it (i.e. time), all-pervading, driving all parts (*kalā*, of the material world), obtains the name "time" (*kāla*).

(It is like) a mechanical contrivance for raising water i.e. in most cases a (Persian) wheel (or machine); 'its turning' i.e. (its) revolution; through it (i.e. the turning), the impulse i.e. agitation of even that (wheel is achieved); similar to these are rotations of revolving time by (consisting in) the ever renewed rise of spring etc. Through these (activities), this (i.e. time), though 'all-pervading' i.e. all-penetrating and eternal, 'drives' (*kālayati*) i.e. pushes the 'parts' (*kalāḥ*), synonyms for 'beings', releases (them) from their (material) causes (and) makes them turn around. Therefore it (i.e. time) obtains the appropriate name '*kāla*'. By this he indicates the following : The soul of the universe is but one, called '*para-brahman*' i.e. the real Being. This same one, due to its being the agent of manifold actions, is defined as possessing unlimited power. And thus, manifesting successive beings which revolve like the turnings of a wheel, it 'drives' (*kālayati*) the beings. Therefore, it is called 'time' (*kāla*). This all-pervading one is independent. For this very reason, it has been established as being an independent power in the *Vākyapadīya* : "Resting on whose time-power, whereupon parts are superimposed.." (= VP 1.3). And here (i.e. in this chapter) too, he will establish : "There are different doctrines about time ; some call it power" (*śakti*); some call it "soul" (*ātman*); and others call it "deity" (*devatā*)" (=VP 3.9.62).

Just as an operator makes the water-wheel turn with his arm, in the same way, the all-pervading (*parabrahman* makes) the beings (turn) through the time-power. (14)

Time's motion, characterised also by suspension, is overcome only through its permission. Therefore, by reference to a simile, he states dependence upon time in every respect i.e. negatively and positively :

pratibaddhāś ca yās tena citrā viśvasya vṛttayaḥ |
tāḥ sa evānujānāti yathā tantuḥ śakuntikāḥ ||15||

It (i.e. time) alone permits the various operations of the universe which are suspended by it (i.e. time), just as the string (of a bird-catcher suspends and permits) the birds (used to catch others).

It is time which releases, when it has reached the state of spring etc., those efficient powers which are suspended by time, when it has reached the time-division of winter etc. Therefore, it is said that it "drives" (*kālayati*). This is as follows : a string i.e. a thread for binding (when) slackened, sends out i.e. releases small birds which are used as a means to catch large birds. Again, the same one (i.e. string) suspends (them) when pulled back, For, bird-catchers cause the birds tied to strings to move in order to catch other birds. And thus, tied to a string they (i.e. birds) experience permission and suspension by the releasing and pulling back of it (string). But they are not able to fly away just like free (birds do), because, when they wish to do so, they are pulled back by the string. In the same way, material things tied to the string of time, experience forever creation and destruction characterised by expanding and shrinking. This is the sense. And consequently, the universe, caught in the web of time, is brought forth when its time has come; it exists (for some time) when it has been brought forth; and when it has existed, having done its work, undergoes destruction. (15)

(If it is asked) how ? he states the sequence in this very (process) :

viśiṣṭakālasambandhāl labdhapākāsu śaktiṣu |
kriyābhivyajyatenityā prayogākhyena karmṇā ||16||

When the powers have reached maturity through (their) connection with a peculiar time, eternal activity is manifested by an act called “instigation” (*prayoga*).

As the diversity of the creation of the universe is (intended) for the experience of the animate beings, at the end of the dissolution (of the universe, i.e. at the beginning of the creation), productive powers direct themselves individually, by the force of destiny, towards atoms. (This is according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems of philosophy).

Or, according to another system of philosophy (i. e. Sāṃkhya), in the primordial matter (which is) the original cause and in the eternal original (subtle) causes (i.e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) whose powers tend towards action, there arises for their mutual combination a peculiar act namely “instigation” (*prayoga*) which is called “inciting” (*preraṇā*), whereby general motion (is caused). This means, eternal activity, the true nature of which was previously expounded, is manifested entering into all beings. Thus, (all) operative causes combine mutually. (16)

And further :

*jātiprayuktā tasyām tu phalavyaktiḥ pratāyate |
kuto 'py adbhutayā vṛttyā śaktibhiḥ sā niyamyate ||17||*

After it (i.e. after eternal activity has been manifested), the manifestation of effect (lit. fruit), arises, prompted by genus. It (i.e. the manifestation of effect) is checked by the powers by a miraculous course of action.

When that eternal activity is manifested, manifestation of fruit i.e. manifestation of effect arises within the (material) causes. “It (i.e. genus) is the prompter of activity for the sake of the production (i.e. manifestation) of its dependences (i.e. individual effects)” (=VP 3.1.27). Thus it has been stated that the genus is the prompter. Because, the operations of the causes are consistent (or, possible) through the connection with effects belonging to a restricted genus, the genus causes the prompting. As the two systems of philosophy distinguished by their views regarding “*sat*” and “*asat*” have been previously (i.e. in VP 3.3.79) refuted, he states “by a miraculous course

of action.” This has been explained in the verse quoted below : “This course of action is so extremely miraculous that without parts and without sequence, the essence of previously non-existent beings comes to light (through it)” (=VP 3.3.81). And the manifestation of effect thus accomplished is restricted by efficient (material) powers, whence it remains there and is treated as belonging to them. Because the operation of efficient (material) causes, in accordance with both ‘sat’¹ and ‘asat’² philosophical systems, has been rejected, the placing of an effect in its own self and also its restriction (is) a miraculous i.e. marvellous course of action. (17)

He states what happens immediately afterwards :

*tatas tu samavāyākhyā śaktir bhedasya bādhikā |
ekatvam iva tā vyaktir āpādayati kāraṇaiḥ ||18||*

Afterwards, however, a power called ‘inherency’ (*samavāya*), opposed to division, makes those manifestations (of effects) as if (so to speak) identical with their (material) causes.

‘A cloth made of (lit. in) these threads’—in this and similar (statements), the cause for ascertainment of ‘in these’, the inherency (*samavāya*) was established before (VP 3.3.10) as a power, because there should be some dependence accepted (for such an ascertainment). After the restriction (of the manifestation of effect, as taught in *kārikā* 17), this power (i.e. *samavāya*) makes the division between the cause and effect disappear, whence here (the cause and effect) appear as if identical. And thus, some (the Sāṃkhya philosophers) do not admit the effect to be different from its material cause. In reality, there is no identity, because, the whole, which is the object of the knowledge of undividedness, is different from the component parts, which are the object of the knowledge of dividedness. Hence the word ‘as if’ (*iva*, is used in this *kārikā*). (18)

1. The Sāṃkhya System of philosophy teaches that “things which are already existent in their subtle form” (*sat*) are only manifested and not newly created (*satkāryavāda*).

2. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems of philosophy teach that “things are not existent in their subtle form” (*asat*) and thus are newly created (*asatkāryavāda*).

When the manifestation of effect has been established thus :

athāsmān niyamād ūrdhvaṃ jātayo yāḥ prayojikāḥ |
tāḥ sarvā vyaktim āyānti stacche chāyā ivāmbhasi ||19||

And after this restriction (taught in verse 17), the genera, which are the prompters, all become manifest just like a shadow (reflection) in pure water.

(The word) *atha* (is used here) in the additive sense, as the idea of 'immediately afterwards' is denoted by the word 'ūrdhva'. When the manifestation (of effect) has been restricted within itself, then right away, because perfection and relation are simultaneous, the manifestation of effect, immediately after it has arisen, is connected with its genus as its prompter. Since, however, in a moment after the time of perfection, qualities such as colour etc. come into being; (and) because of the connection of the sense-organ (eye) with its object, (there will be its perception, through the relation called) 'inherency in the connected (object)'; it is so called, because colour inheres in a produced substance and the substance is connected with the sense organ (eye). (After this perception), the genera become visible, because of (their) inherency in a substance possessing a colour. Here is an example: In clear water, the shadow i.e. the reflection of trees etc., (is seen) inseparably from the water. In the same way, the genera are also treated as if they have obtained identity with the manifestations (effects). This is the similarity of the simile. (The word) 'all' (*sarvāḥ*, indicates all kinds of genera as) 'genus general' (*sattā*, which is called *parā jāti*); 'genus of a substance' (*dravyatva*, which is called both *parā* and *aparā jāti*); 'genus of earth' *prthivī*, which is called both *parā* and *aparā jāti*) etc. (19)

After this, he states the creation of qualities (such as colour etc.) :

kāraṇānuvidhāyitvād atha kāraṇapūrvakāḥ |
guṇās tatropalabhyante svajātivyaktihetavaḥ ||20||

Because (an effect) must be preceded by (its inherent and other) causes, qualities (such as colour etc.) are manifested (or produced, lit.=perceived) in it (i.e. in a produced substance like pot, cloth etc.), preceded by (their) causes (i.e. a produced substance which is

the inherent cause of its own qualities, and the qualities of its component parts which are the non-inherent causes of its own qualities). (And thus manifested qualities are) the reasons for the manifestation of their own genera.

He states that effects (i.e. the qualities such as colour etc.) arise after the origin of (their inherent and non-inherent) causes (which are produced) first. Thus, for one moment, the manifestation of effects (i.e. substances such as pot etc.) is without qualities. Later on, the creation of colour etc. (takes place) in the whole (such as pot etc.). (Here) the qualities of (its) component parts (are) the non-inherent causes (of its own qualities) and the whole (i.e. the substance itself is) the inherent cause (of its own qualities). The colours etc. thus created, manifest their genera i.e. 'the state of being colour' (*rūpatva*) etc. (According to Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems, the world-process is as follows) : (In the first moment), activity is created in atoms by destiny; (then, in the next moment, the atoms are) disconnected from (their) former place; (then in the next moment) the destruction (of the former connection, i.e. complete severance from it); (then) mutual combination (of atoms, i.e. connection with other productive atoms); (then) the production of all objects of experience beginning with (the production of) a two-atom-combination. This is the gist. Throughout all these (activities), the power of time, called sequence, is in operation. This has to be admitted (or, this is the 'permission') (of time).¹ (20)

So far, the proceedings of the creation of beings, caused by time, have been explained. Now he explains existence :

*āśrayāṇām ca nityatvam āśritānām ca nityatā /
tā vyaktir anugrṇāti sthitis tena prakalpate ||21||*

Let eternity of dependences (i.e. on which things depend), or, eternity of dependents (i.e. genera) be the support of those manifestations (effects). Thereby (their) existence is made possible.

1. Here, the commentator used the words "*ity abhyanuññeyam*". These can be translated in either of the ways shown above.

Since the dependences i.e. the material causes of the manifestations of effects are eternal, their(i.e. manifestations') destruction following the destruction of (their) causes is not there; thus their existence (is possible). Therefore, the eternity of causes, atoms etc., is agent (here), which supports those manifestations of effects; because it, a supporter, makes them exist. Otherwise, after the destruction of (their) support, they could not exist. Even if the manifestations of effects possessed non-eternal dependences, due to the eternity of the genera dependent on them, the existence (of the manifestations of effects) is made possible by their genera alone, following the non-destruction of (their) causes. Because, insofar as they belong to a particular genus, (their) existence is possible for a fixed time. Otherwise, if the genera, which are dependent (on the manifestations of effects), were separated (from these manifestations), the substances would become as if non-existent; because, they could not be referred to. (21)

He states : And thus existence, just as creation, is also dependent on something else :

*anityasya yathotpāde pāratantryam tathā sthitau |
vināśāyaiva tat sṛṣṭam asvādhīnasthitim viduḥ ||22||*

As (there is) dependence in (the case of) creation of a non-eternal thing, so also in (the case of its) existence. (Otherwise) it (i.e. a non-eternal thing, would) be created for destruction only. (Therefore, philosophers) assign a dependent existence (to it).

Because there is no creation without a cause, this (creation) is dependent (on its cause). In the same way, because there is no self-existence of a thing without the support of a cause, a created (thing) would suffer destruction immediately after its creation ; thus, that (thing) would be created for destruction only, and not for any purposeful action. Because the creation of this (i.e. a thing) must not be purposeless, the followers of the Vaiśeṣika System of philosophy opine that the existence (of a created thing) is supported by (its) cause (22)

But, since by sequence and simultaneity no permanent, purposeful action is possible, (and) since at the end, the des-

truction (of everything) is seen, and the being produced for the reason of (its) being created, perishes (immediately after) it is created, and since there (in the existence) is no relation (of cause with its effect), there is no existence (of created things). Having raised this doubt, he states :

*sthitah saṃsargibhir bhāvaiḥ sa kriyāsu anugṛhyate |
naiṣāṃ sattām anudgṛhya vṛttir janmavatām smṛtā ||23||*

It (i.e. a being), co-existing with commingled elements, is promoted to (purposeful) actions. Without admitting the existence of these (commingled elements), no course of action can be established for created things.

A being is capable of purposeful action, when it is supported by commingled i.e. cooperative (elements). For, no single (factor) is productive, the final success of an action (results) from a complete set (of necessary factors). Hence, without admitting the existence of these commingled i.e. cooperative (factors), no course of action i.e. operation is possible for created things in any task. Thus, the following definition of existence is arrived at : it means, it is the agent of many successive actions after various cooperative (factors) have been secured. Thus, the permission (of time) for existence too is achieved. But, when it is urged "What do the cooperative (factors) perform ?", then (the answer is) the meaning of cooperation is just working together. Because, addition (growth etc., as distinct from pure existence) has been discussed somewhere else, those who maintain this doctrine, establish a qualified permanency (of the created beings). (23)

Now, he explains the course of time characterised by suspension :

*jarākhyā kālaśaktir yā śaktyantaravirodhinī |
sā śaktiṃ pratibadhnāti jāyante ca virodhinaḥ ||24||*

There is a power of time called "decomposition" (jarā) which obstructs (time's) other power (i.e. *abhyanuḥjñā*, functioning in creation, existence and growth). It (i.e. decomposition) suspends the power (i.e. the strength to exist and grow), and obstructing (states) arise.

That power of time is called "decomposition" (jarā), by which a being is decomposed. It suspends other powers like youth

etc., which are common to both animate and inanimate beings, and hinders the ability of manifestations of effects to perform those purposeful actions which are determined by sojourning in another time. And consequently, certain peculiar states like slowness of intellect and drought etc., which are opposed to strength, are generated in animate as well as in inanimate beings. Whence it appears that decay is at hand. (24)

Thus, when a being is inhabited by decomposition :

prayojakās tu ye bhāvāḥ sthitibhāgasya hetavaḥ |
tirobhavanti te sarve yata ātmā prahīyate ||25||

Which elements (i.e. factors), being promptors, are causes for the state of existence, all those disappear, whence the self perishes.

By which commingled i.e. cooperative (factors) beings are promoted to perform their respective task, all those, being the causes of the parts (i.e. stages) of existence, disappear, when a being is inhabited by 'decomposition' (*jarā*), as if ungrateful, though they did dwell together with it. After their disappearance, the nature of also this being, which has performed its function, departs (from it). (25)

He states that, by the agents of destruction, nothing is done to this (i.e. a being) :

yathaivādbhutayā vṛttyā nikramam niribandhanam |
apadam jāyate sarvam tathāsyātmā prahīyate ||26||

Just as by a miraculous course of action everything is created without sequence, bond and abode, so also (by the same miraculous course of action) its (i.e. the being's) self perishes.

Because in the case of creation, the operation of causes, according to the (Sāṃkhya System) "*satpakṣa*" and the (Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems) "*asatpakṣa*", was previously refuted (VP 3.3.74-79), the universe seems to be created without realisation of (its) form, without a bond of collection of causes and hence without sequence; since due to the absence of the operation of causes, it is not created in successive order part by part. This has already previously been settled in the reflection (i.e. dis-

cussion) on illusion (*vivarta*, VP 3.3.81). In the same way, with regard to destruction too: the destruction of beings, which depends on their sojourn in time, is indeed without bonds, because if it (i.e. destruction) were done (i.e. caused by a cause), it (i.e. destruction) would wrongly come out as a being. This is the meaning. Thus, creation, existence and destruction take place by permission and suspension caused by time. (By this) it is decided that in all these (states) there is the operation of time which is the soul of the universe. With respect to this, it has been said : “Here (i.e. in this world), at every stage, certainly the operation of time is established.” (VP 3.9.12). (26)

Now, he states some other reason for inferring (the reality) of time :

kriyayor apavargiṇyor nānārthasamavetayoḥ |
sambandhinā vinaikena paricchedaḥ katham bhavet ||27||

How can an exact discrimination be possible between two ending activities, which are inherent in separate objects, if there is not a single linking factor ?

Here (i.e. in this world), activity, to begin with, is one whose body is the collection of many moments. As these moments are not simultaneous, activity has a sequence. Thus, (activity is) indeed favoured by the power of time (i.e. sequence). For, every sequence is the essential quality of time. Though the end, after the beginning, with regard to all activities is equal, the peculiar exact discrimination, that (a particular activity) is done quickly and (a particular activity) is done slowly, is impossible without having a linking factor as a precondition. Here, by the word “which are inherent in separate objects” (*nānārthasamavetayoḥ*), he states the difference of activity due to the difference of dependences (i.e. beings). Therefore, this special designation (i.e. “done slowly” and “done quickly”) is not caused by one activity. Because, in the statements such as “a cloth is made slowly” and “a pot is made slowly”, the continuation (of the designation “made slowly”) is there though the dependences (i.e. beings) are different; because, this (continued designation) is not possible insofar as the activity, inherent in different dependences (i.e. beings), is different. For

the same reason, this special designation is not occasioned by the non-eternal substances (i.e. cloth and pot). Because a non-eternal substance is different (from another non-eternal substance), it cannot be a cause for a non-differentiated special designation. Nor again could the agent etc. be the cause here, because this (i.e. the special designation) is continued there even when he too differs. Therefore, it is time which is the cause of this (special designation). If time is also different, the continued apprehension is not possible. Therefore, (in the *kārikā* it is explicitly) said : “(If there is not) a single (linking factor)”. For time being SINGLE, creates by commonness a continued apprehension. (27)

Even if it is so, how is the peculiar designation such as (a particular activity) “is slow” (and a particular activity) “is quick” (possible) ? Having raised this doubt he states :

*yathā tulāyām haste vā nānādravyavyavasthitam |
gurutvam parimīyeta kālād evaṁ kriyāgatiḥ ||28||*

Just as the weight of (lit. settled in) various substances can be measured in a balance or in a hand, in the same way, the course of activity (can also be measured) by time.

Just as the single stick of a balance, on which are superimposed the differences by the contact of strings (tightened on to it) and the lines (drawn on it), determines the weight inherent in substances such as gold, silver etc., as being a *pala* (particular measure of weight) etc.; in the same way, time also, by the employment of its own power experiencing the universal form, measures the series of activities on which diversity has been imposed through the difference of actions such as the closing of the eye-lashes etc. The hand (of some persons), possessing great practice, can measure a particular weight of things; hence it (i.e. the hand) is also given as a simile. Just as the hand, so also time, which is SINGLE and devoid of superimposition (in reality), determines by its strength the difference that belongs to activity. (28)

Thus that SINGLE time :

*jahāti sahaṣṛttāś ca kriyāḥ sa samavaasthitāḥ |
vrihir yathodakam tena hāyanākhyām prapadyate ||29||*

That (i.e. time) forgoes (all) cooperative and co-existing activities, just as a rice (grain) the water. Hence, (time) obtains the name 'hāyana' (a year).

When (thus) the SINGLE time is established, manifold activities, though they co-exist with it (i.e. time), go away (from it). Therefore, it i.e. time obtains the name 'hāyana' which is a synonym for 'saṃvatsara' (a year). (It) leaves the activities and therefore (it is called) 'hāyana'. Here is an example: a rice grain in the form of seed, leaving the co-existing water, is designated as 'hāyana'. That is why, the derivation (of the word 'hāyana') was taught simultaneously (for both of its meanings) by the author of the Grammar (i.e. Pāṇini), through (the sūtra) 'haś ca vrīhikālayoḥ' (3.1.148), a simile being suggested thereby. Just as a rice (grain) is favoured by co-existing waters, so also time favours beings through cooperative activities. Dividedness (of time is) due to superimposition. Undividedness is what is Principal (essential, real). (29)

If time is established as SINGLE, how can it have the form of sequence ? In order to answer this question he states :

*pratibandhābhyānujñābhyām vṛttir yā tasya śāśvatī |
tayā vibhajyamāno 'sau bhajate kramarūpatām ||30||*

(Time) has an eternal course through suspension and permission. Being divided by this, it (i.e. time) obtains the form of sequence.

When effective powers cease to function, the suspension of any activity (takes place). The opposite of this (is) permission. Through these (i.e. permission and suspension), the eternal course of time is seen in (all) beings. In ever-changing beings, it is a regular (course) that something is destroyed and something is created. Thus, the sequence resting in activity is imposed on time. It does not actually exist there (i.e. in time). This is the meaning. The principal quality of activity is the sequence (which is) imposed on something else (i.e. on time). Priority and posteriority in prior and posterior beings is also not independent, but it is recognised as being superimposed. In the same manner, simultaneity, too, a quality opposed to sequence resting in activity, is attributed to time. (30)

He states that evenness (favourableness) and unevenness (unfavourableness) are also attributed to time :

*karṭṛbhedāt tadartheṣu prakarṣāpācayau gataḥ |
samatvaṃ viśamatvaṃ vā sa ekaḥ pratipadyate-||31||*

The SINGLE entity (i.e. time), having obtained excellence and decline due to the diversity of agents in their (i.e. human beings') actions, becomes even (favourable) and uneven (unfavourable).

Here (i.e. in this world), when the agents practise the customs laid down in the “veda” and “smṛti”, then, time, by meeting with excellence, though¹ SINGLE, is designated as “kṛta (yuga)” etc. It means that due to the multitude of the agents of the good custom, (time is) not different (i.e. it is even, i.e. it is a favourable time). The good custom is to be cultivated by the agents with that object. When the agents, being unrestrained, transgress the traditional custom, then due to detracting from the custom, decline takes place; hence this uneven time is called “kali(yuga)” etc. Thus, time, though SINGLE, obtains division due to the diversity of agents. (31)

He states another division attributed to time :

*kriyābhedād yathaikasmimś takṣādyākhyā pravartate |
kriyābhedāt tathaikasminn ṛtvādyākhyopajāyate ||32||*

Just as with regard to a single (person), due to the difference of functions, different designations like carpenter etc. take place; in the same way, with regard to the SINGLE time, due to the difference of activities, (different) designations like season etc. arise.

As in the case of a single agent, designations such as carpenter, blacksmith etc. take place, brought about by (his doing) a particular work like cutting (wood), changing the shape of iron etc.; likewise, in the case of SINGLE time, different designations such as spring etc. arise, due to the difference of activities characterised by the issue of peculiar flowers etc.

1. Instead of ‘kālaḥ sa evaikaḥ’ (=the reading given in the Triv. ed.) The Benares ed. reads : ‘kālaḥ sama evaikaḥ’. Then the translation will be : ‘time, though SINGLE, being even (i.e. being favourable) is designated...’

(Here) due to the expression “et cetera” (*ādi*), the designations of black and white fortnights, the designation of day and night, the designation of evening and morning etc. are taken (meant) one after another, being superimposed by different activities. (32)

He states that there is another distinction which is attributed to time :

*ārambhaś ca kriyā caiva niṣṭhā cety abhidhīyate |
dharmāntarāṇām adhyāsabhedāt sadasadātmanaḥ ||33||*

Due to the difference of superimposition of alien activities with regard to a being, which possesses the states of both existence and non-existence, (the SINGLE time) is called beginning (time), functioning (time) and completion (time).

A thing is of a non-existing nature before its creation. After it is created, (it is of) existing nature. When it is taken as a thing possessing oneness by the faculty of mental perception, (then), due to the difference of alien activities, the time such as beginning etc. is referred to with distinction. It is like this : having aimed at a thing with the faculty of mental perception, procuring of favourable means (is called) beginning time; the functioning of procured favourable means is called functioning time; the completion of (the action) to be performed (is called) completion time. Thus then, through the fabrication of a difference of functions at their proper time, the division of time such as beginning (time) etc. (is accomplished). (33)

He states that this (i.e. the beginning time etc.) is equal everywhere :

*yāvāṁś ca dvyaṇukādīnām tāvān himavato 'py asau |
na hy ātmā kasya cid bhettuṃ pracetuṃ vāpi śakyate ||34||*

As much as this (i.e. the beginning time etc.) is in the case of ‘a two-atom-combination etc.’ (*dvyaṇukādi*), so much it is (in the case) of the Himālaya’s too. For, the soul of anything can neither be decreased nor increased.

Because the wholes (at the moment of their coming into existence as pure substances) have no parts, the beginning time etc.

is equal to all (wholes). The component parts, however, are something different from it (i.e. the whole). Quantity is also an attribute (*guṇa*), which is different from the whole. Therefore, on account of its (i.e. quantity's) difference, the nature of that (i.e. the whole) can neither be increased nor decreased. Hence, due to equality of (any) non-eternal substance, which is (as yet) a mere whole, the beginning time etc., with regard to (substances) of small quantities and of big quantities, cannot differ on account of this (i.e. the whole). But (it differs) on account of alien activities (which are) different from the whole. This is the meaning. (34)

This he states :

*anyais tu bhāvair anyeṣāṃ pracayaḥ parikalpyate /
śanair idam idaṃ kṣipram iti tena pratīyate ||35||*

The increase of things is accomplished by elements different from them. Hence, it appears that, this (is) slow, (and) this (is) quick.

With regard to the wholes of small and big quantities (respectively) : the increase (of the latter) is accomplished i.e. attributed (to them) by other (elements) i.e. many component parts different from them; and decrease (of the former) by a few component parts different from them. Thus, the whole, which has many component parts, is created slowly; but (the whole), which has a but few component parts, is created quickly. So, there (i.e. in between big and small wholes), the beginning time etc. is apprehended as being different. Because the difference (between the whole and its component parts) has disappeared in the aggregate (totality), the whole is designated by the attributes of the component parts. Actually, (the beginning) time (etc.) do not differ with regard to the wholes. (35)

Because :

*asataś ca kramo nāsti sa hi bhettuṃ na śakyate /
sato 'pi cātmatattvaṃ yat tat tathāivāvaśiṣṭhate ||36||*

(There) is no sequence of a non-existing (being); for it cannot be differentiated. That which is the true nature of an existing (being) remains as it is, too.

Before its creation, a being is non-existent. Because it does not have its own nature, there is no division through prior and posterior relation, and (therefore, there is) no sequence. Even (in the case of a being), which exists after it is created, there is no sequence; because, its own nature remains in the same manner, insofar as it cannot be differentiated. Having thus intelligently investigated (the matter), it can be conclusively said that there is no (i.e. can be no) reference to sequence (in the case) of both existing and non-existing beings. For sequence depends upon difference. And with regard to a thing, which is in the stage of being produced, and (which is), in reality, in the stages of both existing and non-existing; this difference is not possible at any of the two stages. Therefore, attributing of priority and posteriority (is done) by holding (considering) together (the two stages). Thus, because even the first sequence is an artificial one, every (sequence) is of that kind (i.e. artificial) and not principal (i.e. not real). (36)

He states that not only appellations such as season etc., whose causes are the differences of activity, are applied to the SINGLE time, but the designations "past" etc. also :

*kriyopādhiś ca san bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānatāḥ |
ekādaśabhir ākārair vibhaktāḥ pratipadyate ||37||*

(Time), having activity as its superimposition, becomes past, future and present, (which are) divided by eleven forms.

When the activities are created and later on destroyed, then (time), having these activities as its superimposition, is designated as past time. But, when activities have their means nearby and when their emergence is expected, then, time, having these (activities) as its superimposition, becomes future. But (time), having begun and not completed activity as its superimposition, (is) called present. These divisions of time such as the past etc. become again eleven in number, on account of their (respective) subdivisions. (37)

He states how (they become eleven in number) :

*bhūtaḥ pañcavidhas tatra bhaviṣyaṃś ca caturvidhaḥ |
vartamāno dvidhākhyāta ity ekādaśa kalpanāḥ ||38||*

Amongst these, past (time) is of five kinds; future (time) is of four kinds; present (time) is of two kinds; thus (altogether) there are eleven fabrications (mental creations).

The past general, being set apart from special kinds (of past), is counted as being one division of past (time, Pāṇini 3.2.110). Thus it has been said : “Just as the special one (is set apart from other special ones), so also the general one (is set apart from special ones)” (*sāmānyam api yathā viśeṣas tadvat*, *M. Bh.* on 2.2.24, Kielhorn’s edition Vol. I. P. 422:5). “Applicable to the current day” (*adyatana*) is the second division of past (time, Pāṇini 3.2.102). “Not applicable to the current day” (*anadyatana*) is the third (division of past time, Pāṇini 3.2.111). Because the fusion of “applicable to the current day” and “not applicable to the current day” is different from either of the two, it (is the) fourth (division of past time).¹ The “unwitnessed past” (*parokṣa*), unperceived by the narrator (Pāṇini 3.2.115), is a kind of “not applicable to the current day” (and) not a division of past, hence it is not counted separately. But, when (though it is) a future, it undergoes the operations of the past tense through extended application (Pāṇini 3.3.132, it is the) fifth division of past. (Because here) the past idea is attributed to future, (this past is) secondary. “The future general” (Pāṇini 3.3.13); (“Future) applicable to the current day” (Pāṇini 3.3.164); “Future) not applicable to the current day” (Pāṇini 3.3.15); and “the fusion of (future) applicable to the current day and (future) not applicable to the current day” (example of this division may be “*adya śvo vā gamiṣyāmi*”) are four divisions of future (time). But that (future), which obtains the operations of “the future general” due to the negation of the grammatical operations (=that would take place) in the case of the future not applicable to the current day (Pāṇini 3.3.135), is referred to in Grammar as “the future general” only. The principal (real) present (is) one (division of present time). But the secondary (present is) that (when) in (nearby) future and past, the state

1. Example of this division is “*adya ca hyaś cābhukṣmahī*”. In this case too the “*luṇ*” (affix) is employed as in the case of “the past general” “(*adya ca hyaś cābhukṣmahīti vyāmiśre luṇeva yathā syāt*, *M. Bh.* on 3.2.111, / Kielhorn’s edition Vol. II. P. 118:24).

of present (time) is extended according to Pāṇini's rule "*vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavad vā*" (3.3.131). This (is) the second (division of present time). Thus (all) these divisions of time are fabricated for the clear division of the grammatical operations. In reality, it (i.e. time) is not of so great a number. In this way, there are distinctions of activities on account of there being (these eleven) subdivisions. On account of the distinction of the activities, there has been taught a division of past time etc.¹ (38)

How can a past activity, (as if) existing,² bestow on time the designation 'past' ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*kāle nidhāya svam rūpam prajñayā yan nigrhyate |
bhāvās tato nivartante tatra saṁkrāntaśaktayaḥ ||39||*

Beings, having placed their own state on time, which (i.e. the state) is received by the intellect, depart from it (i.e. time), (having thus) transferred (their) powers there (i.e. to time).

When the beings are decayed by activity, they are called past, i.e. they have lost their form.³ That being so, the form itself of those beings, which is received by the intellect in their existing stage, (the beings) having placed it (i.e. the form) on permanent time, which is their support, pass away. From whence, after having been experienced once, (they) arise in the stage of such as are remembered. Thus, having transferred (their) powers to the past time, (beings) follow the reference based on remembrance.⁴ This is the purport: The essence of time is well-known through the fact that it has beings (through

1. Here some words are missing in the Triv. ed. They have been restored and translated as above on the basis of Benares ed. which reads :

"*evam anantarabhedatvāt kriyābhedāḥ | kriyābhedād bhūtādibheda uktāḥ |*"

2. The Benares ed. reads : ('though) non-existing' (*avidyamāna*).

3. Here some words are missing. They have been restored and translated as above on the basis of the Benares ed. which reads : "*kriyayā nivartitāḥ padārthā atītā iti bhanyante, atītasvarūpāḥ |*"

4. The Benares ed. reads : '*vyavahāraṁ smārtam*' (the reference based on remembrance). The Triv. ed. reads: '*vyavahāraṁ svāttam*' (the reference acquired by itself) which seems to be wrong with reference to the context. Therefore it has been corrected on the basis of the Benares ed. and translated as above.

their activity) as its superimposition, whose stages are remembered after they have been experienced (once); these beings fabricate the designation 'past' with regard to it (i.e. time), they themselves (through their activity) being superimposed (on time). Thus, usages such as 'A pot existed' etc. are possible. Therefore, this (usage) itself is an evidence which makes known the existence of time. In case of (this) thing's (i.e. time's) non-existence, no such usage (would be) possible. (39)

(Their) form being transferred to time, usages such as 'it existed' etc. (are possible). But, how is, through this, the designation 'future' too, established in time, (possible) ? Upon this he states :

*bhāvinām caiva yad rūpaṃ tasya ca pratibimbakam /
sunirmṛṣṭa ivādarśe kāla evopapadyate ||40||*

Reflection of the form of (beings) that are yet to come, is possible in time only; just like (a reflection of anything is possible) in a well cleaned mirror (only).

(There are two forms i.e. two representatives of the same genus). One is the external form (the form existing in the outside world) of things whose production is expected in the presence of capable means; and the other is the reflection of this external form i.e. generic form, which is ascertained in the intellect. And due to the determination of the identity of these two (forms), one visible and the other imaginable, entrance into permanent time takes place, i.e. there is transference of (their) powers to it (i.e. time). Thus, due to the attribution of that (i.e. form, to time), having determined futurity in time, it (i.e. futurity) is referred to with regard to external beings, as having that (reflected form) for its superimposition. (This is) just as the determination of a fixed form is done after the reflection of a form has been ascertained in a clear mirror. This is the meaning. The things shine (become perceptible) being in the web of time etc. only. In this lies the similarity (of time) with a mirror.

He states, thus there is an everlasting change of beings due to the transference of (their) form to time :

*trṇaparnalatādīni yathā sroto 'nukarṣati /
pravartayati kālo 'pi mātṛā mātṛāvatām tathā ||41||*

Just as a stream drags along grass, leaves, creepers etc., so time, too, lets the properties of those possessed of properties (beings) move forward.

Just as the flow of a river drives forward certain things such as grass etc. i.e. drives (them) away from their position, and again taking away certain (other) things, puts them in the place of those (first ones); in the same way, ever-active time, taking away beings again, releases (them, makes them flow) and causes changes in the qualities of the released (ones). (41)

He confirms the same (idea) through another simile :

*āviśyevānusaṃdhatte yathā gatimatām gatīḥ |
vāyus tathaiva kālātmā vidhatte kramarūpatām ||42||*

Just as air, having entered (into their bodies) somehow, accomplishes the motions of those possessing motions (i.e. creatures); in the same way, time also accomplishes the (beings') consisting of sequence- (= bestows on beings the form of sequence).

Just as the air called the vital air, dwelling in the joints of the inner parts of corporeal beings, accomplishes the actions of going, coming, etc., likewise, the essence of time, too, having entered into the self of beings, accomplishes through suspension and permission, the submersion and emersion (respectively, of beings) characterised by priority and posteriority.¹ (42)

He states that the following results (are based on time) :

*ayanapravibhāgaś ca gatiś ca jyotiṣām dhruvā |
nirvṛttiprabhavāś caiva bhūtānām tannibandhanāḥ ||43||*

The divisions of "the sun's progress to the north and to the south" (*ayana*) , the fixed movement of the heavenly bodies, and the destruction and creation of the elements are dependent on this (i.e. time).

1. Here the Benares ed. reads : '...causes through suspension and permission, submersion and emersion (respectively, of beings) and thereby accomplishes sequence characterised by priority and posteriority' (*pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām nimajjanonmajjane kurvan kramam paurvāparyalakṣaṇam prakalpayati*).

The divisions of “the sun’s progress to the south” (*dakṣiṇāyana*), and “the sun’s progress to the north” (*uttarāyana*) depend on the limits effected by time. The restricted movement of the constellations consisting of rise etc. follows time. At the time of the creation and dissolution (of the universe), creation and destruction of the elements, characterised by manifestation and disappearance, depend on time. Thus, all-beneficial time is called the soul of the universe. (43)

He states that the heavenly bodies, which are otherwise called (by the name) “constellation” (*nakṣatra*), are forms of time-division. (There is) no other real state (of them) :

mātrāṇāṃ pariṇāmā ye kālavrṭtīyanuyāyinaḥ |
nakṣatrākhyā prthak teṣu cihnamātram tu tārakāḥ ||44||

The changes of “the subtle elements” (*mātrā*), which follow the course of time, are called separately “constellations” (*nakṣatra*). Stars (*tārakā*) are mere signs with regard to them.

The changes of the (subtle) elements, (occasioned) by their connection with a peculiar time, having been divided severally get the name of “constellations” (*nakṣatra*) such as “*kṛttikā*” etc.¹ For (it is) thus : a being which has arisen at the time of conjunction of “*puṣya*” etc. (asterisms) with the moon, gets the designation of that particular constellation. For instance, a boy (born under the constellation, *tiṣya* or *punarvasu*) is called “*Tiṣya*” or “*Punarvasu*”. Precisely for this reason is explained the disappearance (Pāṇini 4.3.34) of the suffix (taught in Pāṇini 4.3.33 under the heading of Pāṇini 4.3.24) in these cases (i.e. the names “*Tiṣya*” and “*Punarvasu*”). For the denotation of things on the part of words is derived as depending on their (i. e. things’) own nature.² Therefore, a thing, which is created at a particular time, is to be designated as “*Tiṣya*” etc. Consequently, in reality, the transformation of the subtle elements itself is time, having the constellations as its superimposition. Due to the mention of the word “separately” (*prthak*), time’s constellation-derived

1. The word “*kṛttikādi*” is missing in the Triv. ed. It has been reconstructed and translated as above on the basis of the Benares ed.

2. The syllable “*te*” after “*anvākhyāya*” and the words “*svābhāvikam hy*” are missing in the Triv. ed. They have been reconstructed and translated as above on the basis of the Benares ed.

names such as “*kṛttikā*”, “*rohini*” etc. (are possible). For such application of time¹ with regard to beings is a superimposition through a created activity. But heavenly bodies are indicators of just that (time-division). However, they do not really (by themselves) form a constellation. Because that is accomplished through (their) conjunction with the moon. (44)

He states that just as a particular restricted time is made known through signs in the form of heavenly bodies which are effects, so also by other (signs) too :

rutair mṛgaśakuntānām sthāvarāṇām ca vṛttibhiḥ |
chāyādi-pariṇāmaś ca ṛtudhāmā nirūpyate ||45||

By the cries of beasts and birds, by the courses of action on the part of immovable objects, and by the changes of shadow etc., the season-dweller (i.e. time) is ascertained.

The dwelling i.e. the place of which (are) the seasons; because (time) appears (becomes distinct) through them. The independent power of “*brahman*” (the self-existent spirit), called time, appears divided through divisions such as spring etc. And, as the difference of fixed seasons is determined by means of the cry of the male cuckoo (*pumskokila*) etc., through the issue of ever-new buds, through the difference of shadow and heat etc., which are to be observed on account of the particular passage of the sun etc., and through particular creepers and flowers. For instance :

“Spring is clearly observed, because it is full of six-footed ones (i.e. bees) who are intoxicated by the smell of sweet-scented flowers; the woods are filled by the cry of the male cuckoo ; there blows (everywhere) sweetly jingling and pleasant wind; the lovers cling to the embraces of their (just) awakened beloved.”

“Summer with its heat is clearly observed (through the following characteristics) : It is pleasant on account of the sweet smell of jasmine flowers; there is disturbance (everywhere, because of the elephants who are scorched in the heat.”

1. The Benares ed. reads “For, this time-division” (*sa hi kālābhāgaḥ*).

2. The word “*gajakampitaḥ*” is missing in the Triv. ed. It has been restored and translated as above on the basis of the Benares ed.

Many creepers and flowers are slightly withered by the shaking wind; in hiding places (there is) a mixed crowd of creatures whose mouths are dried-up and who suffer from thirst; the sand is scorched."

"The rainy season is clearly observed in due order here (i.e. among the seasons, through the following signs) : the sun-heat is decreased and the sky is covered by clouds; portions of the ground are flooded by water and here and there are uneven ways, through wanderings (or, difficult for the wanderings, of creatures); the quarters are filled by the cries of peacocks; groups of couples stay in creeperhouses ; men absent from their home and longing (for their wives) are made to tremble".

"The autumn can be clearly observed: through the cries of swans (geese); through the masses of lotus-flowers which shine just like fluid lac; through the clearness of the quarters (of the sky) and completely white clouds which are spots on the sky; through the fields of paddy which look beautiful due to the ripening; through the graceful movements of the deer; through twinkling stars on the cloudless sky".

"The season called winter (from the middle of November to the middle of January) can be clearly observed (amongst these, i.e. seasons) : from the spotless winter-flowers which shine in every quarter; from the animals whose limbs are weak due to stiffness; from crows remaining in the woods; from the long nights which are most welcome to the lovers and from the frost".

"The later, cool or dewy, season (from about the middle of January to the middle of March) is clearly observed (through the following signs): the way (in the mountains) is blocked by the fall of snow; the leaves have fallen and multitudes of birds suffer from cold and (begin to) shiver; the surface of the earth is encompassed by the veils of mist; in this season, there blows always a cold wind which wanders through blossomed jasmine flowers and which is capable of breaking heavy snow; (a time) when swollen trees are seen everywhere. (45)

Now he states the application which time has for beings, even in "the doctrine of non-duality" (*advaitavāda*) :

*nirbhāsopagamo yo 'yam kramavān iva dṛśyate |
akramasyāpi viśvasya tat kālasya viceṣṭitam ||46||*

It is the effect of time that the apparition of the universe, (which universe is), in reality sequenceless, is perceived as if possessing sequence.

As explained (lit. shown) in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (3.3.81), the universe, (which is) the illusory form of “*brahman*” (the self-existent spirit), is devoid of sequence. (The fact) that this universe appears as having sequence, is due to the ability of the suspension and permission effected by time-power. For, the power of “*brahman*” (which is called) time, (and) which in reality is an illusion, bears fruit in individual souls, because it is the cause for the appearance (of beings) with (= as if having) sequence. This has been already decided in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* (VP 1.3). This appearance with (= as if having) sequence (is) indeed the first operation of time here (i.e. in the universe). (46)

He states that the division of time too, which comes immediately after (this first operation) is superimposed :

dūrāntikavyavasthānam adhvādhikaraṇam yathā |
cirakṣipravyavasthānam kālādhikaraṇam tathā ||47||

Just as the decision of far and near has space as its support (= is based on space, by superimposition), so also, the decision of quick and slow has time as its support (= is based on time, by superimposition).

Due to the difference of the manner of going, the decision with respect to “way” such as “this way is far” (and) “this way is near” (is made). But there is no difference of way. For, the way which is far for slow-goers, this same way is near for people moving quickly. Likewise, in time, the static, the decision that (it is) slow, (is) due to the superimposition of increased continuity of activities (and the decision) that (it is) quick (is) due to the superimposition of decreased continuity of activities. (47)

Now, though the division of time such as past etc., which has activity as its superimposition, has formerly been taught, (it is) again established here (in order) to teach something special :

*tasyābhinnasya kālasya vyavahāre kriyākṛtāḥ
bheda iva trayaḥ siddhā yāml loko nātivartate ||48||*

The three apparent divisions (i.e. future, present and past) of this undivided time, which are effected by activity in common practice, are established, which the world does not transgress.

Because (it is) not possible to deal with undivided time in the world, the three apparent divisions of this (i.e. time) named as past, future (and) present (are) generally known having activity as their superimposition. In reality, it (i.e. time) is SINGLE. (Time is called) past when the activity is finished; when the activity is expected (it is called) future; when it (i.e. activity) is present in the form of a flow of moments, it is called present. This (three-fold division of time), indeed, (is) the principal one. (48)

Why is its (i.e. time's) division (in reality) not there (=How can then time be undivided) ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*ekasya śaktayas tīraḥ kālasya samavasthitāḥ |
yatsambandhena bhāvānāṃ darśanādarśane satām ||49||*

(There are) three powers of the SINGLE (i.e. undivided) time which remain firm. By contact with them, visibility and invisibility of existing beings (take place).

(When there is) a difference of effect, a difference of cause (is inferred); because, due only to the difference of power, the difference of effect is possible. There is no real difference in the cause of the world (which is) called time. For so, by contact with "present power" (*vartamānaśakti*), manifestation i.e. creation of beings existing (in the subtle form) only (takes place). By contact with "past and future powers of time" (*atītānāgatakālaśakti*), the disappearance of existing beings only (is called) invisibility i.e. non-manifestation (and) destruction (which are synonyms for) "non-existence of anything which may yet be" (*prāgabhāva*) and "non-existence due to destruction" (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*). Thus, due to the difference of powers (of time), the difference of effect occurs. Hence, the fabrication of (real) time-division is unfounded. (49)

He distinguishes between visibility and invisibility only through the division of powers :

*dvābhyāṃ sa kila śaktibhyāṃ bhāvānāṃ varaṇātmakaḥ |
śaktis tu vartamānākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāśinī ||50||*

This (i.e. time), through two powers (i.e. past and future), indeed (is) of covering nature with regard to beings. But, the power called “present” (*vartamānākhyā*) makes the form of beings appear.

Time effects covering i.e. the concealment of existing beings through past-and future-powers. Through present-power, the appearance of the form of beings (is) visibility. (50)

Why does (the remanifestation of beings) covered by “past-power” not (take place) in the same way as the remanifestation of (beings) covered by “future-power” is effected by “present-power” ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*anāgatā janmaśakteḥ śaktir apratibandhikā |
atītākhyā tu yā śaktis tayā janma virudhyate ||51||*

Future-power does not obstruct present power. But by the power which is called “past”, creation is impeded (i.e. present-power is obstructed).

“Future-power” does not obstruct “present-power” which is associated with creation i.e. the “future-power” does not put any obstruction on (the process of) creation. For in its own (i.e. future) time, that (i.e. present-power) is obstructed by it (i.e. future-power). But, when (there is) the presence of capable causes, “future-power” bestows favour for the rise of “present-power”. For, that (i.e. a being) alone is called future (lit. not yet come) which after a while obtains the state of present time. But the power of creation, called “present (-power)”, is indeed obstructed by “past-power”. For there is no rebirth of a dead one. Thus, a material object, which has fallen in the past-course (i.e. in past time), does not appear (again). (51)

Well, but powers, resting on (a being) possessing powers, remain always just like (this being) possessing powers (i.e. remain as long as the being possessing powers remains). Thus

(beings are) always in contact with them (i.e. the powers). (Therefore), visibility and invisibility (which are) states opposite (to each other), might occur simultaneously with regard to beings ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*tamaḥprakāśavat tv ete trayo 'dhvāno vyavasthitāḥ |
akramās teṣu bhāvānām kramāḥ samupalabhyate ||52||*

These three courses (i.e. the past, future and present) (are) indeed established as devoid of sequence, just like darkness and light. (But) the sequence results in them with regard to beings.

The three time-divisions, called past, future and present, are courses just like roads. Just as travellers perform a continuous series of coming, going, etc. on roads; likewise beings, experiencing transformation in these (three courses of past, future and present), perform a continuous series of going and coming (i.e. disappearance and appearance respectively). (A being) which exists in the future course, the same one having fallen in the present course, falls again in the past course. Thus, the material objects are admitted as having three courses by the "followers of the doctrine of evolution" (*pariṇāmavādin*). It has been stated in the *Pātañjala* (*Yogasūtra* 3.13): "The external aspects possess three courses" (*dharmās tryadhvānaḥ*). Though these three peculiar powers remain in time devoid of sequence, because of their similarity to darkness (past and future-powers) and light (present-power), they effect a regular course among beings which are to be effected, (and) arrange a prior-posterior relation (among them), fabricating the existing and non-existing states, through visibility and invisibility. Just like the three ingredients, having the characters of serenity (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*), though existing simultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect beings through their peculiar evolution, in a proper manner in the splendour of their own course of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, (become) capable of effecting sequence in external aspects (lit. in the difference of beings). This is the meaning. (52)

He distinguishes between the natures of darkness and light only :

*dvau tu tatra tamorūpāu ekasyālokaḥ sthitiḥ
atītam api keśam cit punar viparivartate ||53||*

Then, there (i.e. among the three powers), two (i.e. past and future-powers) are similar to darkness; the state of the one (i.e. present-power) is just like (that of) light. (According to the opinion) of some, the past too returns again.

Past and future, being the causes for the enclosing of beings, are courses possessing the nature of inertia. For, enclosing is the nature of inertia. It has been said : “Inertia is indeed heavy and enclosing” (*guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ, Sāṃkhyakārikā, 13, pāda 3.*). The present course is equal to illumination (and therefore) it is similar to serenity (*sattva*). (It has been said) : “Serenity is desired to be light in weight and illuminating” (*sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam, Sāṃkhyakārikā, 13, pāda 1.*). But, activity (*rajas*) is function in general. It is a peculiarity of time and it is connected with everything. “*Rajas*”, being the inciter through suspension and permission, conformable to function, is indeed the soul of time. The transformations of the three ingredients (i. e. *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*)...¹ can be related to time, though it is in the state of power. The three ingredients (i.e. *sattva, rajas* and *tampas*, exist) in the individual soul through knowledge, activity and inability respectively. It has been said before (i.e. in *kārikā 51* of this same *Samuddeśa*) that the power of time i.e. the past-power of time is obstructive to the power of creation (i.e. the present-power of time). But some opine that (beings), remaining in the past-course too, rise again in another time, in the rotations of the world. For, beings which remain in the interior of the “Primordial” (*pradhāna*), show their own self at a proper time made and perfected and disappear again there (i.e. in the Primordial) alone (at the time of) the dissolution of the universe. This is the approach of the *Sāṃkhyas* who are intent

1. There a few letters are missing in the word “*tatpa...rvadarśane 'pi*” and therefore the entire word has been left untranslated. As it refers to some doctrine, the meaning of the sentence does not greatly differ. Probably he refers to the doctrine of ‘non-duality’. Here Benares ed. reads: ‘*brahma-darśane 'pi*’ (in the doctrine that *brahman* (is ultimate reality)).

upon 'the five reasons' (*pañcādhikaraṇa*).¹ Thus, according to this philosophy, the possession of the three courses (i.e. past, future and present) with regard to beings is certainly consistent, because, all (beings) pass through the three courses (i.e. past, future and present). In the world, which is functioning in a continued series, there are no beings present which have already expired. Although the world revolves, it is not the same that returns but something similar to it. Thus (it has been) previously said that the past-power obstructs the present-power (*kārikā* 51 above). But here, according to (the doctrine) :

'There is no non-existence of an existing (being)' (*nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*, *Bhagavadgītā* 2.16b), it is said that the same thing, which has disappeared, returns again. In this way, somehow, having admitted the difference between external aspects and the bearer of the external aspects, it has been said that according to this philosophy, the external aspects possess the three courses (i.e. past, future and present). (53)

Now he states the opinion of the *Mahābhāṣya*². Maintaining that there is, really, no difference between the external aspects and the bearer of the external aspects, the three designations (i. e. past, future and present) are existing simultaneously with regard to the bearer of the external aspects through (the states of) the external aspects:

yugapad vartamānatvaṃ taddharmā pratipadyate |
keṣāṃ cid vartamānatvāc caiti tadvad atītatām ||54 ||

1. The *Sāṃkhyas* give the following five reasons to prove their theory that a being exists in the subtle form before its manifestation : (1) A non-existing being cannot be created; (2) A particular material cause is needed to create a particular effect; (3) From everything, everything cannot be produced ; (4) A capable man makes a thing which can be made; (5) An effect is just as its cause.

(*asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt |*
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam ||
Sāṃkhyakārikā 9).

2. The Benares ed. reads : "*matāntaram āha*" (He states another opinion). This view has been found in the *Vyāsaḥāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* 3.13, (*The Yoga System of Patañjali* transl. by James Haughton Woods, Cambridge 114 : p. 213, line 26ff.)

Because some (external aspects) are present (while others disappear), the bearer of the external aspects achieves the state of present time as well as the state of past time, simultaneously.

The external aspects are represented by the states of past, present and future. He, to whom they belong is 'the possessor of these' i. e. the bearer of external aspects. And he achieves the state of present time i. e. the condition of present time (and that of past time and future time) simultaneously i. e. at once. Due to the presence of the external aspects as well as due to the presence of the bearer of the external aspects) this bearer of the external aspects who is not different¹ from it (i. e. the external aspect) achieves right away the state of past time, too, like that i. e. like the state of present time, (which means that) he meets the state of past time also, simultaneously. Due to the extinction of an external aspect (we must assume that) the bearer of the external aspects is not different² from it (i. e. the external aspect; this is the meaning.³ In this way, due to the futurity of an external aspect, (the bearer of the external aspects) achieves the state of future time, too. This being so, the bearer of the external aspects is permanent (and) consequently, though he really always remains, is referred to as possessing the three states simultaneously, on account of the three-foldness of the external aspects. It has been established elsewhere that just as the form (is not different from its object), in the same way, the external aspects are not different (from the bearer of the external aspects).⁴ (54)

Pray, as the past and present times are incompatible, how can they co-exist? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*hetūpakārād ākṣipto vartamānatvam āgataḥ/
śānta hetūpakārah sa punar nopaiti darśanam ||55||*

(A being),-effected by the favour of (its) causes, achieves the state of present time, (when) the favour of the causes has subsided, it (i. e. a being) does not obtain visibility

1.2. At both the places the Triv. ed. reads "tadvyatirikta" (different from it), which is not relevant. Therefore, it has been corrected on the basis of the Benares ed. and translated as above.

3. Here some words are missing which are not reconstructable.

4. VP 3.2. 6 and the commentary on it.

again (i. e. it loses the state of present time and achieves the state of past time.)

When the causes, closely united with (each other), begin (their) favour for the effect, then a being, being created from the strength of them (i. e. the causes), descending into the path of visibility and fulfilling purposeful actions, is designated as present. But, when the favouring operation (of the courses is) stopped, (then a being, having) completed (the function) to be performed (by it), and falling into invisibility, (is called) past. But, when the causes (are) not closely united (with each other) for (bestowing) a favour, then (it is called) future (lit. not yet come). Therefore, a difference of designations (used with reference to) one single being is not contradictory, because (the difference of designations) is fabricated through alien superimpositions, the designation depending upon the existence or non-existence of a purposeful action. Pray, because that (being) alone, which (is) the performer of a purposeful action, (is called) existing, how can (a being remaining in the past course) be called existing, as it (i. e. the purposeful action) is absent in the past course ? (Here) we do not regard (consider) the existence of a thing on account of a purposeful action (it performs), but (we take the existence) of material objects, remaining in their own (pure) nature and devoted to their mere nature¹. And this existence (of material objects) possesses three ingredients (i. e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). (There is) no destruction of the Eternal One (i. e. the general reality), because its favour (is) everywhere and eternal, and because (it has been) established (so) by Vītapañcaka (the name of a philosopher). It has been stated (by Vītapañcaka : “That (i. e. the manifested) collection of the three worlds separates itself from the manifestation alone (i. e. disappears), but not from its existence (i. e. the general reality).” (55)

He states that some (scholars, who) like a brief statement, having viewed the invisibility of a being in the past and future courses (of time) as equal, admit only two courses of time (which are) synonyms for suspension and permission:

1. Here a few syllables are missing in the text which have been reconstructed and translated as above.

*dve eva kālasya vibhoḥ keśāṃ cic chaktivartmanī |
karoti yābhyāṃ bhāvānām unmilananimīlane ||56||*

(According to the view) of some (scholars, there are) only two power-courses of all pervading time, whereby (time) effects the creation and destruction (lit. the opening and closing) of beings.

Invisibility of a being in the future and past courses (lit. non-existence of anything before its production and non-existence of anything after its destruction) is not different. Thus (there is) only one power (both in the past and future courses) characterised by 'suspension' belonging to time representing the lord over all (beings) and the cause of it (i. e. invisibility). The second (power) of time, the lord over all (beings), is characterised by 'permission' effecting the manifestation of beings. In this way, the essence of time has been expounded. (56)

Here some differ in opinion (stating) that, because (it is) impossible to refer to time (which is) undivided, activity etc. alone, which is fabricated to superimpose differences upon it (i. e. time, may be accepted) as the cause for such references. What is to be done with the invisible and inapplicable nature of time ?¹ And if there is difficulty for (practical) dealing

1. This is the view of the *Nirīśvarasāṃkhya* (i. e. the *Sāṃkhya* System of philosophy propounded by Kapila). Vācaspatimiśra, commenting on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 33, writes as follows :

"According to the Vaiśeṣikas time is SINGLE (i. e. undivided, and therefore, it) cannot cause references such as "future" etc. Therefore, this (i. e. time, according to them) obtains the division of "future" etc., through the differences of superimpositions (of activities). The *Sāṃkhya* philosophers say, these superimpositions (on which the Vaiśeṣikas depend for the division to time) alone may be the (direct) reasons for the reference of "future" etc.; away with useless time! Therefore, another element in the shape of time is not admitted (by the *Sāṃkhya* philosophers)." (*kālaś ca vaiśeṣikābhimata eko nānāgatādīvyavahārabhedam vartayitum arhati | tasmād ayam yair upādhibhedair anāgatādibhedam pratipadyate santu ta evopādhayo*— '*nāgatādīvyavahārahetavaḥ kṛtam atrāntargaḍunā kāleneti sāmkyācāryāḥ | tasmān na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti*').

("Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvakaumudī*" von Srinivasa Ayya Srinivasan, Hamburg 1967 : p. 140 line, 17ff.)

without time as fabricated above, the nature of time may be as follows. Thus he states according to their doctrine (Yoga System)¹ :

*kalābhiḥ prthagarthābhiḥ pravibhaktam svabhāvataḥ |
ke cid buddhyanusamhāralakṣaṇam taṁ pracakṣate ||57||*

Some (philosophers) teach (that) it (i. e. time) is spontaneously divided by (i. e. into) parts possessing separate purposes, and (that) it is characterised through a collection (of these parts, performed) by the intellect.

1. This is the view of the *Śeṣvarasāmkhya* (i. e. the *Yoga System* of philosophy propounded by Patañjali). The *Yogabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* 3. 52 runs as follows : "Just as the atom is the minimal limit of matter, so the moment is the minimal limit of time. Or, the time taken by an atom in motion in order to leave one point and reach the next point is a moment. But the continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence. Moments and the sequences of these (moments) cannot be combined into a (perceptually) real (*vastu*). Hours-of-eight-and-forty-minutes,-days-of-thirty-such-hours and so on are combinations by a mental process (*buddhi*). Thus time being of this nature, does not correspond to anything (perceptually) real, but is a structure by a mental process and follows as a result of perceptions or of words. (Thus) to the ordinary thinking of the emergent mind it might appear as if it were (perceptually) real. But the moment does come within the (real) objects and rests upon the sequence. Furthermore the sequence has its essence in an uninterrupted succession of moments. This (sequence) is called time by experts in time. So the yogins use the term. For two moments cannot occur simultaneously. Because it is impossible that there be a sequence between two things that occur simultaneously. When a later moment succeeds an earlier without interruption, there is a sequence. Thus in the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or later moments. Therefore there is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly the whole world passes through a mutation in any single moment. So all those external aspects of the world are relative to this present moment. By constraint upon moments and their sequence both are directly perceived. And as a result of this, the (intuitive) knowledge proceeding from discrimination comes about."

("The *Yoga-System of Patañjali*, embracing the mnemonic rules, called *Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali* and the Comment, called *Yoga Bhāṣya*, attributed to Veda-Vyāsa, and the Explanation, called *Tattva-Vaiśārādī*, of Vāchaspati Miśra", translated by James Haughton Woods, published under Harvard Oriental

Different accumulations (of parts), characterised by activities and being collected by the intellect, (i. e.) being arranged (by the intellect) become causes for designations such as 'slow' and 'quick' etc. and, in the same way, of the designation 'day' 'night' etc. (as well). And thus, an interior (lit. not exterior) element, a mere collection (effected) by the intellect (and) devoid of characteristics, has been established to represent time, e. g. 'slow' etc. For, in this way, by subdivision of a long time, different portions only are arranged as its (i. e. time's) own parts. In the same manner, (the parts) of a short time and also of the time 'day' etc. (are arranged). And this division of a long (time) etc. (does) not (result) from a superimposed activity, because in the way just stated, there is a difference in the intellect itself. And this same difference is superimposed upon the continued succession of activities arranged within its own (i. e. the intellect's own) object. This is seen (in the dictum) :

'It is the essential quality of the intellect to conform to the shape of its objects'. On account of the shortness and longness of (the collection of) moments which are the objects (of perception), the condition (or, state) 'slow' etc. is employed for the intellectual calculation (or, structure) representing time. (57)

Series, Volume Seventeen, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Harvard University Press, First Edition 1914 : p. 287, line 36ff, and p. 288)

(*yathāpakarṣaparyantaṁ dravyaṁ paramāṇur evaṁ paramāpakarṣaparyantaḥ kālāḥ kṣaṇo yāvatā samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrvadeśaṁ jahyād uttaradeśaṁ upasampadyeta sa kālāḥ kṣaṇas tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramaḥ kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastusamāhāra iti/ buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ sa khalv ayaṁ kālo vastuśūnyo 'pi buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānāṁ vyutthitadarśanānāṁ vastusvarūpa ivāvabhāśate/ kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī / kramaś ca kṣaṇānantaryātmā taṁ kālavidāḥ kāla ity ācakṣate yoginaḥ/ na ca dvau kṣaṇau saha bhavataḥ/ kramaś ca na dvayoḥ sahabhuvor asambhavāt/ pūrvasmād uttarasya bhāvino yad ānantaryaṁ kṣaṇasya sa kramas tasmād vartamāna evaikāḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottarakṣaṇāḥ santīti tasmān nāsti tatsamāhāraḥ/ ye tu bhūtabhāvinaḥ kṣaṇās te pariṇāmānvitā vyākhyeyāḥ / tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmam anubhavati / tatksaṇopārūdhāḥ khalv amī sarve dharmāḥ/ tayoḥ kṣaṇatatkramayor samyamāt tayoḥ sākṣātkaraṇam/ tataś ca vivekajaṁ jñānaṁ prādurbhavati/)*

(The *Yogabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* 3. 52)

(See *Pātañjalayogadarśanam*, *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣyasahitam*, edited and translated into Hindi by late Pt. Rudradatta Śarmā, publisher Surendrakumāra Śarmā, Vaidika Pustakālaya, Nicibāg Vārāṇasī, 1960, Fifth Edition, p. 400.)

Most Buddhists and others in this connection opine that there is no essence of time; time (is) something else, exterior (one). He states that it may be so, we need not dispute about it :

*jñānānugataśaktiṃ vā bāhyaṃ vā satyataḥ sthitam |
kālatmānam anāśritya vyavahartum na śakyate ||58||*

It is not possible to deal (with the things) without having recourse to time, which really exists either as an exterior one or as the collection made by the intellect (lit. as possessing powers dependent upon the intellect).

This (i. e. time) may have powers such as 'slow', 'quick', 'present' etc., which conform to knowledge i. e. which have the form of the intellect, i.e. (time) may be a mere intellectual collection of this kind or (time may be) some real elementary substance possessing divided powers such as the 'present' etc. By us no philosophical investigation is started. But (by us) should be examined that which is a part in the verbal reference. And there is a verbal reference (i. e. every day-usage relating) to different stages of time such as '(it) was', '(it) is' and '(it) will be'. There, according to the usage, (the reality of) time, which is certain and convenient, should be admitted. This is the meaning. (58)

For, in this way, time is admitted by some (scholars) indeed as being indistinct from beings. Thus he states :

*tisro bhāvasya bhāvasya keśām cid bhāvaśaktayaḥ |
tābhiḥ svaśaktibhiḥ sarvaṃ sadaivāsti ca nāsti ca ||59||*

According to some (philosophers, there are) three powers of activity (which) belong to each and every being. Through these, its own powers, every (being), always, exists and does not exist, too.

In the philosophy (i. e. *Sāṃkhya* philosophy) propounded by the great ṛṣi (i. e. Kapila), in ever changing beings, the mere power of 'serenity' (*sattva*), 'activity' (*rajas*) and 'inertia' (*tamas*) is the appellation of the time-division such as the past etc. Thus too, because each and every being possesses

the three ingredients (i. e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, they are automatically) connected with the three powers) i. e. the past, present and future). (Therefore) the reference to the existence and non-existence (of a being is made) on account of the generation and non-generation of (these) powers respectively. (59)

For thus:

sattvād avyatiṛeṇa tās tisro 'pi vyavasthitāḥ |
kramas tās tadabhedāc ca sadasattvaṃ na bhidyate ||60||

Though these three (powers, i. e. the past, present and future) remain fixed indistinctly from (each and every) being, they (become) a sequence. And on account of their indistinctness (from a being), the existence and non-existence (of a being) do not differ (i. e. do not make any material difference).

These (three) powers alone, (which are) indistinct from a being, are called a sequence. Beings, undergoing appearance and disappearance on account of (their) connection with the powers such as the present etc., show the form of a sequence in themselves. Thus, these powers alone (are) a sequence in purport. Though the (three) powers are not distinct from a being (and) though they remain for ever like (that) being, due to the miracle of the course of action, there is no intermingling (of the three powers). The visibility and invisibility are their operations (i. e. of the powers). And it (i. e. the operation) is peculiar. And the reference to the existence and non-existence (of a being is made) on account of it (i. e. the operation of the powers) alone. Therefore, it (i. e. the reference to the existence and non-existence of a being), too does not make any material difference. The visibility (of a being) remaining in the past and future states is missing, but not (its) existence. Thus, because a reference to the non-existence (of a being takes place) in (the case of its) invisibility alone, and because a being exists (in subtle form) even then (i. e. even in the state of its invisibility), the existence and non-existence (i. e. appearance and disappearance of a being) do not differ (i. e. do not make any material difference). (60)

Whence :

darśanādarśanenaikam dṛṣṭādrṣṭam tad eva tu |
adhvanām ekatā nāsti na ca kiṃ cin nivartate ||61||

One and the same (being), however, is seen and not seen through visibility and invisibility. There is no inter-mingling (lit. oneness) of the courses (i. e. the past, present, and future). And nothing ever desists from (its existence).

The manifestation (of a being) through the present power (is) visibility i. e. perception. But, disappearance through the past and future powers (is) invisibility i. e. the non-perception (of a being). Because both of them (i. e. visibility and invisibility) remain (in a being) in mutual exclusion, (there is) no oneness (i. e. inter-mingling of them.). Thus, due to the difference of operation, (there is), no doubt, a difference of ways, but (there is) no inter-mingling (of the ways). A thing, which (is) seen, and not seen again i. e. passed by, (is) one and the same (lit. the bearer of the external aspects). The bearer of the external aspects does not part from his real state through the rise and fall of the external aspects. And therefore, here, the courses such as the states of the present etc., are not distinct from a being. Due to the absence of the intermixture of functions, (there) is no inter-mingling in the form of a unity amongst them (i. e. the courses such as present etc.). Complete and barren destruction of a real (thing) is not possible. But, (its) disappearance (is possible). Therefore, the existence and non-existence (of a thing) do not materially differ, i. e. (there) is no (material) change between existence and non-existence. For disappeared existence alone is called non-existence (of a thing). But not that non-existence means complete destruction (lit. formlessness of a thing). This is the meaning. It has been said in the *Pātañjala* (i. e. in the *Bhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* 3.13) : “The bearer of the external aspects (*dharma*) does not possess the three courses, the external aspects (*dharmin*) possess the three courses; they (i. e. the external aspects), characterised by them (i. e. the three courses) and obtaining different states, are referred to as different. (And this reference is) due to the alien state (of external aspects) and not due to the alien substance. Like-wise, (an external

aspect), having forgone its future character, obtains the present character. But (it is) not separated from (its) future and past (characters).” (61)

Now he sums up different views on the real state of time according to their sources :

*śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam |
prathamam tad avidyāyām yad vidyāyām na vidyate ||62||*

There are different doctrines about time; some call it “power” (*śakti*), some “soul” (*ātman*) and others “deity” (*devatā*). That (i. e. the doctrine of time) is the first (stage) of illusion, which does not exist in the knowledge (of spiritual truth).

Time is an independent power of “*brahman*” (the self-existent spirit). This is the opinion of honourable Bhartṛhari. But, the commentators comment that the causing power (remaining in things) is called time. For instance : the power of seed, permitting the development of sprout, at the same time suspending the growth of stalk, is called time; because (the power of seed) performs the function (which is generally thought to be performed) by time. In this way, the power of sprout etc., which is a regular order permitting the production of its next effect and suspending the effect (which is) not immediately connected, is called time. But this view appears to be false. For, beings possessing restricted causes do but arise in the presence of (these) causes, not otherwise. Thus it (is) only the strength of a (material) cause (which is mainly responsible for the production of its effect). But, because (this strength of the cause remains) for a restricted time (only), its cooperative factor, time, is said to be different from it (i. e. the strength of a cause). Due to the visibility of sequence with regard to beings created from the series of causes, it should be admitted that (there is) a time-power called sequence having activity as its superimposition. Hence, that (i. e. time) alone, (which is) capable of making differences appear among the beings, (is also capable of) making the sequence appear (which) follows them. Thus, (it is) appropriate (to say) that ‘time’ is the independent power of the self-existing spirit in

touch with the individual soul. For, thus it has been said by us in the *Vākyapadīya* (on 1.32). For this very reason, he states another doctrine which is in favour of this doctrine : the soul i. e. the personal soul i. e. the individual soul alone is called time, because there alone appears the sequence.¹ For, he who is incapable of recognising things (in their) true nature, accomplishes a sequence there according to time which is his own reflection. And thus, because the time-division results from him (i. e. the individual soul), he alone is given the name of time by implication. For, he (i. e. the individual soul) alone (is the) retribution-land (i. e. the place of reward and punishment) for time-power which is the companion of “illusion-power” (*avidyāśakti*). And on account of his (i. e. the individual soul’s) destiny etc. only, suspension and permission among beings (are accomplished by time). Some others opine that time is a deity possessing individual shape and great power. In this (doctrine) also, the power, i. e. the deity alone of “*brahman*” (the self-existent spirit), who is in the form of pure thought, is voracious of the food in the form of the entire world. Thus, (this doctrine too is) in favour of it (i. e. the doctrine that time is the independent power of “*brahman*”). Therefore, the doctrine that (time is the independent power of “*brahman*”) is the settled doctrine here. Therefore this i. e. the doctrine of time is the first (stage) of “illusion” (*avidyā*) which is the cause for the world. For the world is full of apparent differences. And (this) difference (comes) through space and time. And there, the time-division is the first (stage) in the creation of the world. Consciousness in the form of “*paśyantī*” (the second stage of the “*śabdabrahman*” having approached the course of the vital air, appears as if (it had) obtained the sequence through time. Thus (it) has been decided by us in the “*Śabdaprabhā*” on the *Vākyapadīya*². (In detail, it should) be learnt from that alone. For, the reality of “*brahman*” (which is) devoid of sequence, full of knowledge and unimpelled by time, obtains the form of sequence on account of illusion and revolves (i. e. changes from one

1. Some words are missing here in the text. They have been restored and translated as above on the basis of the Benaras edition.

2. The *Śabdaprabhā* is the name of a commentary on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* written by Helārāja. This commentary is not available now.

state to another) in due order. Thus, due to the penetration of time, the appearance of successive material objects occurs in the individual soul who has been proved to have no beginning. For every division is caused by illusion. This division of divine truth, which (is caused) by time according to different doctrines is also expanded only through illusion. But, when the spiritual knowledge is attained (lit. manifested) due to the vanishing of every manifestation of the division, this (i. e. the time-effected division of the divine truth) vanishes too. Therefore, it is useless (lit. it has the result of mere exertion) to discuss here that (some people's opinion is) correct and (some people's opinion is) not correct. Because everything in the empirical world is real, it is irrelevant to decide the real nature (of the things). This is the purport here¹. Thus, in practice, time is useful to the material objects which possess birth. Thus (time) is established. (62)

How then (is) the division of shortness etc., effected by time (possible) in the case of eternal sounds? We say that (it is) fabricated. That (is) just as (in the statements) 'this is slowly done' and 'this is quickly done' though both the cognisances are of equal time, the apparent difference of time is observed in one's own self, through the increase and decrease belonging to the objects; likewise, a difference of time is (erroneously) perceived in a short etc. (i. e. or long, or protracted) vowel, too, although (all vowels are) of equal duration, because the essence of sound is eternal. If it is so:

*abhede yadi kālasya hrasvadīrghapluṭādīṣu
dṛśyate bhedanirbhāsaḥ sa ciraḥkṣiprabuddhivat ||63||*

*hrasvadīrghapluṭāvṛtṭyā nālikāsalilādīṣu |
katham pracayayogyaḥ syāt kalpanāmātrahetukaḥ || 64||*

If there is no (real) time-division in a short vowel (*hrasva*), in a long vowel (*dīrgha*) and a protracted

1. Here the Triv. ed. reads: "vyavahāre sarvasyaivāsatyatayā, sattvavyavasthayanūpapatter ity atra tātparyārthaḥ/" This is irrelevant with reference to the context. Therefore, this has been corrected and translated as above on the basis of the Benares ed. which reads:

"vyavahāre sarvasyaiva satyatayā tattvavyavasthānūpapatter ity atra tātparyārthaḥ"

vowel (*pluta*) etc., and the appearance of difference (of time) is seen (there) just like on the cognisance (or, apperception) of slowly (done) and quickly (done) then, when one repeats a short vowel, a long vowel and a protracted vowel, how can (this seeming difference in time), which is caused by mere fabrication, be qualified to increase the water in a water-clock (*nālikā*) ?

(If it is said that) in the case of a short vowel etc., though (there is) no real difference of time, a fabricated time-difference is resorted to just as in the case of the apperception of 'slowly (done)' and 'quickly (done)' how, then, could a relation of the flow of water (from a water-clock) with increase, result from the difference between a short etc. (i. e. or long, or protracted) vowel which possess a mere fabricated time-difference and which, in reality, are devoid of a time-effected difference ? (For instance:) When a short vowel is uttered repeatedly the flow of water from the water-clock is little, but at (each) repetition of the utterance of a long vowel, it is three times (lit. three parts) more than that, and again three times more (at each repetition of the utterance) of a protracted vowel. If with regard to a short etc. (i. e. or long, or protracted) vowel (there is) no real time-difference (and the apparent) time-difference (is) a mere fabricated one, then, a thing which is fabricated through mere imagination cannot be related to purposeful actions. Thus, in the utterance of a short vowel, (a long vowel and a protracted vowel) etc., the flow of water (from the water-clock) ought to be of the same form (i. e. quantity, but in fact it is not so). Since the expression 'et cetera' (*ādi*) is used (in *kārikā* 64), any difference in the creation of other things, which is observed while a short etc. (i. e. or a long or a protracted) vowel is uttered, may be used as an illustration. Consequently, short etc. (i. e. long and protracted) sounds are actually of different duration and thus (follows) a contradiction to the eternity (of sounds) from admitting the flux of time. This is the meaning.

(63.64)

Here (is) the conclusion :

abhivyaktinimittasya pracayena pracīyate |
abhinnam api śabdasya tattvam apracayātmakam' ||65||

The essence of sound, though it is undivided (by time) and not increasing by nature, is increased through the increase of the causes of (its) manifestation.

Because (manifested) sound, although it (appears) divided (i. e. differentiated) through the differences of short etc. (i. e. or long, or protracted) vowels, is eternal and because there is a difference of time due to the increase and decrease of the multitude of the manifesting sounds, a difference of time must be admitted in regard to the manifested sound, too,—in spite of the fact that it does, really, not possess limitations of time—, inasmuch as no difference between manifested and manifesting sounds is admitted. For, primary (i. e. manifesting) sounds, being heard in contrast to the nature of (manifested i. e. eternal) sound, project their own difference of time on it (i. e. manifested or eternal sound). The true nature of (eternal) sound is not perceived apart from manifesting sounds. It has been stated (VP 1.85) : “The manifested word appears in the intellect together with the last manifesting sound”. Because the essence of the eternal sound depends upon the manifesting sounds for its manifestation, the attribute (of the manifesting sounds) projects its own shape (on the eternal sound) just as the manifesting sound itself (does). Thus the flow of water in the water-clock differs. And for this reason alone, (Pāṇini’s rule), “The letter which has ‘t’ after or before it, besides referring to its own form, refers to those homogeneous letters which have the same prosodial length or time” (*taparas tatkālasya* 1.1.70; *vr̥ttiḥ|| taparo varṇas tatkālasyaātmanā tulyakālasya guṇāntarayuktasya savarṇasya grāhako bhavati svasya ca rūpasya*)¹ is relevant, (namely) through the attribution of time which belongs to the manifesting sound (to the eternal sound). It has been decided in the first *Kāṇḍa* (VP 1.79) : ‘But the modes of recitals (*vr̥ttibheda*), effected by the modified sounds (*vaikṛtadhvani*), do not cause the difference (of time with regard to manifested sounds)’. And it will be stated in the next verse : ‘The multitude of attributes such as (prosodial) shortness, (prosodial) length, nasalisation etc. (seen) on the self of (the manifested)

1. ‘The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini’, edited and translated into English by Ś.C. Vasu, reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1962: Vol. I. p. 63, line 23ff.)

sound, comes through (lit. is dependent upon) the manifesting sound. In the *Brahmakāṇḍa* especially, it has been elaborately said : 'Though that (i. e. the manifested eternal sound) is neither prior nor posterior, (and is) devoid of sequence, it appears as if possessing differences through sequence because the (manifesting) sound is produced in a sequence. etc.' (=VP 1.48). There (i. e. in the case of manifested sounds), unlike in the case of the apperception 'quickly (done)' and 'slowly (done)', this difference of time must be inherent in its (i. e. the manifested sound's) own nature; otherwise no difference in effect (i. e. increase and decrease in the flow of the water in the water-clock would be possible) through it, because (there is) no real difference (of time in eternal sounds). But, because the listeners determine indifference, through indiscrimination, between the primary sound and the eternal sound which are (called) the manifesting (sound) and the manifested (sound) respectively, and due to the fact that the nature of the eternal sound cannot be determined without (the means of) manifesting (sounds), the difference of time belonging to the (manifesting) primary sounds is indeed a supplement for practical purposes. The relation between the primary sounds and the eternal sounds is not the same as that between the apperception and its objects. Because the form of an object is perceived as being distinct from the form of the apperception; but the (manifested) eternal sound is perceived as being indistinct from the (manifesting) primary sound. But in the *prima facie* argument, the appearance of (time-) difference (in the manifested sounds) was questioned carelessly (lit. shutting the eyes just like an elephant), (thinking) that (this difference of time) does not enter the nature (of the manifested sounds); and (therefore), it has been objected that in this way the difference of effects could not be explained. (65)

He states that the eternal sound is undivided not only in (the case of) a short vowel, a long vowel etc., but everywhere in the case of a word, sentence etc. too :

evam mātrāturīyasya bhedo dāśatayasya vā |
parimāṇavikalpena śabdātmani na vidyate ||66||

The difference between the fourth part of a mora = one

fourth of the quantity of a short vowel (*mātrāturīya*) and “(the entire text of the *Rgveda*) containing ten *maṇḍalas*” “(*dāśataya*),” (which comes) through the variation of the quantity (of time), does not exist (really) in the eternal sound.

(There) is no difference, through the variation of the quantity of time, between the fourth part of a mora (*mātrā*) manifested by a very short (manifesting) sound and those hymns (*rc*) consisting of ten books (*maṇḍalas*) i. e. the bulk of the *Rgveda* which contains sixty-four (*adhyāyas*) in number, manifested by very many (manifesting) sounds. Inasmuch as two (manifested) sounds are equal on account of their being eternal, the difference in duration belongs only to the (sounds) manifesting (them). This is the meaning. This is like the two notions of ‘an elephant’ and ‘mosquito’ which by their true nature are of equal form, but are experienced as if they were different due to a disturbance (caused in the intellect) by the (respective) sizes (of the objects they refer to). In the same way, the soul of the (manifested) sound, whose true nature is *sphoṭa*¹ which, is the same² everywhere in the sphere of words and sentences, looks only as if it were different, due to the variation of the (sounds) manifesting (it). (66)

If (there is) a difference of short etc. (i. e. or long, or protracted) vowel due to the difference of a (manifesting) sound, how could (there) different modes of recitals (*ṛttibheda*) be expressive of different effects? And thus, when in the rapid mode of recital (*drutā ṛtti*) the mute letter ‘t’ is added (after a vowel to signify the inclusion of only such varieties of the vowel as take the same time for their utterance as the vowel marked with ‘t’), then, the middle (*madhyamā*) and slow (*vilambitā*) (modes of recitals) ought to be mentioned, too.³ Having raised this doubt, he states :

1. “*Sphoṭa*—the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered”. (See, Sir M. M. Williams’s Sanskrit—English Dictionary, under *sphoṭa*)

2. Here Triv. ed. reads: “*padavākyaviṣaye ’pi vilakṣaṇo ’bhi*” which is irrelevant. Therefore it has been corrected as “*padavākyaviṣaye ’vilakṣaṇo ’bhi-*” and translated as above.

3. The utterance of a letter takes one-third time more in the “*madhyamā*

anuniṣpādikalpena ye 'ntarāla iva sthitāḥ |
śabdās te pratipattrṇām upāyāḥ pratipattaye ||67||

Those (secondary) sounds which, in the manner (of things) issuing in continuous succession, remain, so to say, in the midst (of the ear), become the means for the comprehension of comprehenders.

Those (secondary) sounds, which arise after the soul of the sound is manifested by primary (manifesting) sounds, remain, so to say, in the midst of the ear, like echoes in continuous succession. They (i. e. the secondary sounds), due to the fast frequency of the succession, having reached the space of the ear, (and) becoming the cause for grasping a multitude of sounds from the chord of the organ of hearing, cause a difference in the modes of recital such as “*drutā (vṛtti)*” etc. Thus they (i. e. the secondary sounds) remaining exterior to the soul of the sound (i. e. the manifested eternal sound), do not divide it (i. e. do not cause any difference to the manifested sound). It has been stated (in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*): ‘After the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, the secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance, but the essence of the *sphoṭa* is not affected by them.’ (VP 1.77)¹. It has also been stated in the *Vārttika* (on Pāṇini’s rule 1.1.70) ‘But it is solved. The letters (i. e. the manifested sounds) remain firm (i. e. unaffected). The modes of recitals differ due to the quick and slow utterance (of letters) by a speaker’.

(67)

In this way,—when it is objected that (the time-effected division of short, long and protracted vowels) cannot be demonstrated inasmuch as eternal sound cannot be discriminated through the duration of the manifested sounds, such (proof) is (nevertheless) established (by the statement that the time-effected division)

vṛtti” than in the “*drutā vṛtti*”, while in the “*vilambitā vṛtti*” it takes one-third more than in the “*madhyamā vṛtti*”. In short, the utterance of the same letter takes in the three “*vṛtti*” the quantity of time in the proportion of 9:12:16, respectively.

1. See ‘*The Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti*’, Chapter I., English Translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, published under Deccan College Building Centenary & Silver Jubilee Series: 26, Poona 1965 : p. 80. line 12ff.

belongs to the manifesting (primary sounds and it enters the manifested sounds, too). Now coming to the context, he shows how differently time can be practiced on account of alien superimpositions:

*viśiṣṭam avadhīm taṁ tam upādāya prakalpate |
kālaḥ kalāvatām ekaḥ kṣaṇamāśartubhedabhāk ||68||*

Time, the divider (lit. the SINGLE) of (beings) possessing parts, acquiring particular limits (of activities such as the rise and set of the sun etc.), is differentiated into moments, months, seasons (etc.)

Time, the divider of beings (through their activities) possessing parts i. e. possessing limbs (and therefore) non-eternal, is differentiated into half a second (*lava*), the thirtieth part of a day (*muhūrta*) etc.; through acquiring limits (of activities) such as the rise etc. of restricted things (i. e. the sun, the planets, the constellations etc.) (68)

He states that even this division is not real:

*buddhyavagrahabhedāc ca vyavahārātmani sthitaḥ |
tāvān eva kṣaṇaḥ kālo yugamanvantarāṇi vā ||69||*

And time, remaining (always) the same, (becomes) within the sphere of normal usage a moment, or a world age, or a *manvantara*¹, because it is differently perceived by the intellect.

Whatever part of the continuous succession of moments is perceived as a unit by the calculating intellect—that much time taken together (*ekaḥ*), is referred to as ‘a month’ etc. ‘The time arrived at by a process (*kāṣṭhā*) of diminution (of moments) is called *kṣaṇa*.—‘The time arrived at by a process (*kāṣṭhā*) of accumulation (of moments, is called) *manvantara* etc. Though in reality, time, an elementary substance, is SINGLE, there (exists), nevertheless, this intellectual fabrication (of time-

1. See the footnote on page 45.

division). In the doctrine that time is a collection (of parts characterised by activities) performed by the intellect (*kārikā* 57 above), this (fabrication is) essential (real). (69)

Pray, a reference to time such as a moment, day, night etc., (is made) on the basis of the flow (of water) from the water-clock. Thus, it (i. e. the flow of water from the water-clock) itself may be called time, what is the use of another fabricated thing (i. e. time) ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

pratibandhābhyānujñābhyām nālikāvivarāśrite |
yad ambhasi prakṣaraṇam tat kālasyaiva ceṣṭitam ||70||

That flow, which (takes place) in water resting in the cavity of the water-clock, is prompted by time alone through suspension and permission.

When water contained in both sides of the water-clock (*ghaṭikā*) flows out of the hole, the effluence of one portion (of water, which takes place) first (implies, at) the same time the non-effluence of another (portion of water): this is meant by suspension and permission, effected by time. Otherwise, the water (which is the) whole, pervading into all parts (of the water-clock), would flow at once due to its heaviness. But due to its flow with a sequence, time, which is active here, is different (from the flow of the water) and the flow of the water alone is not time. But, this (i. e. the flow of the water) determines it (i. e. time). That (i. e. the flow of the water), determined by the activity of shutting the eye or by the flow of the vital air or by the continued succession of moments (calculated) by the intellect, is capable of determining the time different from them. (In fact), the shutting of the eye-lashes etc., too, is determined by time (which is) in the form of a subtle sequence. Therefore, it cannot be denied that time-power, called sequence, is connected with all beings in a subtle form incessantly (lit. sewn consecutively). Because it is experienced thus (in all beings). Since every perception is encompassed by the form of a sequence, the supreme soul (essence), which is devoid of sequence and which is of the nature of “*Agni*” and “*Soma*” and which changes continuously through the support of transformed states such as the forms of the moon,

the sun etc., spreads the course of the mundane egg for the promotion and destruction of the creatures. And this has been elaborately decided by us in the *Vākyapadīya* (i. e. probably in the commentary called “*Śabdaprabhā*” composed by Helārāja on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, 1.3.) (70)

If time is SINGLE (undivided), how can its (i. e. time's) division from the flow of the water through bigger and smaller holes (of the water-clock) be determined? Having raised this doubt, he states:

alpe mahati vā chidre tatsambandhe na bhidyate |
kālasya vṛttir ātmāpi tam evāsyānuvartate ||71||

The course of time does not change with its (i. e. the water's) relation to the hole (whether the hole be) big or small. Its (i. e. time's) soul, too, follows that (i. e. the relation of the water to the hole) alone.

The operation of time, characterised by suspension and permission, does not change when the relation of water (takes place) either with a big or a small hole in the water-clock. And thus though the soul of time is indistinct, (it) follows that relation between the (size of the) hole (and the amount of water passing through it), *alone*. And by following it, due to excess of suspension and permission in (the case of) a small hole (for the effluence of water from it), this (i. e. time) is determined as a long time. The following is the meaning : Here, though time (is) undivided, its division, (which is) imposed (on it) through the relation (of water) to a particular hole (of the water-clock) is determined. (Pray) for the same reason (given above), (when the hole is closed), the water does not run out of the water-clock (*ghaṭikā*), but (it i. e. the water) runs out (flows out) when (it is) released through the hole. (Under such circumstance) what is to be done with time here?—One should not argue like this. The fundamental operation of time cannot be refuted (in this case). The suspension and permission alone, which are effected by time, are regulated through the parts and the hole respectively of the water-clock. For instance, the time-effected suspension and permission, in germination of the sprout from the seed, are nourished by the

granary and the field respectively. That is why it has been said (in this *kārikā*) that its (i. e. time's) soul, too, follows that (i. e. the relation of the water to the size of the hole) *alone*. For, when coherence between a visible cause and time-power (is established), due to (their) mutual congeniality, (it is) not reasonable to drop one of them while holding on the other. (71)

He states : 'What (is to be done) with more (elaboration)? The soul of time, though undivided, displays a division in all beings through the variety of its own powers:

ākriḍa iva kālasya drśyate yaḥ svaśaktibhiḥ |
bahurūpasya bhāveṣu bahudhā tena bhidyate ||72||

Through that, which appears as if a play of time possessing manifold forms through its own powers, (the soul of time) is manifoldly divided with regard to beings.

Because (beings) view (everything) through the face of time, it (is) the master of beings (and) playing with them (as) with plays (—play-things i. e. toys?) and accomplishing the rise and fall of (beings) as in the swing-play, shows the dividedness of its own self, inhabited by its own powers, through a variety of forms such as present time etc. (72)

And, furthermore:

tvacisārasya vā vṛddhiṃ tṛṇarājasya vā dadhat |
tāvat tadvṛddhiyogena kālatattvaṃ vikalpate ||73||

The same amount of real time (lit. essence of time) causing the growth either of a bamboo (*Bambusa*) or of a palmyra palm (*Borassus flabelliformis* Roxb.) is differentiated merely through the contact with their growth.

The same amount, i. e. the same quantity, of real time (lit. essence of time), not divided by reason of mere suspension and permission (effected by it), accomplishing the growth i. e. gradual development up to the issue of seeds of a bamboo tree, (and again) causing the growth of a palmyra tree (which is)

more than that (of a bamboo tree), is divided through the difference of (its) relation with (their) growth (which remains) in beings just as a play (of time). For, it is thus : the time up to the growth of a bamboo tree is short; but (the time up to the growth) of a palmyra tree is long. In this way, elsewhere, (in other) beings, too, through its relation with different states of creation, existence and destruction, the division of time may be illustrated. (73)

If the division of time (results) from the division of states, there would be no eternity of it (i. e. time), because it would perish after the annihilation of the (said) states. Having raised this doubt, he states :

*vyatikrame 'pi mātrāṇām tasya nāsti vyatikramah |
na ganṭratibhedena mārgabhedo 'sti kaścana ||74||*

Though (there is) a vanishing of properties (i.e. states of beings), (there) is no vanishing of it (i. e. time). (Just as there) is no difference in (the length of) the road because of the difference of wayfarers (and (their) goings).

Because time is the substratum for beings and their states, though (they) vanish, (there is) no vanishing of (their) support (i. e. time). Just as though wayfarers and (their) goings vanish, the road i. e. path does not vanish. For the lapse of a time such as 'spring' etc. is spoken of only because (certain) actions come to an end, nothing more. But in reality, time, due to its eternity, does not vanish. (74)

And furthermore:

*udayāstamayāvṛttyā jyotiṣām lokasiddhayā |
kālasya vyatipāte 'pi tāddharmyam iva lakṣyate ||75||*

Though (there is) no lapse of time, through the repetition of the rising and setting of the heavenly bodies, which is generally known (*lokasiddha*), (it) appears as if (there is) a similarity of law (with regard to time).

The soul of time gets divided through the motion of the sun etc. Thus, though (time) does not lapse, because of their

(i.e. the sun's etc.) disappearance alone, (it is) determined as if it (i.e. time) had lapsed. (For instance) : the day is gone; the night is spent; winter passed by. (75)

He states that because (there is) a reference to the diversity of time through the course of the heavenly bodies, some modern (i.e. superficial, lit. whose vision is directed to proximity) (scholars) consider it (i.e. the course of the heavenly bodies) alone as time:

*ādityagrahanakṣatrapariṣpandam athāpare |
bhinnam āvṛttibhedena kālaṃ kālavidō viduḥ ||76||*

Furthermore, some other experts (with regard to the doctrine of time) consider the course of the sun, the planets and the constellations, (which is) different through the difference of (their) revolutions, as time.

The motion of the sun, beginning (from his) rise (and) ending at his setting, (is called) 'day'. The time, beginning from (the sun-) set and ending at (the sun-) rise, is called 'night'. And it (i.e. the time of day and night) repeated fifteen times, (is called) 'fortnight'. (Day and night) repeated thirty times, (is called) 'month'. Or else, it is assumed that the moon's passing through all constellations (lunar mansions) is one month. The motion of Jupiter through one sign of the Zodiac (is called) 'year'. In this way, the division of time such as 'yuga', 'manvantara', 'kalpa', 'mahākalpa', etc. can be traced by observing the difference of the motions of the other planets and constellations established in the science of astronomy.¹ (76)

He states that, in this way, the activity of these (i.e. the heavenly bodies) commonly known as time. serves to measure any other uncommon activity :

1. *Kalpa*= a fabulous period of time (a day) of *Brahmā* or one-thousand Yugas, a period of four thousand, three hundred and twenty millions of years of mortals, measuring the duration of the world). *Mahākalpa*= a great cycle of time. See 'A Sanskrit-English Dictionary' by Sir M. M. Williams. See also the footnote on page 45.

*kriyāntarapariicchede pravṛttā yā kriyām prati |
nirjñātaparimāṇā sā kāla ity abhidhīyate ||77||*

That (activity), the measure (of time) of which is well-known, and which is employed in measuring (the duration of) any other activity, with regard to (any other) activity, is called time.

The motion of the sun etc. is expressed through the words such as 'day' etc. And a particular activity such as the milking of a cow etc. obtains the name of time, because it is a limited measure (i. e. its measure of time is well-known) (and) because it is a means for measuring a particular activity such as 'sitting' etc. (of Devadatta etc.) (which is) different from it (and) the measure (of which is) unknown. (Examples:) '(He) reads all day long,' '(He) reads the whole night', '(He) sits as long as a cow is milked.' (Here) though (the purpose is) served through the statement 'employed in measuring (the duration of) any other activity', the re-statement of 'with regard to (any other) activity' is intended to make known the absence of any fixed rule for an activity to become time. Because it depends upon different considerations. Thus, the milking of a cow etc., the measure (of time) of which is established from another (source), becomes indeed time, by measuring the (duration of) activities such as sitting etc. of Devadatta etc. (77)

How can he, whose vision is introverted and who lies in the inner apartment without determining the motion of the sun etc. and the flow (of the water) from the water-clock, know the division of time ? (Having raised this doubt,) he states :

*jñāne rūpasya samkrāntir jñānenaivānusamhṛtiḥ |
ataḥ kriyāntarābhāve sā kriyā kāla iṣyate ||78||*

The entrance of the form (of internal activity such as the flow of the vital air takes place) in the intellect. The reduction (of the moments of the activity is done) by the intellect *only*. Therefore, in the absence of other (external) activity, that (i. e. the internal) activity is desired (to be called) time.

(A man), though his vision is introverted, knows of a certain commenced activity such as the flow of the vital air etc., the form of which enters the intellect. (Then he) calculates the moments of the activity entered into the intellect through other (calculating) perceptions. Thus, in the absence of other (external) activity too, this activity, remaining in the intellect, is called time, because (this internal activity) determines other external activity. For example, when (there is) an increase of many comprehensions (of the moments of the internal activity, then he) recognises a longer time in the external (activity). When (there is) a rise of a few (comprehensions of the moments of the internal activity, he recognises) a shorter time (in the external activity). And the contemplative saints observe, indeed, the things through the motion of the vital air; and it is well-known that others too (observe the things) through counting the moments of the vital air. For example, through the calculation that 360 motions of the vital air are equal to one “*nāḍikā*” (i.e. 24 minutes), (the scholars) say that 21,600 (twenty one thousand and six hundred motions of the vital air) make a day and night.¹ (78)

Now, if time as such is not different from activity, how can one say ‘existence existed’ (*bhūtā sattā*), because no connection exists of an activity called, ‘existence’ with another ‘existence’ which is also an activity? Having raised this doubt, he states :

bhūto ghaṭa itiyaṃ ca sattāyā eva bhūtata |
bhūtā satteti sattāyāḥ sattā bhūtābhidhīyate ||79||

(In the usage) ‘*bhūto ghaṭaḥ*’- (a pot existed), the pastness refers only to the existence (denoted by the verbal root. ‘*bhū*’). (In the usage) ‘*bhūtā sattā*’ (existence existed), the existence (denoted by the verbal root ‘*bhū*’) of the existence (denoted by the noun ‘*sattā*’) is said to have become past (through the affix ‘*kta*’ which is prescribed in the past time).

Here in (the usage) ‘*bhūto ghaṭaḥ*’ (a pot existed), which (of the two terms) possesses the state of past time? The pot can-

1. See Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 12, 3, 2, 7-8.

not (be said) to have possessed (the state of past time). For this is, by nature, a substance (and) therefore has no (direct) connection with time. Though activities are of the nature to be accomplished, (there is) a relation between them and time (which is their) instrumental cause. (This relation is a direct one). Thus, the activity called existence (which is) denoted by the verbal root, ('bhū') is made known to have become past through the affix 'kta' (which is prescribed by Pāṇini in past time through the rule 'niṣṭhā' 3. 2. 102). But this existence (which is denoted by the verbal root ('bhū')) is inherently connected with the pot. So (time has an) indirect relation with the pot; but (there is) no direct (relation) between a substance (i. e. the pot) and time. Even in the doctrine that time is different (from activity), the relation (between time and a substance) takes place through activity. In this way, even in the usage 'bhūtā sattā' (existence existed), verbally, the existence in the form of activity, denoted by the verbal root ('bhū'), is different from (the existence) in the form of a substance denoted by the base of the noun ('sattā'). Therefore, when (there is a) relation (of the existence denoted by the verbal root ('bhū')) with another existence (denoted by the base of the noun ('sattā')), the apprehension of the state of the past time of the existence (which is) in the form of a substance, is through the state of the past time of the existence denoted by the verbal root ('bhū') only. Thus, (there is) no logical flaw (i.e. inconsistency) (in the usage 'bhūtā sattā'). This is the meaning. With regard to the eternal existence (nityā sattā), too, when there is a difference (in it, i. e. in the existence) through its resting upon its dependence, the connection with three-fold time is, thereby, not impaired. This has been arrived at. (79)

After the nature of time has been decided, the reference in the Grammar depending upon it (i. e. time) is discussed now. Under "*vartamāne laṭ*" (Pāṇini 3.2.123), it has been stated (by the author of the *Vārttikas*) : "And due to the non-division of time, in eternally existing (things)". (It means), because there is no division of time in eternally existing things, the state of present time is irrelevant (there, and therefore in such cases) the present tense (i. e. the affix "*laṭ*") must be taught. Pray, currency is the state of present

time which is the correlative of past and future (times). And due to the absence of the past and future times in eternal things (which) exist uninterruptedly (i. e. always), there is complete relevancy in it (i. e. the state of present time). It is said here (in this connection) : These designations, which are inconsistent with each other, on account of time, (are) fitting with regard to beings whose benefit is effected by time. And they are non-eternal (lit. possessed of birth). Surely, there (i. e. in the case of non-eternal beings), these (designations are) possible, because their life is restricted to a particular period of time. For example, (beings are called) future, whose production will take place in presence of the means. (Beings) who have obtained their birth from their means (are called) present, as long as they exist. (Beings are called) past, when their body is destroyed. Thus, the designation of the present time rests in the midst of the past and future times; and where there are no past and future times, there cannot be (present time). It has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini 3. 2. 123) : "The present (time) is the correlative of the past and future (times)". For, where there are past and future (times) there (will be) their counterpart present (time). This is the meaning. And due to the absence of the past and future (times) in eternal beings, (there is) the absence of it (i. e. the present time). And it has been said that for the requirement of grammatical procedure, the present tense must be taught. And indeed the affixes of all tenses must be taught (when an eternal thing is spoken of). For that reason only (the author of the *Vārttikas*) used the words 'due to the non-division of time' (in the *Vārttika* mentioned above). In the back-ground of what so far has been said (lit. and having done in this way), due to the absence of time-division here (i. e. in the case of eternal beings), there is no activity at all which (can be) superimposed on time. For, it (i. e. activity), which is superimposed on time, is possessed of sequence, and is of the nature to be accomplished. And as it (i. e. activity, possessing all qualities mentioned above), is not here (i. e. in the case of eternal beings), every fixed relation of time, dependent on the superimposition of activity and declension, must be taught (explicitly). This is the (underlying) meaning. And as confutation to this argument it has been stated (by the author

of the *Vārttikas* on Pāṇini 3. 2. 123): 'And there are time-divisions (Examples:) 'The mountains will stand'; '(The mountains) stand'; '(The mountains) stood'¹. Again, it has been questioned (in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 3.2.123) : 'Is it possible (to say) that, because these words can be used, therefore there are time-divisions ?'²

This is the opinion:—How has it been said,—instead of objecting that due to the absence of time-division alone the usage of these words is not possible,—that this (i. e. the usage of the words mentioned above) alone is the deciding factor (in the existence of time-division with regard to eternal beings)? Therefore, it has been stated (in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini 3. 2. 123, in order to answer this question): 'Not necessarily due to the usage (of these words) alone'.³ (It means, because activity) is denoted by verbs (and activity is an aggregate) of prior and posterior (moments), and because for the people who believe in verbal authority, the meaning is determined through it (i. e. verbal statement) alone, let the usage of the words be the authority on the division of time. Even repudiating it (i. e. the usage of the words as the authority on the division of time), here (i. e. in the case of the usages such as 'mountains stand' etc.) on the basis of the meaning alone, the division of time is explained. This is the meaning. Therefore, (the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*) states (commenting on Pāṇini 3. 2. 123) : 'The activities of the past, future and present kings are the support of the verbal root 'sthā'. (It means that the activities of the past, future and present kings are responsible for bringing about time-divisions

1. In the *Mahābhāṣya* these example are as follows :

'tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ ; sthāsyanti parvatāḥ; tasthuḥ parvatā iti. (The *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, ed. by F. Kielhorn, Vol. II. Bombay 1883 : p.123 line 17-18)

2. This quotation from the *M. Bh.* was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. This has been corrected and translated as above on the basis of the *M. Bh.* Kielhorn's ed. (see 1 above) which reads : *kiṃ śakyanta ete śabdāḥ prayoktum ity atah santi kālavibhāgāḥ*'. (ibid. p. 123. line 18)

3. Here too, the quotation from the *M. Bh.* was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. The *M. Bh.* runs as follows: '*nāvaśyaṃ prayogād eva*'. (Ibid. p. 123. line 19)

with regard to eternal beings). He explains (the statement made in) the *Mahābhāṣya* (mentioned above) :

parato bhidyate sarvam ātmā tu na vikalpyate |
parvatādisthitis tasmāt pararūpeṇa bhidyate ||80||

Every (being) is altered through alien (activities). But the soul (of this being) is not changed. Therefore, the standing of mountains etc. is altered through an alien state (i. e. activity).

A division of time is applicable even to eternal mountains, rivers etc. on account of a difference of existence (caused) by (their) relation with the existence belonging to other things associated with them. Every being (*bhāvajāta*) is altered by force of (its) contact with a superimposition, but never by its own nature. Thus, it has already been said : ‘(They are) divided;—this is an alien superimposition’ (VP 3. 1. 20). For, the activities of kings, being the differentiators of the standing of mountains etc., are referred to as their (i. e. the mountains’) dependences. The state of three times (i. e. past, present and future), the sequence, the state to be accomplished, (which are consistent within the case) of the activities of kings, are attributed to the standing of mountains. Thus, here (i. e. in the case of eternal beings), the secondary reference to the three times is correct and so the (use of the) present tense is justified. (80)

As an alternative, he states that the standing of mountains etc., being in association with the activities of kings, and experiencing the benefit from (this) relation at every stage, alters by itself. But the difference (in this ‘standing’ of mountains) is, due to the uniformity of this (activity of ‘standing’), hard to realize, and, therefore, it is explained by means of alien activities of associated (past, future and present kings) :

prasiddhabhedā vyāpārā virūpāvayavakriyāḥ |
sāhacaryeṇa bhidyante sarūpāvayavakriyāḥ ||81||

The differences in the operations, the component activities of which are dissimilar, are well-known. (But those operations), the component activities of which are similar (in all three times), differ through the associa-

tion (with the activities of others remaining in different times).

Activities like cooking (food), breaking (things) etc. are operations, the component activities of which are of a dissimilar nature. The differences (in such operations) are well-known i. e. comprehended as being different, indeed, as possessing different times. For, the component activities such as the act of putting the vessel on the fire etc. of the activity 'cooking' are different. In the same way, (the component activities) such as the act of lifting up etc. of the activity 'breaking' (are different). But, the activities such as self-maintenance and the standing of mountains etc., the component activities of which are similar (in all three times), and possessing indeterminable differences (in different times) due to (their) similarity alone, are differentiated in (regard to) time, with the (help of) the concomitant activities of kings (living in different times) which possess dissimilar continued successions and determined divisions. And for this reason, the activities of kings, due to their differentiating (character) becoming the supporters (to the standing of mountains), are referred to as representing the (three stages of) time with regard to the standing of mountains etc. The activities of 'standing' with reference to mountains etc. possess alterations that can be determined by the changes of the course of the sun etc., too, because the activities of kings are used in a generic sense. For the activities of kings (are) best-known, (therefore they) have been used as illustrations in the (*Mahā-*) *bhāṣya*. Neither is the idea of activity illogical (in this case) inasmuch as a sequence is resorted to; because the (activity of) 'standing' manifests itself every moment through its support. For thus, it has been said :

'Birth alone, having resorted to the same form (i. e. possessing indeterminable division, is called) existence.'
(= *VP* 3. 8.26bc).

And in the case of eternal things, the state of their being supported every moment by their support and the undoubted prior-posterior relation alone is designated by the term 'birth'. On account of the dictum that in verbal reference the meaning of

a word (itself) is the object, the meaning denoted by a verb, possessing sequence, indeed follows the definition of activity. This has been arrived at. (81)

It has been stated in the *Vārttika* (on *Pāṇini* 3. 2. 123): "When the commenced (activity) is not completed, the present tense must be taught, because (this is actually) not present". It means), when there is no completion of a commenced activity due to the non-fulfilment of the main object (lit. fruit), and again, due to the commencement of another activity (during the commenced activity), the commenced activity (being broken by the intermediary activity) becomes past. (Therefore, in such cases), the affix of the present tense should be taught. (Examples) : "We live here"; "We assist Puṣyamitra at a sacrifice". Thus, though engaged in some other activity while assisting (Puṣyamitra) at a sacrifice, (one) states (it) like that, because (one is) not yet finished with (his) assisting at a sacrifice, due to the non-fulfilment of the main object (lit.—fruit) such as the "sacrificial fee" (*dakṣiṇā*) etc. Here, it has been stated (by the author of *Vārttikas* on *Pāṇini* 3. 2. 123 in the conclusion) : "Certainly (the present tense is) correct, due to the non-completion of the commencement (i. e. the commenced activity)". Because the main object (lit. fruit) is not yet fulfilled, and because the activity (is intended) up to it (i. e. up to the fulfilment of the main object), though there is an intervention through another activity, the (main) activity is not yet finished; so the affix of the present tense (and) the present time are correct. If in the meantime, due to the interruption (of the main activity) through other activities, the absence of the present time should be desired here; (in order to remove this doubt), it has been stated (by the author of the *Vārttikas* on *Pāṇini* 3. 2. 123) : "And (there is) a pause (in the case of a present tense, which is) free of doubt". For, in the present tense like " (He) is eating" etc., which is free of doubt, indeed there is a pause (of the main activity "eating") through other intermediary activities (such as laughing, chatting etc.). For example, it has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on *Pāṇini* 3. 2. 123) : "He, certainly eating, also laughs, chats or drinks water." He explains this (statement in the *Mahābhāṣya*) :

*vyavadhānam ivopaiti nivṛtta iva dṛśyate |
kriyāsamūho bhujyādir antarālapravṛttibhiḥ ||82||*

*na ca vicchinnaṛūpo 'pi so 'virāmān nivartate |
sarvaiva hi kriyānyena saṁkīrṇevopalabhyate || 83||*

The activity such as “eating ” etc., (which is) the aggregate of (many component) activities, obtains apparent interruption (and) appears as if withdrawn, through (other) intermediary actions.

Though it (i. e. the activity such as eating etc.) has a broken form, (it is) not withdrawn, due to (its) non-completion. For, every activity indeed is ascertained, apparently mingled with another activity.

The aggregate of an activity such as “eating” etc., the nature of which is the totality of component parts (remaining) in the prior-posterior order, undergoes the interruption of its past and future moments through the (intermediary) actions such as laughing, chatting etc. And because the object (lit. fruit) of “eating” is satisfaction, one continued succession (of its moments) is indeed accomplished (there, though interrupted by other actions); so the word “as if” (*iva*) is used (in the verse). For, (there is) no interruption of the entire aggregate (of the moments of the activity), but only of (a few) moments. And that much (i. e. a few moments of the aggregate) is not the nature of activity. But, in view of the absence of the (immediate) future moments, and by forming the past moments (in the imagination), the entire aggregate of the moments of activity appears as if withdrawn.

Though this (i. e. an activity such as eating etc.) is,—through (other)intermediate actions—of a partly broken nature, it is (nevertheless), being incomplete, determined as possessing the nature of the present time, because of its continuation until the obtainment of (its) object. Not only (the activity such as) ‘eating’ etc., but also (the activities such as) ‘laughing ‘chatting’ etc. are interrupted by other (intermediate) actions. (There is) even an interruption (of them) by the closing of the eyes etc. In the end there is breathing etc. (by which they are interrupted). Due to the recommencement of the activity after some pause (the activity seems) to

have been mingled (with other activities). But it is not completely mingled, because (there is) no completion (of the activity) until (its) result is achieved. The intermediate actions (which) inevitably take place, cannot cause (a total mingling). The aggregate of the moments such as planning (lit. visualizing an operation) etc., up to the moment of the (fulfilment) of the object (lit. fruit, is called) activity. Though there is a cessation of physical operations for some time, indeed (there is) no cessation of the mental operation such as vision (planning), desire etc., until the fulfilment of the object (lit. fruit). In this way, due to the incompleteness of (the activity) such as the assisting at a sacrifice etc., the state of the present time is established. (82) (83)

In this way, an activity (is defined as) an aggregate (of moments) ending with a result, and (the use of) the present tense is justified even if (the activity) suffers interruption through other actions aimed at other results. (Now), he states that another activity, commenced in the middle (of the main activity) does not belong to a different category (at all):

tadantarāladṛṣṭā vā sarvaivāvayavakriyā |
sādrśyāt sati bhede tu tadaṅgatvena grhyate || 84||

Or, indeed every subsidiary activity, seen in the middle of it (i. e. the main activity), is accepted as a part of it. (i. e. the main activity), due to (its) similarity (with another essential subsidiary activity such as sipping the water from the palm of the hand etc.) despite its difference (with the moments of the main activity).

Those different activities such as laughing etc., remaining in the middle of it. i. e. the (main) activity such as 'eating' etc., are but parts of (the activity of) 'eating' etc. alone. Because, under the guise of subordinate operations such as the sipping the water from the palm of the hand (*ācamana*, which is an inevitable intermediate action during eating), they aid (the main activity). And thus, due to (their) similarity with 'sipping the water from the palm of the hand' (*ācamana*) etc., (they are) accepted as being a part of 'eating', though there is a difference (between them) and normal component operations

(of eating) such as pouring of the curd (upon the rice) etc. Because even in the absence of laughing etc., the 'eating' activity may be accomplished. Just as (in the case of) the load to be carried by two men, the third (man) who gets there by chance (is also taken as one of the load-carriers, in the same way, the laughing etc., too, taking place during 'eating', are taken as a part of it). The word 'but' (*tu*, is used here) in the sense of 'though' (*api*.) For friends, accomplish eating (activity) being at ease (lit. possessing happy minds) (and) doing acts, such as 'laughing', 'chatting with each other' etc. In the same way, here the question has been raised viewing the completion of activity part by part, just as in the usage (*prakṛtaḥ kaṣaṇ devadattaḥ*) the affix "kta" has been supported (through the statement) : '(The affix "kta") is certainly correct, because (there is) the completion of the beginning' (a *Vārttika* on Pāṇini 3. 2. 102). But, having viewed the aggregate of the moments up to the (fulfilment) of the object (lit. fruit) as activity, the decision (has been made). Thus (it has been settled). (84)

Now he objects that the state of present time is nowhere demonstrable with regard to activity:—

sad asad vāpi vastu syāt tṛtīyaṃ nāsti kiñcana !
tena bhūtabhaviṣyantau muktvā madhyaṃ na vidyate ||85||

A thing may be either existent or non-existent; there is no third (possibility). Therefore, except the past and future (times), there is no middle one (i. e. the present time).

The state to be accomplished is called activity. And there is a moment, which is past, (and it is existent i.e. the nature of it has been accomplished; so there the activity is past. And (a moment), which is non-existent, is to be accomplished, i. e. it is a future moment. So, there the activity is conditioned as future. There is no other (i. e. third) moment possessing both existing and non-existing states, because (such) a contradictory nature (would be) opposed to unity (i. e. incompatible with unity). And therefore, the state of the present time cannot be a qualification of activity (lit. the meaning of

a verbal root). Therefore, it has been stated in the (*Mahā-bhāṣya* (on Pāṇini 3.2. 123): 'O crow you are flying neither in future nor in the past; if you are flying now, this entire world is flying. The (mountain) Himālaya is moving, too.'¹ The past activity being inferred by the result, due to its pastness, how can (it) be denoted through the affix of the present tense? In this way (i. e. if the past activity can be denoted through the affix of the present tense), (in the case of the mountain) Himālaya (which is immovable) too, the usage (such as the mountain Himālaya) 'is flying' (*patati*) would take place, (fabricating) the (place of) departure and (the place of) arrival, which could be an effect of an unseen activity. (85)

(It is argued) that the state to be accomplished, which is the existence (of activity) in its own form, is the state of the present time with regard to activity. (Refuting this view) he states:

nirvṛttirūpam ekasya bhedābhāvān na kalpate |
sad asad vāpi tenaikam kramarūpam katham bhavet || 86||

Due to the absence of the division of a single (thing), the state of originating (with sequence) is not possible (in its case). (A thing is) either existent or non-existent therefore, how could a single (thing) possess sequence?

Due to the absence of the division of a single thing i. e. the nature of a thing, (there is) no state of originating, possessing the form of sequence (which is) the characteristic of activity. For instance, a thing is either existent or non-existent. There, the existent (thing, due to its existence alone, is not to be accomplished (and it is) devoid of sequence. A non-existent (thing)

1. The literal meaning has been given above. The underlying meaning is as follows: 'The usage "*patasi*" (you are flying) is not possible in future time because the activity 'flying' is not there due to its futurity. In the same way, this usage cannot take place in past time, because the activity 'flying' is not there due to its pastness. Though the activity does not possess the state of present time, if the usage '*patasi*' becomes the object of reference, then due to the absence of any speciality (or, a fixed rule), with regard to (immovable) mountains, too, such usage may take place.'

(For details, see Kaiyata's '*Pradīpa*' and Nāgeśa's '*Uddyota*' on this passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*).

due only to its non-existence, in that stage, would not resort to the state of originating. (And thus), how could (it) possess sequence ? For, (there is) no sequence of a non-existent (thing) devoid of all attributes. And due to the absence of a third group, (there is) no state of activity to be accomplished and possessing sequence. So, how could that be the present (time) ? (86)

Here it is said : Many moments arranged in prior-posterior relation (are called) activity. Thus, it (i. e. so defined activity), before the origin of the result, obtains the state of the present time. (He states), this, too (is) not (possible). Because :

*bahūnām cānavasthānād ekam evopalabhyate |
yathopalabdhi smaraṇam tatra cāpy upapadyate ||87||*

Because many (moments) cannot exist (together), only one (moment) is perceived (at a time, and there is no sequence in it). And there (i. e. in the single moment), the recollection takes place according to the perception, (but there is no perception of the sequence in the single moment)¹.

The component (moments of activity), produced in sequence, possessing scattered nature, are not present simultaneously. And therefore, one nearest moment alone is perceived (at a time) ; so, due to the absence of the division of it, (there is) the absence of sequence. If it is said that many (moments), occurring in sequence, are recollected simultaneously, that too (is) not (possible). Because recollection must be preceded by perception, and with regard to one (moment) perception of a sequence does not arise. Hence how could even recollection indicate a sequence there ? (87)

He states that (it is) also not proper (to say) that many (moments) form a unity of activity:

1. For the translation of this *kārika*, I have taken the help of *the Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti* wherein the next two *kārikās* (89 & 90) have been cited and interpreted. (For details, see '*The Mādhavīyadhātuvṛtti* (sic)' ed. by Pandit Ananta Śāstri Phadake and Pandit Sadā Śiva Śarmā Śāstri, the Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 103. Benares 1934 : p. 6, line 19ff.)

*sadasadrūpam ekam syāt sarvasyaikatvakalpane /
nirvṛttirūpam nirvṛtteh sāmānyam athavā bhavet || 88||*

(If both the past and future moments together) form unity (i. e. one activity), then both the existent and non-existent forms of every (thing) would form a unity (which is contradictory). Or, (if it is said that every moment is connected with the origination), the form of originating of the origination would be common (to every moment).

If (it is) accepted that the past and future moments, possessed of the existent and non-existent forms (respectively), form an activity, a contradictory oneness, full of existent and non-existent (forms), must be admitted with regard to every thing. This (is) not proper, because it is (our) observation that (mutually) contradictory (forms) never form a unity. Or, due to the incompatibility of the unity of many (i. e. the past and future) moments, some unitary nature must be framed (with which they could be connected). Accordingly, the form of originating , i. e. the capability of producing, with regard to origination, i. e. activity which is to be produced and possesses the nature to be accomplished, would be common to each and every moment as (its) form, (namely) the quality of representing one activity. Hence (the conception of) one activity would not result. This is the meaning. The state of being connected with many moments has been adopted as the 'self' of activity. But many (moments) do not (form) one activity. Hence (many moments) cannot indeed manifest one activity. For (there is) only association of different (i. e. past and future) moments with the form of originating (i. e. activity); but for each of them (i. e. of the moments) the nature of the manifestation of activity is not established. And thus, how (can) the (moments of) activity (be) present ? (88)

Here he states the conclusion :

*kāryotpattau samartham vā¹ svena dharmena tat tathā /
ātmatattvena grhyeta sā cāsmiṁ vartamānatā || 89||*

1. Here the word 'vā' (or) indicates the alternative solution offered in the next *kārikā*. Therefore it is not translated here.

That (i. e. the fabricated aggregate of moments) which is capable of producing an effect by its (own essential) quality (i. e. sequence) may thus (i. e. as possessing sequence) be taken as being present¹ (lit. with its own essence); the state of present time (abides) in it (i. e. in the aggregate of moments).

Here the unity of activity i. e. the aggregate of moments is (achieved) by fabrication. For instance, the moments, possessing the regular prior-posterior relation, and proceeding with an aim to (fulfil) the object (lit. fruit, are called) activity. So, due to the identity of the object (lit. fruit), this (i. e. activity) is one. In this way, in a proper manner, (each) activity differs (from all other activities) through the difference of its object (lit. fruit). And here (i. e. in this definition of activity), though the moments are both existent and non-existent, the state of the present time is indeed applicable (to them). For the state of existence is not the definition of the present (time). But the incompleteness of a commenced activity is the definition of the present (time). And this (state) lasts (as the state of an aggregate of moments) apprehended as identical before the result (of the activity) manifests itself, for (the duration of) as large an aggregate of moments as pass until the result (is achieved). And it (i. e. the aggregate of moments) alone is capable of producing an effect. And it (i. e. the aggregate of moments), preceded by a mental operation (and) ended by physical operations, is to be inferred through (its) means, (its) effort and (its) result. And there, the aggregate (of moments) remains with its own quality i. e. sequence; as when it is taken with its own nature, i. e. with its own existing nature, then this stage of existence of it (i. e. the aggregate of moments is called) the state of the present time. Here, the word 'or' (*vā*) is the indicator of an alternative solution, in respect of which some thing will be said later on (i. e. in the next *kārikā*). The following is the meaning: The aggregate (of moments) is, because it possesses a fixed sequence, successive. And although it consists of existent as well as non-existent (moments) each and every next single moment possessing a

1. For the interpretation of this *kārikā*, see the *Mādhaviyadhātuvṛtti* (as under the footnote on page 113)

sequence (which they mutually impose one on the other), partakes of the state of the present time. And though this moment, being one, is not successive and consequently (represents) no activity, yet the sequence belonging to the other moments is fixed on it through a wrong perception. Hence, there is no fault. It has been said in the *Mahābhāṣya* (3. 2. 123, 5) :

‘With regard to that which is the motive for beginning an activity and to that effort, which is made for its sake, one may use the word ‘*gacchati*’ (= he goes, present tense) without hesitation.’¹

The desire for the result, (which is) a mental activity, is the reason for the commencement of a physical activity. The effort (is made) for (that) result (i. e. the commencement of activity which ends with the result). And (this effort) for achieving that result (takes place) in a general and particular manner. In this way, it has been clearly demonstrated: the physical operation, preceded by a mental operation, ending with a result, apprehended as a continuum (of moments), and possessing the nature of present activity, can be expressed by the word signifying it. (89)

He states the view expressed by the word ‘or’ (*vā*) (in the previous *kārikā*) :

kriyāprabandharūpaṃ yad adhyātmam vinigrhyate |
saṃkrāntabimbam ekatra tām āhur vartamānatām ||90||

The form of a series (of component) activities, the reflection of which enters into the intellect, (when) determined as one (lit. condensed into one cognisance), is (due to the presence of this cognisance) called the state of the present time (in the case of an external activity, too).

Previously, the unity of the aggregate of the moments was supported by the view (that they proceed) to (fulfil) one object

1. Here, too, this quotation from the *M. Bh.* was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. The *M. Bh.* reads ‘*tat samikṣya*’ instead of ‘*tad apekṣya*’ (—the reading given in the Triv. ed.) (See the *M. Bh.* Kielhorn’s ed. (as given under footnote on page 105) p. 124, line 9). Nāgeśa also gives the same reading. For the meaning of this verse see also Kaiyaṭa’s ‘*Pradīpa*’ and Nāgeśa’s ‘*Uddyota*’ on this.

(lit. fruit). Now, however, reference is made to the actual unity resulting from the fact that (whatever) approaches the accumulating intellect obtains as its form the shape of the intellect. For instance, when an aggregate of activities, possessing scattered parts enters with its image into the intellectual self and (consequently) is perceived in one place (i. e. determined as one cognisance), it is, then, because it (i. e. this aggregate of activities) does not differ from this single notion, determined (to be) like it (i. e. like the single notion), (namely) present and one. And the accumulation of (moments) apprehended in a sequence takes place, too, because the present consciousness of past perceptions is at hand. Otherwise, there would be no notion of an aggregate etc. For it is sure, perception precedes recollection, but what has been apprehended as a sequence is definitely¹ recollected at once, because (otherwise) the consequence would be that (the notion of) 'one hundred' etc. could not be apprehended. And because an image (or, shape) within the intellect is perceived under the form of the intellect, an external unity is referred to as 'present'. And when this has been established, there is, with reference to this, no further difficulty to establish 'past' and future'. Therefore, it has been proved that the three times (past, present and future) are qualifications of activity. This is settled. (90).

Here, when an activity has passed unaccomplished and *lyñ* (i. e. the conditional tense) is enjoined (Pāṇini 3. 3. 139-140), the past as well as the future are made use of. He objects that they are not applicable :

*kriyātipattir alyantaṃ kriyānutpattilakṣaṇā |
na ca bhūtaṃ anutpannaṃ na bhaviṣyat tathāvidham || 91||*

If an activity passes unaccomplished, it is characterised by complete non-production of activity. And neither the past nor the future can be non-produced.

1. Here the Benares ed. gives the clear idea. It reads : "na tu krameṇo palabdham yugapān na smaryate" (p. 379. 18)
The *Mādhaviyadhātuvṛtti* gives still clearer idea : "anubhavapūrvakatvaṃ smaraṇasya niyataṃ na tu kramikatvaṃ api" (p. 6, 22-23. See the footnote on page 113).

According to the Triv. ed., the words 'niyataṃ' and 'na tu' must be repeated twice and translated as above.

‘If he were to call Kamalaka, the cart would not be upset’— in this sentence the activity, characterised by ‘calling Kamalaka and not upsetting the cart’, passes unaccomplished (which means) it definitely does not come to pass at all, because the power of the instrument (i. e. the efficient cause) is deficient. And a non-produced form of an activity cannot be referred to as either past or future. For ‘past’ means the lapse of existence with regard to something produced. And ‘future’ (means) expected production when sufficient means are at hand. And since here the means are lacking, production (can-) not (be) expected, either. Therefore, non-production has been qualified by the word ‘complete’ (i. e. absolute). (91)

He supports the reference to the past and future (times) here (i. e. in the conditional tense) :

*prāg viruddhakriyotpādān nirvṛtte vā virodhini |
vyāpāre ’vadhībhedena viśayas tatra bhidyate ||92||*

Before the production of a contrary activity or after the contrary activity has been accomplished, the subject-matter differs there through the difference of time.

One makes the statement ‘If he were to call Kamalaka (which he cannot), the cart would not be upset’ without expecting the future call to the capable agent (who could or, would) be the reason for the non-upsetting (of the cart). And in this way, when Kamalaka goes to another country (which is) contrary to inviting him, and when a very heavy load is placed on the cart (which is) contrary to the non-upsetting (of it), the sphere of the future (tense) is assigned to the non-completion of the action due to the difference, i. e. due to the distinction of the time intended, as there is futurity of (something) previously not contrasted. The non-upsetting of the cart which represents the activity (will) not (materialize) because Kamalaka is not invited, and an invitation to him will not materialize because he has gone to another country. Although such future (activity) cannot be imagined, still there is the futurity of what appears under the form of non-completion of an action (and is) characterized by absolute non-production. If the activity is future in the sentence ‘When there will be an invitation to a

capable agent, the activity will materialize'; then absolute non-production of this (activity) is future, too. Similarly, in the sentence : 'Had he been seen by that person who seeks for a *brāhmaṇa*, he would certainly have been fed, but (he) did not get a chance to eat.' Here the non-completion of the action (characterized by absolute non-production of activity) is, due to the difference of time inasmuch as it belongs to the sphere of the past (tense), referred to as past because the activity of non-eating, being contrary to eating, is passed. This has been settled. (92)

Now, in connection with time, he discusses (Pāṇini's) rule 'When there is a syntactical relation between the senses of the verbs, the affixes are valid, even in denoting time other than that for which they have been specifically enjoined'¹ (*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*, 3.4. 1) in order to authorize (the use) of affixes for tenses other than those normally taught :

vyabhicāre nimittasya sādhutvaṃ na prakalpate |
bhāvya āsīt iti sūtreṇa tat kāle 'nyatra śisyate ||93||

Since there is a deviation from the motive (that led to the formulation of a general rule), the correctness of an expression like, '*bhāvya āsīt*' (=The future function existed) is not secured. Therefore, it (i. e. the correctness) is taught by a *sūtra* (= 3.4.1) for a time other (than that covered by the general rule).

Here (i. e. in Grammar) affixes are enjoined (each) for an individually restricted time. Hence, their correctness cannot be secured in case of deviation from the time for which they are enjoined, (i.e.) for another time. For instance, (in the usages) '*bhāvi (kṛtyam) āsīt*' (The future (function) existed) and '*agni-ṣṭomayājy asya putro janitā*' (A son, who has already performed the ceremony of *Agniṣṭoma* will be born to him), the word '*bhāvi*' (in the former example) has been formed in future time and it would not enter into a relation with the past time in the word '*āsīt*', where the affix has been prescribed in the past time. Similarly, (to form the word '*agniṣṭomayājī*' in the latter example the affix ('*ṇini*' after the verbal root '*yaj*' Pāṇini 3. 2. 84-85) has been prescribed in the past time to denote the meaning 'he

1. See (as under the foot note on page 91) p. 555, line 8ff.

who has already performed the ceremony of *Agniṣṭoma*.' The past time (in the word '*agniṣṭomayāji*') could not be connected with the future time (in the word) '*janitā*' (to form which, the affix has been prescribed in the future time). Therefore, (for the correctness of such usages, Pāṇini) framed the rule '*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*'. Due to the absence of a relation between the verbal roots, their meaning is meant (by the word) '*dhātu* (a verbal root) here (i.e. in the above mentioned rule). And since relation is (necessarily) based on difference, the dual is to be understood in the *vṛtti* formation¹ (i.e. *dhātusambandhe = dhātvoḥ sambandhe*). The relation between the meanings of the roots is characterized by the nature of qualifier and the qualified through the agents (*sādhana*, such as 'subject' (*kartā*), 'object' (*karma*) etc. denoted by the case-endings). Though the word '*pratyaya*' (affix) is understood here from the governing rule '*pratyayāḥ*' (Pāṇini 3.1.1), the purpose of reiterating the word '*pratyayāḥ*' (affixes) in the rule '*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*' has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on this rule = 3. 4. 1) : ('In the usages) *gomān āsīt* (A man possessing cows existed), *gomān bhavitā* (A man possessing cows will exist), (the affix '*matuṣ*') might be correct in relation with the meanings of the roots.' It means that though the affix '*matuṣ*' has not been prescribed under the governing rule "*dhātoḥ*" (Pāṇinī 3. 1. 91), it may be treated as correct, when it leaves the state of the present time coming into a relation with the verbs (denoting) other times (i.e. past and future) also. This rule (i.e. *dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*) has been rejected by the *Vārttika* (on the same rule) : 'Inasmuch as the proper time has been prescribed for (each) affix when in relation to the meaning of the roots (the true intention of Pāṇini) has already been accomplished'. In the doctrine, that the formation of (individual) words (takes place without considering their relation with other words), the affixes are prescribed each for its proper time (only). Therefore, even without this sūtra (3.4.1), the desired purpose has been achieved. This is the meaning. (93)

1. *Vṛtti*— (in gram.) a complex formation which requires explanation or separation into its parts (as distinguished from a simple or uncompounded form e.g. any word formed with *kṛit* or *Taddhita* affixes, any compound and -even duals and plurals which are regarded as *Dvandva* compounds, of which only one member is left, and all derivative verbs such as desideratives &c.);

(Sir M. M. Williams's '*A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*' reprinted, Oxford 1956 (column 1), line 44ff.)

Here (it) is stated :

svakāla eva sādhuś cet kālabhede gatiḥ katham /

If (a word) is (considered as) correct for a specific time only, how is the situation when the time changes ?

If the formation of a word such as 'bhāvi' etc. is accepted in its specific time (only), whence comes the comprehension of the time other than its own specific when (the word 'bhāvi' enters) into a functional relation with the word 'āsīt' ? In this (case) also, it has been stated in the *Vārttika* (on Pāṇini 3.4.1) : 'Certainly, the qualifying word obtains a time other than its own (specific) time, from the qualified word'. So, due to the relation of the adjoining word i. e. of the qualifying word with the qualified word, the time of it (i. e. of the qualified word) is determined by the sentence. Since the meaning of the sentence is absent when the word is formed, it (is) not an auxiliary (for framing grammatical rules).

He explains this (meaning) :

vākyārthād atadartheṣu viśiṣṭatvaṃ na sidhyati ||94||

(The knowledge of a time other than its own specific time with regard to the qualifying word) comes from the sentence. The distinction (i. e. the relation between the qualifier and the qualified) does not result (in the words) which do not possess that meaning.

The words (are called) 'atadārtha' (by the 'bahuvrīhi' compound), because that meaning which is comprehensible through the consideration of the sentence, does not occur in the words i. e. they possess a meaning incongruous with the meaning of the sentence. Thus, because the meaning of the sentence is separated from them (i. e. from the meaning conveyed severally through the isolated words forming the sentence), a distinction (i. e. relation between the qualifier and the qualified) does not occur (in isolated words). Consequently, the particular meaning of the sentence cannot be established unless the word 'bhāvi' is connected with the word 'āsīt', for the (notion of) past time cannot be obtained from the word 'bhāvi'. Hence, when it has been established that the time of the qualifying word is determined by the qualified word because they (together) con-

stitute one sentence, no purpose is served with by the *sūtra* (3.4.1). This is the meaning. (94)

He states that, quite to the contrary, the intended meaning would not be understood if this *sūtra* (3.4.1) is framed :

tadarthaś ced avayavo bhāvino bhūtatāgatiḥ |
na syād atyantabhūtatvam evaikam tatra sambhavet || 95||

If a part (of the sentence, namely the word ‘*bhāvi*’) possessed the meaning of past time, (it, i.e. the word ‘*bhāvi*’) would not change over to the notion of past time. There rather would result one absolute past time (expressed twice).

If through this rule (3.4.1) it is set down that in a sentence like ‘*bhāvi kṛtyam āsīt*’ (The future function existed), a part as (the word) ‘*bhāvi*’ etc. representing a qualifying (word), denotes the time referred to by the verb which is the principal element (of the sentence), (then) the past time of the future function which is desired to be authorized (by the said rule) would not be comprehended. Inasmuch as past time is expressed already by the word ‘*āsīt*’, merely a further affirmation would be understood through the word ‘*bhāvi*’ possessing the same idea of past time (lit. possessing the same saying). And thus, the meaning of the sentence would be : ‘This function, i. e. a thing to be done, was there as (something) past indeed’. And this (meaning) is not intended. Consequently, it results that the word ‘*bhāvi*’—future—refers to past time (only) when a specific time is prescribed (for each affix) and the meaning of the sentence is interpreted. It was desired to express past time for a function to be understood as future. Now, this has become present. For, previously (i. e. in the *kārikās* 59—61 above, it has been proved) that beings possess the three (i. e. future, present and past) courses. Consequently, the entrance of the future course into the past course is correct. For instance, it has been stated by the venerable saint Vyāsa: ‘Your inevitable destruction has now drawn near by fate because it was in store. For this your time was previously yet to come.’ (95)

‘Pray, if in this way a word, for which a specific time has been enjoined, changes over to another time on account of the meaning of the sentence, is there not the (undesirable) inclination

that it may lose its (own) accepted time (completely) ? He states that (there would be) no such inclination :

viśiṣṭakālatā pūrvam tathāpi tu viśeṣaṇe

āśrayāt so 'ntaraṅgatvāt tatra sādthur bhaviṣyati || 96||

(A word like 'bhāvi' refers to) a specific time before (it is connected with other words) and the same is the case even when it becomes a qualifying word (in a sentence): It will be correct there (i. e. referring to the time specifically enjoined for it) because (the particularly enjoined time is) the support for (the formation of the word) and the connection with it represents an *antaraṅga*-relation (which supersedes other rules).

A word like 'bhāvi' etc. is correct, before it is connected with another word, because it has been formed for a specific time (i. e. to denote a specific time-relation). And even when it becomes a qualifying word in connection with other words, it still belongs to a specific time. Because it then adopts the time of the word to be qualified without giving up its own time-connection : It is the past time of (something) future. And therefore, the word 'bhāvi' etc. is there, too, (i. e. in its original meaning) correct when connected with other words, because its particular time is the reason for its formation, and there is an *antaraṅga*-rule inasmuch as this (time-relation) is established first (i. e. prior to the connection of the word 'bhāvi' with others, in a sentence). The particular time is not given up, because it is by referring to it that (a meaning) is understood as distinct from the meaning of the sentence. Thus, in the example : 'To him a son will be born who has already performed the ceremony of 'Agniṣṭoma', the future time of something past results from the meaning of the sentence. Were the *sūtra* (3. 4. 1) framed, mere future time would be understood. Thus this *sūtra* has been refuted. (96)

Some (scholars), however, construe the matter according to the view of the *Vārttika*. He states how :

āmiśra eva prakrāntaḥ sa padārthas tathā vidhiḥ |

kevalasya vimiśratvaṁ nitye 'rthe nopapadyate || 97||

It has previously been stated that the meaning of a word is (always) mingled (with the meaning of the

other words of the same sentence); thus is the rule. The mingling of an isolated meaning (of a word with the meaning of other words) is not possible (in the doctrine that, the word, its) meaning (and the relation between them) are eternal¹.

Here (i. e. in Grammar) expressions are explained and words are employed, for common practice; therefore, the sentence being essential in this (i. e. in common practice), ought to be explained. Consequently, after words have been taught in such a way that at first an analysis (is performed) of meanings of words which are capable of being connected with the meanings of other words, every meaning of a word is, in the explanation aiming at the sentence, right away conceived as distinct and mingled just as it is understood from its application within the sentence. But when words are taught without regard to their connection with the meanings of other words, i. e. in case a specific meaning is assumed by a (word) previously established, once it later on enters into connection with other words, this would be incompatible with the maxim that the connection between word and meaning is eternal (i. e. invariable).

‘The general meaning, having disappeared, does not remain in the particular (meaning). How could the acquired (general) meaning) be given up? And, having vanished, where could it remain?’ (VP 2.15).

Such and such an objection has been raised here (i. e. in the doctrine that different words together form a sentence). (97)

Having stated (it), generally, in this way, he connects this (with the matter) under discussion :

*śuddhe ca kāle vyākhyātam āmiśre na prasidhyati !
sādhutvam ayathākālam tat sūtreṇopadiśyate || 98||*

And the correctness (of the affix) explained in the pure (i. e. its particular own) time, does not hold good in a mingled (time). That (i. e. the correctness of the affix) in the time other than its own, is taught by the rule (*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*).

1. ‘*siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*’.

(*The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, ed. by F. Kielhorn, Vol. I. Bombay 1892 : p. 6, line 16.)

The affix (in the word) 'bhāvi' has been taught as correct in future time, unmingled with (past) time. When in connection with a past, it does not hold good (any more for the time which was intended first). Therefore, the correct prescription for the affix at a mingled time is obtained (through *sūtra* 3.4.1) (98)

If it makes no difference (whether the word 'bhāvi' is connected with the word 'āsīt', or the word 'āsīt' is connected with the word 'bhāvi'), why then does the past time of the word 'āsīt' not become correct (as referring to a future) when it is connected with future time as represented by the word 'bhāvi'? (In answer to this question) he states :

*ākhyātapadavācye 'rthe nirvartyatvāt pradhānatā |
viśeṣaṇam tadākṣepāt tatkāle vyavatiṣṭhate || 99||*

The (greater) importance (lies) in the meaning expressed by the verbal root (i. e. in the activity), because (this) must be accomplished. The qualifying word, being attracted by it, remains fixed in its (i. e. the activity's) time.

The past is taught for the future. So, the activity expressed by the root, possessing the nature of something to be accomplished, being the meaning of a sentence, indeed everywhere (becomes) the principal. But 'the instrumental in bringing about the activity' (*kāraṇa*), expressed by the noun, is of the accomplished nature (and is therefore) the secondary. And the secondaries follow the principal, but never does the principal follow the secondaries. So, the meaning expressed by the noun, attracted by the meaning expressed by the root for its own benefit, being secondary, follows its (i. e. of the meaning expressed by the root) time. And in this way, in accordance with the general rule (mentioned above), when there are the secondaries and the principal together in a sentence, the secondaries must follow the principal, as (their) mutual relation is not possible otherwise. Because the secondaries, for the favour of the principal, follow its (i. e. the principal's) time through the renunciation of their own time, the usages such as 'bhāvi (*kr̥tyam*) āsīt' (The future (function) existed) are established. (Therefore), no purpose (is served) with the

rule (*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*). The following is the gist : For, there is indeed distinguished mingling of the meanings of the words everywhere, when there is a relation among them. But it (i. e. the distinguished mingling) is not determined by itself without the use of some other word. For this reason it is said that a word remains in (its) general meaning and a sentence in the distinguished meaning. Certainly, there is neither the renunciation (of the general meaning) nor the acquirement (of the distinguished meaning). (99)

Thus, when the word is formed in (view of) a meaning which is to be conveyed, the formation is, right away (*prakrame*), done for the mingled meaning, too. For an affix is not debarred in its specific time when this (specific time) is inseparably connected with another time. Therefore, he states that, no purpose (is served) with an effort (i. e. with the rule '*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*') here :

saṃpratyayānukāro vā śabdavyāpāra eva vā |
adhyasyate viruddhe 'rthe na ca tena virudhyate || 100||

Either the image of the comprehension (of the sentence) or the operation of a word (characterised by expressing its meaning) is superimposed on the opposed meaning. Yet, (this latter) is not opposed thereby.

Here (i. e. in Grammar) meanings do not deviate from their true nature on account of a rule, and therefore correct understanding is not effected through merely teaching correctness (of an affix) for another time. Therefore the rule (*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*) is useless. But the appropriateness (of such expressions) is established, because there are secondary (elements) and one principal (element) making a connection possible, and because there is *one* sentence since (the secondary elements) comply with the time of the principal (element, i. e. the activity expressed by the verb). Or else, the affixes (retain) the time specifically enjoined for each of them even in connection with (words denoting other) times. Yet, (their) mutual connection (takes place) through superimposition. For example, the specific meaning of past time is conveyed by the word '*agniṣṭomayājīn*' (he who has already performed the

ceremony of *Agniṣṭoma*). In connection with the word '*janitr*' however, the particular image of a notion restricted to past time, is not applicable but transferred to, i. e. superimposed on, opposed time, namely future. This future time (implied by the word) '*janitr*' is, in view of the completion of the ceremony of *Agniṣṭoma* after the time of birth, at this very moment, perceived as past time. So, the following is the meaning : 'To him a son will be born who will perform the said *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice.' Or, the operation of the word '*agniṣṭomayājīn*', characterised by expressing its own meaning, is superimposed on future time. Because it is impossible to express through this (i. e. through the word '*agniṣṭomayājīn*'), the future meaning (i. e. a son who will perform the said *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice), the operation of it (i. e. the word '*agniṣṭomayājīn*') is future (i. e. in the future meaning). Thus, (the following) meaning results : 'To him a son will be born, who born and grown, will get the designation of *agniṣṭomayājīn*'. It has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini 3. 4. 1) : 'When (will he be designated like this) ?—(Then) when the said *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice will be performed by him'.¹ Hence in this way, through the image of the comprehension (of the sentence) or through the verbal operation, which is to be superimposed (on the opposed meaning), the meaning which is thought to be opposed, is not opposed. The meaning is that in this case there is no inconsistency in the mutual connection. (100)

He derives (i. e. corroborates) the same (statement) through an example :

*bhūtaṃ bhaviṣyad ity etau pratyayau vartamānatām |
atyajantau prapadyete viruddhāśrayarūpatām ||101||*

'(This is) past' (and 'this is) future' these comprehensions, obtain the form of opposed shelters, without leaving the state of present time.

1. Here again the quotation from the M. Bh. was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. The M. Bh. runs as follows :

“*kadā/yadānenāgniṣṭomenēṣṭam bhavati*!”

(The *Mahābhāṣya* (as under the footnote 1. on page 105) p. 168, 15-16)

Just as these comprehensions i. e. notions such as 'That thing (is) past; the other (one) is future' having arisen, though they by themselves possess the present time, bear the form of the past or future time opposed to their own time (i. e. the present time); in the same way, here (i. e. in the case of '*bhāvi kṛtyam āsīt*' and '*agniṣṭomayājy asya putro janitā*'), the superimposition (of the particular own time) on another time, without forsaking the particular own time, is proper. Thus, the desired connection (of the words in the sentence) is drawn from the meaning (of the sentence). Thus we have to understand the meaning of this *kārikā*). For the comprehensions possessing the forms of the past and future (times), without forsaking their own notion of the present time, determine their forms as the past and future. In this way, in the word '*agniṣṭomayājīn*' the image of the notion, without giving up its own time, obtains the form of (the element) by which it is supported, i. e. the object upon which it is superimposed, (namely) future time which is opposed (to it).

For, (a thing on which a certain other thing is) superimposed, does not forgo its own form, just as the '*gotva*' (the genus cow) on the '*bāhika*' (the native of the '*bāhika*' country). (101)

In connection with time, he now discusses the vicinity of the present time :

adhvano vartamānasya yaḥ śeṣo ya upakramah |
tad vartamānasāmīpyam śāstre bhedenā darśitam || 102||

That, which is the remainder and which is the commencement of the present time, has been shown distinctly in Grammar, as the vicinity of the present time.

It has been stated (in *kārikās* 89 and 90, above) that the series of actions uninterrupted until the accomplishment of the result is the present time. And the remainder of it (i. e. of the present time), which is characterised by a continued course of reminiscent impressions even after the completion (of the activity), is the vicinity of the present time connected with the past (time). And that, which is the commencement i. e. mental desire for (the state of) present time, is the second vicinity of the present time concerning the future (time). There (i. e. in the vicinity

nity of the present time), due to the invisibility of the physical operation, the affixes of the present tense are extended to the states of the past and future (times) inasmuch as the present time has no (fixed) limits (i. e. cannot be delimited with exactitude). Since 'vā' is used (in Pāṇini's *sūtra* 3. 3. 131 : *vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavad vā*), (and) since the affixes of the past and future tenses are enjoined in the (i.e. as an) alternative, this (vicinity of present time), being not present indeed, is treated as (a) different (tense, i. e. as the secondary present). Here too, like (in the) previous (case, i. e. like in the usages 'bhāvy āsīt' etc.), the formation of the word 'gacchāmi' etc. is formed for its own particular time, only. And for this reason the present time alone is understood. But, when another word is employed, (the present time) is superimposed on the time (denoted) by it (i. e. the other word). The affixes of the past and future tenses are justified because the word 'vā' is used (in *sūtra* 3. 3. 131, and) because the superimposed forms may be resorted to, optionally. Hence, there is no need for an effort (i. e. *sūtra* 3. 4. 1 : *dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ*, can be dispensed with). (102)

The 'expectation' (*āśamsā*) exhibiting the nature of a keen desire, is, because it is a specific notion, obviously present. How has it been said in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini 3. 3. 132) to possess future time? Having raised this doubt, he states:

āśamsā vartamānāpi viṣayeṇa bhaviṣyatā |
bhāṣye bhaviṣyatkāletī kāryārthaṃ vyapadiśyate || 103||

Expectation, though present, is, on account of (its) future object, referred to in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini 3. 3. 132) as possessing future time, for the purpose (of grammatical) operations.

Expectation, although being by nature a mental act and, (therefore), belonging to the present time, is, due to futurity of a desired object, designated as possessing future time, on account of the nature of the object. And therefore, it is correct to prescribe the (grammatical) operation, characterised by the affix of the past tense, for the future object. (103)

If the designation takes place on account of the nature of the object also, then (in the desiderative), due to the futurity of the desired (object), the desire, too, would be of future time. So (in the desiderative statement) '*cikīrṣati*' (= he desires to do), the affixes of the present tense should be prescribed there (i. e. in future time, to cover the future tense) through extended application ? Having raised this doubt, he states:

icchā cikīrṣatīty atra svakālam anurudhyate |
bhaviṣyati prakṛtyarthe tatkālam nānurudhyate || 104||

The desire, in (the desiderative statement) '*cikīrṣati*' (= he desires to do), adheres, here, to its own time. The meaning of the original base (i.e. '*kartum*' of the word *cikīrṣati*) is future (and the desire) does not adhere to its (i.e. original base's) time.

Here, in (the desiderative statement) *cikīrṣati* (= he desires to do), the desire, which is expressed by the root ending with (the desiderative affix) — *san*—, is the principal. The activity (expressed by the root) '*kr*' (in the original base '*kartum*'), being secondary, becomes the sphere of it (i. e. of the desire). The affix of the present (tense) is established (for the desiderative statement '*cikīrṣati*') because, according to the maxim 'The original base and the affix together express the meaning of the affix'¹, the desire expressed by the root ending with the desiderative affix is present and, therefore, must be followed by time; although the secondary (element) expressed by the root which is the base for the desiderative affix—*san*—, belongs to the future time. Inasmuch as the principal does not follow the secondary elements, the time expressed by the root '*kr*' which represents a secondary element, is disregarded. (104)

Why is there no regard for its own specific time, in the case of expectation, too ? Having raised this doubt, he states:

āśaṃsyamānatantratvād āśaṃsāyām viparyayaḥ |
prayoktrdharmaḥ śabdārthe śabdair evānuṣajyate ||105||

1. The *Mahābhāṣya* (as under the foot note 1, on p.—105) p. 58, line 11-12

In the (case of the) expectation (it is quite) reverse, because the expected (object) is the principal there. The (mental) state of the speaker is attached (i.e. attributed) to the meaning of the word through the *context* (lit. through the words) only.

Desire is the principal because it represents the meaning of the affix; expectation is different, because *this* (i.e. expectation) is not expressed by the affix. It is rather its object, that which is expected, which is denoted by the affix. For expectation is a (mental) state of the speaker, not the meaning of a word. For example: 'When the teacher comes, Grammar is studied'. Here, the expected coming of the teacher and the expected learning of the Grammar (which are) expressed by the affixes are essential i. e. principal. So, the consideration of their time alone is correct. But, this sentence is employed by a speaker who is expectant of these (objects). Thereby expectation is suggested. For the meaning of a word (is the) proper reason for (its) formation, how could the expectation (which is) a (mental) state of the speaker, (be) the reason for the word-formation? Having raised this doubt, it has been stated (in the *kārikā*):

'The (mental) state of the speaker is attached (i. e. attributed) to the meaning of the word through the *context* (lit. through the words) only'.

The (mental) state of the speaker is superimposed on the meaning of the word employed, through the sentence (i. e. through the context) alone. For, when it (i. e. the sentence) is enunciated, that (mental) state is suggested (to have arisen) in (the mind of) the speaker. And since it is suggested, it may be the reason for the formation of a word just as physical pain etc. (may be the reason for the formation of a word). For it has been discussed in the *Vākyapadīya* that Grammar is enjoined in (the expression of) mental states of men, too. This has been settled. (105)

Here (i. e. on Pāṇini's rule '*kṣipravacane lṛṭ*' 3.3. 133), the author of the *Vārttikas* frames his *Vārttika* as follows): 'For an unaccomplished (thing), due to (its) non-accomplishment, the expression of accomplishment must be taught.' It means, for the

unaccomplished (future) action, the affixes of the past tense must be taught. For example : 'If the god has rained, the grains have been produced.' (The word) 'unaccomplished' (*aniṣpanna*) (in the above-mentioned *Vārttika*) possesses the meaning 'similar to the accomplished one' (*niṣpannasadrśa*) through the negation connected with the noun (*paryudāsa*).¹ So, in the presence of a capable means, the expected production (of grains) is stated. Hence, the affixes of the past tense are not justified (i.e. not capable to express) mere future time (without any further condition). And even though the word 'aniṣpanna' has been used, the reason has (once more) been stated by the word 'aniṣpannatvāt' (due to (its) non-accomplishment). The meaning is: This statement should not be understood as a figurative expression. Here, the action is comprehended as being future only, not attended by the past state. So, the affix of the past tense must be taught. This is the meaning. That is why the propriety of the affix of the future tense alone has been stated in the (*Mahā-*) *bhāṣya* (on 3. 3. 133, with the following dictum) : 'One should say : *niṣpatsyante śālayaḥ* "The grains will be produced". The refutation of this (i.e. the *Vārttika* mentioned above, was effected by another *Vārttika* on the same *sūtra* which runs as follows): 'It is, however, established as correct by the fact that the future tense is rejected.' In case somebody says : 'If the god has rained, the grains will be produced' (*M. Bh.* on 3.3.133), it is observed in everyday conversation that the use of the form expressing futurity is rejected : 'Do not speak like this! Say : The grains have been produced' (*M. Bh.* on 3. 3. 133). The meaning of the *Vārttika* is : it is permitted (to use) affixes expressing the past tense, only.

Now he states the view of the *Vārttika*, how this does result :

apśālibījasamyoge vartate niṣpadir yadā |
tatrāvayavavṛttitvād bhaviṣyatpratiṣedhanam || 106||

1. "When the particle 'nañ' is connected with the last word in the compound, it is called "*paryudāsa*". When it is connected with the verb, it is called '*prasajyapratīṣedha*'. *prasajyapratīṣedho 'yaṁ kriyayā saha yatra nañ/*

paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottaraḥ padena nañ||"
 ('A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar' by K. V. Abhyankar, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1961 : see under *paryudāsa*).

When the verb '*niṣpad*' denotes the combination (or, connection) of water and seed, the future tense is rejected because it (i. e. the activity) represents there a component (operation, only).

Here, the meaning of the verb *niṣ-pad* is 'producing grain' when all necessary factors are at hand, and this is essential. When that (i. e. the aforesaid essential meaning) is superimposed on a mere component (of the main activity) namely on the bare combination of water and seed, then the meaning of the verb is past because as much as that is effected by rain alone, and hence the affixes of the past tense are established as correct. Inasmuch as the production of a combination of water and seed is no sphere for the affixes of the future tense, the rejection of the future tense is accurate. (106)

But when the meaning of the verb *niṣ-pad* is essential, how is then the (use of the) past time (justified) in this case ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*phalaprasavarūpe tu niṣpadau bhūtakālatā |
dharmāntareṣu tad rūpam adhyasya parikalpyate || 107||*

But when the verb *niṣ-pad* represents (the meaning) 'producing grain' the state of past time is admitted, after that form (i.e. the meaning 'producing grain') has been superimposed on (or, transferred to) the other qualities (i. e. component activities).

When the verb *niṣ-pad* denotes the meaning characterised by the accomplishment i. e. production of the effect (lit. fruit) to be accomplished in the presence of (all necessary) means, then this form of the production of the effect is superimposed on other activities (which) precede the production of the effect, depend on causes (and) gain importance through the combination of the seed and water. Because they are past, the production of the grain is (also) admitted (i.e. considered) as past. Thus, the affixes of the past tense (in future time) are established. (107)

He states the remedy (i. e. he establishes the correctness of the usage) by some other method :

*upayukte nimittānām vyāpāre phalasiddhaye /
tatra rūpaṃ yad adhyastam tatkālam tat pratiyate || 108||*

When the form of the causes (working) in the operation,—which (operation) is needful for the attainment of the result,—is superimposed there (i.e. on the result), the latter (i. e. the result) is comprehended as possessing their (i.e. the causes') time.

Because the effect can be produced by a complete set (of needful means) only, the secondary (lit. presupposing something else) productive causes are many. Their operation, i.e. their assistance in producing the result (produces),—when it is sufficient—, the future form of the result, and the form of the assistance of causes is superimposed there, i.e. on it (scil. on the future form of the result). Inasmuch as the operation of causes is past, it belongs to past time. And the result, having been identified with it (i.e. with the operation of causes), is determined as sharing its time, (in other words) as belonging to past time, too. Formerly (i. e. in *kārikā* 107), the superimposition of the effect on the operations, (i.e. the favour) of the causes (has been stated); but here, (the superimposition) of the favour of the causes on the effect (has been stated). This is the difference. The purpose of (emphasizing) the favour of the causes here is to prove their increased efficiency. And by this (*kārikā*), the second of the rejecting *Vārttikas* (serially fourth *Vārttika*, which rejects the serially second *Vārttika* on 3. 3. 133, mentioned on p. 131 above) has been clearly explained. (The *Vārttika* runs as follows) : 'Or, due to the consideration of the time of the causes'¹. The past time, which belongs to rain,—(which rain is) the cause (for accomplishing the result) —, is superimposed on the effect (i. e. the result). The word *pratiyate* 'is comprehended', serves the purpose to prove that there is no consideration of other causes. This is the meaning. In answer to the objection : 'When there is a production why then (i. e. at that very moment) do the grains not yield the effect of the produced (grains) ?', it has been stated (in

1. This *Vārttika* was wrongly cited in the Triv. ed. The *Vārttika* runs as follows : 'hetubhūtakālasamprekṣitatvād vā.'

(The *Mahābhāṣya* (as under the foot note 1, on p.—105) p. 160, 3)

the *Mahābhāṣya* on the *Vārttika* mentioned above = 'Or, due to.....': 'Something else is said now.'

If the production of the grains (means) to come into use (lit. performance of a purposeful action) (at that very moment), then even (the harvested grains which) are stored (for some time) in the granary (would be treated) as unproduced, because before they come into actual use of eating, they must be thrashed, (winnowed, milled) etc. (lit. in the purposeful action characterised by eating, there is dependence on thrashing etc.) (108)

He states that when (it is accepted that) the accomplishment (of the result) is dependent on mere achievement of the favour of a (particular) cause, then in due order, it is established that accomplishment (of the result) means accomplishment of the favour of a (particular) cause:

*niṣpattāṃ avadhiḥ kaś cit kaś cit prativivakṣitaḥ |
hetujanmavyapekṣātaḥ phalajanmeti cocyate || 109 ||*

In the accomplishment (of the result) sometimes this and sometimes that particular cause (lit. limit) is recommended (or, contested). And it is with regard to the accomplishment of (any particular) cause that the accomplishment of the result is spoken of.

Here someone thinks that the production of the grains is dependent upon the combination of the seed and water; some other (thinks that it is) dependent upon the succession of favourable circumstances resulting from the combination of the sun-heat (and the seed) etc. (taking place) after the combination (of the seed and water). Thus, the cause in production (of the grains) is unsettled. For thus one says in order to point out the different favour of (each) cause. And when the accomplishment of the result is spoken of on account of the accomplishment of such and such a cause, the operation of the other causes is minimized in order to magnify the favour belonging to the more principal cause. Or, because of the accomplishment of the cause characterised by the combination (of the seed) with sunshine etc., it is correct to speak of the result as past, inasmuch as this (accomplishment

of the cause) is past. And this reference (is) indeed dependent on favourable circumstances (*upacāra*), through considering the time of the cause; so this (i.e. the reference) does not result without superimposition. But if recourse be taken to the meaning of the verb *niṣpad* (maintaining that it denotes) a mere combination of water and seed, the former remedy (i.e. the establishment of the correctness of the affixes of the past tense in the usage '*saṃpannāḥ śālayaḥ*', in *kārikā* 106 above) may be used. In this (case) the meaning of (the verb) *niṣpad* is secondary. But the solution offered in *kārikās* 107 and 108 above, the essential meaning (i.e. the accomplishment of the result) of (the verb) *niṣpad* (has been resorted to) and both the cause and the effect have been identified through superimposition. Thus, the option (i.e. resorting to either the secondary meaning or the essential meaning of the verb *niṣpad* in order to establish the correctness of the usage '*saṃpannāḥ śālayaḥ*') has been demonstrated. (109)

If the effect is to be produced with the complete set of means (only), how could the production (of the effect) result when there is merely one of the means available? In order to discuss this objection he states:

abahissāadhanādhinā siddhir yatra vivakṣitā |
tat sādhanāntarābhāvāt siddham ity upadiśyate || 110||

When it is intended to specify a result not depending on external causes, it is, in the absence of other causes, called 'accomplished.'

When some internal cause is at hand and it is intended to specify the effect without regard to any other, exterior cause, different (from the internal cause), it (i.e. the effect) is almost real and called 'accomplished'. This is the common way of speaking in everyday life. And in Grammar, too, this rule is valid in conformity to the former, because Grammar follows the usage of words and meanings, as it is current in everyday life. And thus, the reference to the three times (i.e. the past, present and future) is established as correct here (i.e. in Grammar), in accordance with the desire to express (definite facts). (110)

He concludes :

*tasmād avadhibhedena siddhā mukhyaiva bhūtatā |
anāgatatvam astitvam hetudharmavyapekṣaṇe ||111||*

Therefore, the essential pastness alone has been established through the difference of the cause (lit. limit). Futurity and presence (become essential) when the operation (*dharma*) of (future and present) causes is taken into consideration.

The pastness (of the effect becomes) essential like (the pastness of the cause) through the difference of the cause (lit. the limit) in the production (of the effect), because the effect is superimposed here (i.e. on the cause) whichever it may be. For the effect, not past time, is superimposed on the cause. When the operation of some other cause is accepted for the production of a future effect, the futurity (lit. the state of not yet come) of the effect is considered as essential indeed. But, when the operation to produce an imminent effect is to be attributed to another cause, the state of present time (results) because the succession of operations forms a unity (i.e. a continuum) up to the limit (where the) result (is reached, and) on account of the fact that it (i. e. the succession of operations) exists although it consists of prior and posterior, existing and non-existing, parts. In this way, three modes of speaking are correct: 'The grains have been produced.'—'(The grains) will be produced.'—'(The grains) are produced.' This has been settled. (111)

The author of the *Vārttikas* has framed some other (*Vārttika* on Pāṇini 3. 3: 133, which runs as follows): 'With regard to (the verbs) denoting the meaning of existence, the affixes of all (tenses must be taught) in the meaning of the present tense due to the existence of the subject.' The '*tin*' affixes possessing the meaning of the past and future times must be taught in the meaning of the present tense i. e. in the (place of the) affix '*laṭ*' possessing the meaning of the present time. Because (otherwise) the affix '*laṭ*' alone would be (correct) in the (i. e. to denote) present time. The statement, 'due to the existence of the subject' combined with 'in the meaning of the present

tense' is to prove that the existence (of a well etc.) ascertained at the time of the employment (of the sentence), is based on the (verbal) expression, but indeed not (on its) real (existence). At the time of the employment (of sentences) such as 'A well existed.' '(A well) has existed.' '(A well) will exist.' '(A well) is to exist,' the 'well' (which is the) subject (here), is perceived ever undestroyed. This is the meaning. And so, the following explanatory (*Mahā-*) *bhāṣya* (on the *Vārttika* mentioned above) defines the existence (of the well) as the state of being at present perceived (by means of a mental process):

'A well was seen by him some time ago and he does not notice its disappearance.'¹

The following *Vārttika* (= 3. 3. 133, 6) rejects (the former *Vārttika*) : '(The expression) is, however, correct because (the personal endings of the several tenses) are employed according to their specific times.' This employment of the '*tin*' affixes (is made) in due order for their specific times, only; but not indeed for present time. So, there is no need of teaching (the affixes of all other tenses in the present tense). This is the meaning. To prove this, it has been stated (by the author of the *Vārttikas*): 'Due to the absence of any option' (= 3. 3. 133. 7). In the absence of option these expressions are used in their particular own time, only. Because, if their correctness were taught for the present, all personal-endings would occur there (i.e. in the present tense), alternately. But, (in reality), they do not occur so. Therefore, it has been stated (by the author of the *Vārttikas*) : 'And interchange is not established' (= 3. 3. 133. 8). It means something contrary is not established. For nobody states 'A well will exist', when it is desired to state 'A well existed.' Therefore, due to the absence of the optional employment (of different tenses) and because (different tenses) are employed (in their particular own time only) without inter-mingling, the employment of the '*tin*' affixes in their specific own times alone has been established. He states how is this possible according to the view of the *Vārttika* (— 3. 3. 133. 8):

1. Here again, the quotation from the *M. Bh.* was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. The *M. Bh.* runs as follows : '*kūpo'nena kadā cid dṛṣṭo na cāśya kaṁ cid apy apāyaṁ paśyati.*'

(The *M. Bh.* (as under the foot note 1. on p. 105) p. 160, line 14.)

*satām indriyasambandhāt saiva sattā viśiṣyate |
bhedena vyavahāro hi vastvantaranibandhanaḥ ||112||*

This very existence varies due to the contact of existing things with the organs (of sense and action). For the usage with discrimination (i.e. the usage of different tenses) is based upon (certain) other things (i.e. alien activities).

It has been already stated (in *kārikās* 7 to 23 above) that here (i.e. in this world) every practice with things (is done) by covering them with commingling alien activities. And consequently, this existence of a well, present here, becomes, once perceived, the cause for using a word. Because (the existence of the well) not perceived (by the organ of the eye) becomes similar to the non-existence (of the well); therefore, (the existence of the well), possessing the superimposition of the perception, comes (lit. descends) to the (verbal) reference. The contact of the sense objects with their (respective) sense organs is the cause of the perception. So, where on the way, the contact of a well (i.e. the sense-object) with the (sense-) organ (i.e. the eye) is imminent, the existence (of this well) is referred to as future. But, where it (i.e. the contact of the object, the well, with the sense-organ eye) took place, (the existence of the well is referred to) as past. But, where (the contact of the object, the well,) takes place (with the sense-organ eye) in the present time, (the existence of the well is referred to) as present. Hence, the modes of employing (personal endings) with reference to the three times have been established as correct although they (i.e. the modes) represent general as well as particular (statements). When the contact (of the object) with the organ is remote past, then, 'lañ' etc. (affixes) referring to the particular past (are prescribed). When (the contact of the object with the organ) is remote future (lit. to be coming), then, 'luṭ' etc. (affixes) referring to the particular future (are prescribed).¹ (112)

¹ This entire portion has been given in the Tri. ed. as belonging to *kārikā* 111. As a matter of fact, it should serve as introduction (*avatārikā*) to *kārikā* 112.

Pray, just as the affixes of the past and future (tenses) do not trespass on the sphere of the present (tense), in the same way, it (i. e. the affix of the present tense), too, should not trespass on the sphere of them (i. e. the sphere of the past and future tenses). Thus, the expression 'A well exists' would not be justified when contact with the sense organs is past or yet to come ? Having raised this doubt, he states :

*astitvaṃ vastumātrasya buddhyā tu parigrhyate |
yaḥ samāsādanād bhedaḥ sa tatra na vivakṣitaḥ ||113||*

The existence of a mere thing is ascertained by the intellect (and not by the sense-organs). There (i. e. in this case) it is not intended to express the difference (resulting) from the contact (of the objects with the organs of sense and action).

When (there is) no desire to express the difference characterised by the past and future (times, respectively) (which results) from contact or non-contact (of the object) with the organs (of sense and action), and when (the speaker) aims with (his) mind at a mere existing well (*kūpa*), it is possible to use, in a general way, (the statement) : 'A well exists.' This is the meaning. But, mutually contrasted particular (expressions, such as 'A well existed.' 'A well will exist.' etc.) are not inter-mingled. (113)

(Is the difference) of existence here perhaps (to be explained) by a superimposed difference? He states that the difference of existence is indeed real:

*yogād vā strītvapuṃstvābhyāṃ na kiṃ cid avatiṣṭhate |
svasminn ātmani tatrānyad bhūtaṃ bhāvi ca kathyate ||114||*

Or, due to (its) connection with masculinity (i.e. growth) or with femininity (i. e. destruction), nothing remains firm in its own self (without undergoing any change). There (i. e. under such circumstances, where a being either should grow or meet destruction), the past and the future are said to be different from each other.

The (*Mahā-*) *bhāṣya*, on the rule '*striyām*' (Pāṇini 4.1.3), runs as follows : 'For, here (i. e. in the world), nobody indeed remains

firm in his own self even for a moment; he either grows as long as he can or he meets destruction.¹ (The author) will state in the '*Lingasamuddēśa*' that rise (growth) is masculinity and fall (destruction) is femininity :

'Issue is production and destruction is annihilation (lit. coagulation = '*saṁstyāna*') (VP 3. 13. 27).

And in this way, (there is) contact of all beings with masculinity and femininity i.e. rise and fall which have perpetual function. So the use of the three times referring to different states (of beings) is proved to be real at every moment in the midst of beings which possess (simultaneously) a constantly alternating form (and) the form of an unvarying continuous series. And therefore, the past form, (where) the connection (between) the organ (of sense and action and its object) is no more, is indeed different (from) the future (form, where) the connection (between) the organ (of sense and action and its object) will take place. And (again, the present form, where the connection (between) the organ (of sense and action and its object) is taking place, (is) indeed different (from past as well as future forms). But the general form, ascertained as devoid of variations by the intellect, (is) to be expressed by the affix of the present tense (and) may correctly be referred to by the statement: 'It exists.' (114)

Thus the *Kālasamuddēśa*, (the) ninth (chapter of the *Prakīrṇa*-(ka) *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*), and the *Prakīrṇa*-(ka) *prakāśa* (a commentary on it) written by Helārāja, the son of Bhūtirāja, are finished.

1 This quotation from the *M. Bh.* was wrongly given in the Triv. ed. The *Mahābhāṣya* runs as follows: '*na hīha kaś cit svasminn ātmani muhūrtam apy avatiṣṭhate/ vardhate vā yāvad anena vardhitavyam apāyena vā yujyate/*' (The *Mahābhāṣya* (as under the footnote on p.—105) p. 198, line 8—9)

Corrections of the Sanskrit Text

(Trivandrum Edition)

The Trivandrum edition of the *Kālasamuddeśa* has been corrected by us in the following places:

Page and line	Read :
50, 14	<i>vibhudravayam</i>
54, 16	<i>kālaśaktim upāśritāḥ</i>
55, 16—18	<i>satyām, kāraṇeṣu phalavyaktiḥ kāryavyaktiḥ prajāyate </i> <i>‘svāśrayasyābhiniṣpattyai sā kriyāyāḥ prayojikā ’</i>
55, 19	<i>kāraṇānām</i>
56, 1	<i>vyāpārasya</i>
58, 14—15	<i>yaiḥ pravartitāḥ svakārye bhāvāḥ saṃsargibhiḥ saha-</i> <i>kāribhiḥ, sthityaṃśahetavas te</i>
59, 12	<i>tasyāpi bhede ’syānuvṛtteḥ </i>
63, 2—3	<i>mukhyo vartamāna ekaḥ </i>
63, 3	<i>vartamānasāmīpye vartamānavad vā</i>
63, 5—6	<i>evam anantarabhedatvāt kriyābhedāḥ, kriyābhedād</i> <i>bhūtādibheda uktaḥ </i>
63, 10	<i>kriyayā nivartitāḥ padārthā atītā iti bhāṇyante,</i> <i>atītasvarūpāḥ </i>
63, 13	<i>smārtam</i>
63, 15—16	<i>ghaṭa ityādivyavahāraḥ </i>
64, 10	<i>nimajjanonmajjanaṃ paurvāparyalakṣaṇam</i>
64, 22	<i>pravibhaktāḥ kṛttikādinakṣatrasaṃjñāḥ</i>
64, 24	<i>anvākhyāyate</i>
64, 26	<i>svābhāvikam hy arthābhidhānam</i>
65, 14	<i>gharmārtagajakampitaḥ </i>
68, 8	<i>svāśaktimāhātmyād bhāvabhedeṣu</i>
68, 14	<i>varaṇakam eva</i>
68, 20	<i>atītādhvavartino ’pi</i>
68, 22—23	<i>sāṃkhyānām ayam abhyupagamaḥ </i>

69, 6	<i>sāṃpratikatvam</i>
69, 6—7	<i>tadavyatirikto</i>
69, 7	<i>vartamānatvāc cānantarām apy atītatām</i>
69, 8	<i>tadavyatirikto</i>
69, 21	<i>svarūpamātrajuṣām</i>
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71, 1	<i>bhāvebhyo 'vyatirikta eva</i>
71, 28	<i>na dharmī</i>
72, 5	<i>śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam</i>
72, 9	<i>°palambham</i>
72, 9	<i>pratibadhnatī</i>
72, 18—19	<i>jīva eva kālas tasyaiva kramāvabhāsāt </i> <i>sa hi yathātattvaṃ arthān</i>
73, 7—8	<i>sarvasyaiva satyatayā tattvavyavasthānupapatter</i> <i>ity atra atātparyārthaḥ </i>
73, 11	<i>ciram idaṃ kṛtam</i>
74, 6	<i>kālabhedāvadhāraṇam </i>
74, 22	<i>cāvivekā</i>
75, 6	<i>padavākyaviśaye 'py avilakṣaṇo' bhi</i>
80, 22	<i>prayoktum ity atah santi kālavibhāgāḥ '</i>
80, 24	<i>'nāvaśyaṃ prayogād eva' iti </i>
82, 4	<i>sakramaḥ</i>
82, 14	<i>nissamśaye</i>
82, 15—16	<i>hasati vā jalpati vā pānīyaṃ vā pibati'</i>
83, 17	<i>dadhyupasecanādibhir anyair bhede </i>
83, 20	<i>ādikarmaṇi, 'nyāyyātv ādyapavargāt' (Vārttika</i> <i>3. 2. 102)</i>
84, 21	<i>yathopalabdhi smaraṇam</i>
86, 4	<i>tat samīkṣya prayuñjīta</i>
86, 14	<i>jñānātmani</i>
86, 18—19	<i>buddhirūpatayādhyavasāyāt</i>
86, 26—27	<i>śakaṭāparyābhavanalakṣaṇāyāḥ</i>
87, 8	<i>paryābhaviṣyad ity aparyābhavanasya</i>
87, 10	<i>aparyābhavanavirodinaḥ</i>
87, 12	<i>śakaṭāparyābhavanasya</i>
91, 19	<i>'kadā yadānenāgniṣṭomeneṣṭam bhavati '</i>
93, 26	<i>anāgatarūpeṇaivānupacaritātītāvasthena</i>
95, 4—5	<i>'hetubhūtakālasamprekṣitatvād vā' iti</i>
95, 8	<i>'anyad idānīm etad ucyate 'iti </i>
96, 17	<i>bhavantyā laḍvibhakter arthe</i>

Page and line	Read:
96, 22	<i>'kūpo'nena kadā cid dṛṣṭaḥ/na cāsya kaṃ cid apy apāyaṃ paśyati /'iti</i>
98, 1—2	<i>'na hīha kaś cid api svasminn ātmani muhūrtam apy avatiṣṭhate / vardhate vā yāvad anena vardhitavyam apāyena vā yujyate /'</i>
98, 4	<i>saṃstyānam</i>

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Index of Terms with varying Meanings

Numbers refer to the *kārikās* of the *Kālasamuddeśa*

<i>adhvan</i>	course 52. 61; space 47; time 102
<i>antarāla</i>	intermediary 82; middle 84; midst (of the ear) 67
<i>artha</i>	action 31; meaning 94. 95. 97. 99. 100. 104. 105; object 27; purpose 57. 103
<i>avadhi</i>	cause 109. 111; limit 68; time 92
<i>ātman</i>	as being (lit. its own) 89; being 11. 33; eternal 66; intellect 90; real essence 7; self 6. 25. 26; soul 12.34. 71.80; sphere 69; state 3; true 36
<i>ekatā, ekatva</i>	identical 18; inter-mingling 61; unity 88
<i>kārya</i>	effect 89; (grammatical) operation 103
<i>kriyā</i>	activity 1. 16. 27. 28. 29. 32. 37. 48. 77.78. 81.82. 83. 84. 90. 91. 92; functioning (time) 33; (purposeful) action 23
<i>gati</i>	course 28; going 74; motion 42; movement 43; notion 95; situation 94
<i>darśana</i>	doctrine 62; visibility 49. 55. 61
<i>dharma</i>	activity 6. 11. 33; external aspect 54; (mental) state 105; operation 111; quality 89. 107
<i>nimitta</i>	cause 65, 108; instrumental cause 3; motive 93
<i>parimāṇa</i>	dividing factor 1; measure (of time) 77; quantity (of time) 66
<i>pravṛtti</i>	action 82; motion 14
<i>bhāva</i>	activity 59; being 39. 49. 50. 52. 56. 59. 72. element 23. 25. 35
<i>bhūta</i>	element 43; existed 79; past 37. 38. 79. 85.91. 95. 101. 107. 114
<i>mātrā</i>	mora (= quantity of a short vowel) 66; property (i.e. state) 41, 74; subtle element 44
<i>vṛtti</i>	course 30.44. 45. 71; course of action 17.23.26; functioning 9; operation 15
<i>vyāpāra</i>	activity 1. 12. 92; operation 12. 81. 100. 101
<i>śabda</i>	context 105; (secondary) sound 67; sound 65. 66; word 100. 105
<i>siddha</i>	accomplished 110; established 48
<i>siddhi</i>	attainment 108; result 110
<i>sattva</i>	being 60; existence 60